

Marine Corps Gazette



NOVEMBER 1961
FIFTY CENTS

The Reds: Order of Battle

(See map facing page)

Soviet Armed Forces: total 3-3,200,000 supporting army of 160 divisions (130 full strength), a navy of 500 submarines and 2,325 other units, and air force of 18,500 operational planes; of this force: about 100 divisions, 140 submarines, 6 cruisers, 70 destroyers and auxiliary ships, and 13,500 operational aircraft are stationed in European Russia and satellite countries.

Poland: 220,000 troops in 15 divisions. Breakdown: 5 armor divisions (1 Soviet), 9 armored infantry divisions, 1 mechanized division (Soviet). Operational air force of 1,550 planes (400 Soviet).

Czechoslovakia: 180,000 troops in 14 divisions. Breakdown: 2 armor divisions, 12 motorized infantry divisions. Operational air force of 850 planes.

E. Germany: 110,000 troops in 6 divisions. Breakdown: 12 armor divisions (10 Soviet), 14 armored infantry divisions (10 Soviet). Operational air force of 1,250 planes (99 Soviet).

The Ministry of National Defense run by General Karl Heinz Hoffman controls E. Germany's armed forces. These consist of:

► **National Volksarmee** or People's Army: Fifth Army commanded by Generalmajor Beck, hqs Neubrandenburg Third Army commanded by Generalmajor Kunath, hqs Leipzig. Items:

- Each Army comprises 2 motorized infantry divisions and 1 armor division plus separate artillery, AA, communications, pioneer, motor transport and chemical units.

- Armament includes JS-1, 2, 3, T-34 and T-54 tanks, 122-152 mm howitzers, 85 mm AT guns, 107 mm recoilless gun RG-107, 37-57-85 mm AA guns, 82-120-160 mm mortars. Heavy infantry weapons include Degtyarew and Goryunow type heavy machine guns. Rifles largely replaced by submachine guns and automatic rifles such as the Simonow semi-automatic SKS carbine and the Kalashnikow AK machine gun. 9 mm Makarow pistol recently introduced.

- Training and operations conform to Soviet pattern, involve gas and atomic-defense and, more recently, tactical atomic offensive situations. Training is long and hard. Desirable age of recruit is 19 years. Tour is two years but lack of volunteers allegedly has forced recent conscription measures.

- Training is carried out in 22 known areas and is augmented by 12 service schools. Officers in rank of captain and up attend long (2-5 year) courses in Soviet academies.

► **E. German Navy** commanded by Admiral Ehm, former CPO and veteran Communist. Hqs at Rostock commands 7 flotillas with major bases at Warnemünde, Sassnitz and Peenemünde. 150 total units including 3 DEs.

► **E. German Air Force** commanded by LtGen Heinz Kessler. Hqs at Strausberg-Eggersdorf and Cottbus. AF is divided into Air Forces and Air Defense Forces. Air Forces comprise 2 fighter divisions, total 370 planes including 150 MIG-17s and 30 MIG-Umig-15s. Some MIG-19 jet fighters recently received. Air Defense Forces comprise 1 AA Division

and 2 radar battalions. Some 180 mm AA guns recently received.

The Ministry of Interior run by LtGen Karl Maron controls E. Germany's para-military forces. Numbering around 900,000, these consist of:

► **Bereitschaftspolizei** or Security Alert Police or Storm-Troopers: 30,000 troops commanded by Colonel Klaus Manfeld, Hqs Berlin. Considered the most reliable force in E. Germany. Major mission: to quell political disturbances. Items:

- Divided into 10 regiments of about 1,500 men each plus a Guard Regiment Berlin of 4 battalions and 1 "Combat Battalion Berlin."

- Uses standard infantry weapons including TT-33 pistol, 41 machine pistol, K-44 carbine, light and heavy machine guns, AT guns, light and heavy mortars, armored cars, APCs, T-34 tanks and mobile water throwers.


► **Allgemeine Volkspolizei** or People's Police or *Vopos*: about 78,000 commanded by MajGen Hans Hugo Winkelmann. Administered by 14 district hqs. Trained as infantry, then police. Armament includes standard infantry weapons including light and heavy machine guns.

► **Deutsche Grenzpolizei** or Border Security Police: 45-50,000 commanded by Colonel Peter, hqs at Pätz. Comprises 8 brigades of 25 border regiments: 15 of these deployed along western frontier, 3 along Baltic coast, 3 around Berlin, 2 along Oder-Neisse Line, 2 along Czech border; armament includes standard infantry light and heavy weapons, armored cars, APCs, T-34 tanks and 76 mm SP guns.

► **Kampfgruppen der SED** or SED Militia or Worker's Battle-Groups: 300-350,000 administered in 102 man companies and in action commanded by People's Police. Individual training requires 33 weeks in such subjects as basic weapons through light machine guns, field infantry, street fighting and night attack tactics. Heavier weapons such as AT guns and mortars are controlled by the parent People's Police unit.

► **Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik** or GST or Sports and Technology Association: about 400,000 including 15% women and girls. An independent state organization that receives technical instruction from the Ministry of National Defense. Administered by a Congress through a Central Committee Secretariat whose First Secretary is the real boss. This is Richard Staimer, who as General Hoffman commanded the XIth International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. Hqs at Neuenhagen near Berlin;

GST operates on the territorial-factory principle. Members receive training in shooting, cross-country runs, flying, parachute jumping, car driving, motorcycle riding, sailing, signalling and other activities. "General training" compulsory. This requires 4 months, 80 off-duty hours in field and weapon training, drill, sports, map reading, nuclear strike reporting and first aid. Weapons training in carbine, machine pistol, pistol and machine gun. Exercises have been conducted with other para-military units and with the National Army.



CRISIS, Contd

groups" (30,000), and a large number of GST (Sports and Technology Association) units.

Within a radius of 30 miles the People's Army maintained an armor division, four separate regiments (border, reconnaissance, pioneer and AA), and a motor transport battalion—about 14,000 troops in 10 garrisons. In addition: three regiments of well-trained Storm Troopers, or about 4,000 troops, 45 tanks and 108 armored cars in three garrisons; four regiments of Border Police or about 5,000 troops, 60 tanks and 184 armored cars in 16 garrisons; assorted "battle-groups" and GST units.

Since 13 August units of People's Army have been garrisoned in Berlin—they put up the wall. They and their para-military chums are trained and equipped to fight, but their morale varies. Over 100 Vopos have escaped to W. Berlin during past few weeks. The 1953 riots make the highly-touted "battle-groups" a doubtful quantity. Western estimates of People's Army are not high—loyalty is doubted even by the Soviets.

The back-up: the combined forces of US, Britain, France, and W. Germany stand ready to fight. Major ground strength in Germany is US Seventh Army of five highly-mobile, atomic-equipped, well-trained divisions, seven brigades of British Army of the Rhine, W. Germany's eight new but good divisions and elements of French First Army. Add to this numerically inferior but excellent air forces, short and medium range missile units, Polaris units, the massive power of SAC and ICBMs.

Enemy ground strength of 20 Soviet and six E. German divisions in East Germany is massive. From a reliable European intelligence report: "The collection of Soviet and satellite troops in E. Germany represents the greatest troop concentration in the world."

Add to it another 15 divisions in Poland, 14 divisions in Czechoslovakia. Soviet divisions in Poland reported on their way to E. Germany and Gomulka, Poland's boss, muttering about Polish mobilization. E. German (See Crisis, page 4)

THE RING AROUND RUSSIA—



IN THE "FIRST WAVE" against Russia, formidable U.S. forces would strike from every corner of the globe—

From 80 bases in the U.S. and overseas: More than half of SAC's 1,700 bombers, firing H-bombs and Hound Dog missiles.

From dozens of bases at Russia's borders: More than

one third of the Air Force's 2,000 fighter-bombers, and nuclear payloads.

From England and Italy: 40 Thor and Skybolt missiles, each able to destroy a city.

From Navy carriers at sea: Half of the fleet's 1,500 attack planes, including heavy attack bombers, attack transports.

From under the seas: Three of the Navy's 5 Polaris submarines—a total of 48 city-busting missiles—the status of only one line.

From the U.S.: 39 command spanning Atlas missiles now operational at 4 bases, all with great targets.

From other bases and states: Matador, Mace and Regulus nuclear missiles, by the score, able to reach almost Soviet borders.

IN THE "SECOND WAVE" and other attacks, the rest of the vast U.S. arsenal could be turned to Soviet targets.



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It is the U. S., . . . and not Russia, that would deal from real power if a military showdown came today.

These are the hard facts that Khrushchev sees, as he looks around today's world:

- In the U. S. hands is the greatest array of firepower ever accumulated by man—35,000 to 40,000 nuclear bombs and warheads with explosive force equal to 35 billion tons of TNT. That's 10 tons for every person on earth.

- To deliver these weapons, if needed, the U. S. has surrounded Russia with hundreds of bomber bases, missile sites, Polaris submarine rockets and aircraft carriers equipped for swift retaliation.

- . . . America's 15 attack aircraft carriers, many always on station near Russia, support Navy planes that alone outnumber the heavy bombers of the Soviet Union.

- . . . 80 Polaris missiles are now operational and cocked for action aboard nuclear submarines ranging off Russia's shores.

That's Navy power alone. Add the Strategic Air Command of the Air Force with 1,700 medium and heavy bombers. Add 2,000 fighter-bombers of the Air Force at bases near Russia. Then take Atlas missiles in the U. S., Thor and Jupiter missiles in England and Italy. Add also more than 500 Matador, Mace and Regulus nuclear missiles not far from Russia.

CRISIS, Contd

forces backed by 1,270 operational aircraft (900 Soviet), a large missile complex and, of course, the immense Soviet home air force.


The outlook: at the worst, all-out thermonuclear war in this way: Russia signs separate treaty with E. Germany which closes air-road-canal access to W. Berlin. Allied forces, Berlin, now besieged. Allies force E. German border aimed for W. Berlin. E. Germany either shoots first or offers passive resistance and forces West to shoot first. The West, if forced, shoots first. If West proves too strong the Russians back E. Germans. If West is pushed back they employ tactical atomic weapons. If Russians pushed back they em-

ploy same. Meanwhile air war over access corridors being pursued. This could escalate to all-out war, mutual suicide.

Will this happen?: not likely. Nuclear parity with balance definitely in West's favor makes all-out war as unattractive to Russia as to the West. Both sides showing increased preference for solution by negotiation. Major Western problem is to stay flexible while staying in West Berlin.

Both sides seem to be playing it cool, no panic.

Army: 40,000 troops sent to Europe; four regular divisions alerted for transfer to Europe; several National Guard and Reserve units mobilized; two Na-



Red Rockets and Missiles in Europe

This map was compiled by MOD Bonn (Germany) Press Section from information and reports contained in domestic and foreign newspapers and periodicals.

tional Guard divisions called up; two more alerted; 4,000 reserve officers extended for one year; 84,000 short-timers extended for 4 months; 4,500 new ROTC officers assigned to 2-yr. tours; 25,000 draft in September, 20,000 in October.

Air Force: 28,000 specialist officers and men extended for 1 year; 28,000 Air Reserve and National Guard alerted; tactical fighter strength in Europe reinforced.

Navy: 2,000 officers and 24,000 enlisted extended; ships plucked from mothball fleet include 22 amphibious vessels.

Cost of these measures is high and economic disruption is a Soviet gain, but America and the West also have gained:

► By fomenting the Berlin crisis and by resuming nuclear weapon tests Khrushchev again has displayed his aggressive intentions to the world. Though reaction of "unaligned" countries disappointed the West, the intellectual minority running these countries can scarcely hold any illusions regarding Russia's attitude vis-à-vis peace.

► Unrest in Poland and the Ukraine over Berlin and the resumption of nuclear tests has forced Khrushchev to look toward his own public opinion—for example, to declare (at Stalingrad in September) that he would definitely negotiate to settle the Berlin crisis. More recently he has offered specific points of negotiation in talks with Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak and

former French Premier Paul Reynaud.

► America's reaction is the biggest shock to the Kremlin since the Berlin airlift. This decadent Western democracy would refuse to fight over Berlin, or so the Russian ambassador in Washington reported. As late as late August Khrushchev seemed unimpressed at American mobilization measures. America's willingness to fight is now so obvious that the White House reportedly is worried about public opinion intruding on the delicate question of future negotiation.

► America's determination to hold firm has infused the Western alliance with new spirit, has re-created American leadership in NATO. To date US-British-French solidarity in the crisis leaves little to be desired.

Marine Corps involvement: undoubtedly FMFLant figures in some of the Pentagon's 50-plus contingency plans for Berlin. Operations more likely remote from Berlin or W. Germany. With the eggs of Berlin breaking on the stage floor, performer Khrushchev may turn to a favorite Russian trick: shift eyes of audience to new and better aggression while tidying up present mess. Strong possibilities are Iran, Laos, and South Vietnam.

In a word: America and West have refused to buy the most recent Soviet blackmail attempt. We will negotiate if possible—but we will negotiate through strength, not weakness, not even fear.

Marines at Work

Why—after completing 186 years of practice—were Marines at work last month polishing up the amphibious art?

For an answer, listen to GAZETTE special correspondent John Neubauer's special report from PHIBLEX 3-61:

Place: Vieques. Time: October. Characters:

14 MEU (Col E. J. Doyle) consisting of—

ProvMAG-40 (HMR-263, VMA-224)

BLT 1/2 (LtCol R. E. Bristow)

LogSptGru (Dets, ForTrpsLant, 2dSerBn)

PHIBRON-8 (Capt W. S. Kirkpatrick, Jr., USN) starring *USS Valley Forge* making first appearance as LPH.



Marines in Vieques grass

► Problem: Antennas for control of boats and of air too close together in ship design. Result: Garbled word, delay of H-Hr on R-Day by 5 min. Solution: Antenna can't be moved, so spread frequencies further apart. Worked.

► Problem: Green ship's crew made minor goofs as when one guide mistook port for starboard. Solution: Hold two rehearsals.

► Problem: Dual rehearsal plus three-hour standby at GQ tired troops. Solution: Take off packs, hold off donning life jackets until reaching deck.

► Problem: Maximum buildup ashore. Solution: Gas helos with rotors still turning, save turn-around time.

► Problem: Realistic training. Solution: Use of blank ammo, 2dForRecon Co (Maj D. M. Twomey) in guerrilla-type aggressor role. And the terrain added to the realism, Correspondent Neubauer reported, with "head-high grass, heavy humidity, soaring temperatures, and infernal mosquitoes."

But, as they have for 186 years now, such beach parties in unlikely spots added their lessons to the assembled know-how that spells out a true amphibious force-in-readiness.

Elsewhere, other equally hard-working Marines carried on without benefit of a GAZETTE observer. From East to West.

29 Palms—2-18 October DESFEX (SANDSTORM) involving RLT-1 (Col C. T. Hodges) HMR(L)-263, HMR(L)-462 and supported by VMA-121, part of MASS-3, and a newcomer—VMGR-352. The transport squadron used GV to lift 3/1 and 1/5 to the desert, was scheduled to carry 2/1 and 3/7 back. How'd it work? In 21 sorties (9 hours flight time) the big refueler-transport lifted 1,651 combat equipped Marines and 20 tons of cargo, including two M113 tractors.

China Lake—Lt D. S. Shelor of VMA-211 hit the V-ring in a simulated special weapons delivery. His practice bomb hit a 3-inch brass triangulation marker—first such super bullseye in an estimated 200,000 tries on that range.

Yuma—Regular MACS-1 hosted Reserve friends MACS-16 (Minneapolis) for two weeks realistic training.

El Toro—Looking for the PX? Look again. They sell toothpaste at the MX. PX-1 was a late Sept exercise for Wing personnel and administrative files. Repeats are planned.

Okinawa—Farthest west, but not least, 10-24 Oct Exercise WARMUP, a major brigade readiness exercise. 9th MEB (Col R. E. Carey) was set to land RLT-9 over KIN beaches, fight in a guerrilla environment, supported by MAG-16. Joining in, the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force (2/3 and HMR (L)-362) was to land by chopper, seize, and operate from KUSHICHIN airfield. 3/3 was to then defend airfield operations against guerrilla probes. Scheduled as added phases for the last three days: a 3dMarDiv CPX and a Force Logistic Support Exercise (LOGEX). CPX remains ashore, LOGEX reuses shipping to load seldom-landed service and support units over KIN beaches, ferry them around to east side of island at OURA-WAN beaches. Supporting LPH: Faithful "USS Futema."

New ResO Training

Director, MCR has announced largest, best-balanced school training plan yet for ground reserve officers. About 1,400 quotas are available for both OF and professional type courses.

New policies:

- You can apply any time, late applications are welcome.

- However, applications on hand will be sorted, selected 90 days in advance of course date (45 days if course convenes before Apr 62). Thereafter, it's "space available."

- After four years, you may repeat most senior professional course normally open.

- After four years, you may repeat OF courses, IF you've finished all other available training.

Offered in OF training for first time is a special infantry operations course (11 Jun '62 by 1stMarDiv) with one week patrolling, one week anti-guerrilla war. Other new courses:

Mountain leadership training, air transportability planning, artillery refresher, engineer refresher (USMC-type), tracked vehicle course, supply refresher, brigade level amphibious staff planning.

Aviation reserves can apply for most of the professional courses listed (See *Reserve Marine* for complete data). Avn OF courses will be announced in about two months.

Better VolRes Training

DivRes planners are delighted with one aspect of the pilot-model once-weekly school for Volunteer Reserve officers now in session in New York City. It's attracting new blood—the younger officers with no previous Reserve training. Ten Reserve officers get 24-drill pay status as instructors to teach 27 students equivalent of Junior Course. Course takes a year, part-time. If successful it could show the way to improve training for some 4,000 Reserves if they live in or near bigish cities. This would give better chance at annual quotas (500 for Res Jr & Sr Courses) at Quantico to outlanders.

Troop Test, Phase I

Will HQMC adopt new combat and combat support T/Os recommended by Quantico as a result of FMF Phase I Troop Tests?

A high-powered board headed by BGen H. C. Tschirgi (G-4) has been directed to report by 15 Nov its recommendations on how to achieve test objectives. Members are BGen H. W. Buse, Jr. (G-3), BGen B. A. Hochmuth (R&D), and Col K. B. McCutcheon (DirAvn). LtCol R. H. Jeschke, Jr., is recorder.

Money & Marines: The Joint Account

Last month's resume of what Congress gave the Commandant to run the Corps this year did not cover Marine Aviation.

DivAv's money comes out of joint checking account, carried in the name of BuWeps. As with other joint accounts, family discussions do occur. And as with other joint accounts, both parties strongly influence what the other buys. These are some highlights of what the account and the discussions look like now (in millions of dollars):

Aircraft Procurement	\$250*
Associated missile procurement	\$ 30*
"Section M" equipment	\$ 8.5
Other Procurement, Navy	\$ 8.0
TOTAL	\$296.5

*Estimate. Of Navy appropriations for a/c, missiles, ordnance (\$2 billion plus this year) about 30% of buy normally goes to Marine squadrons.

What will this buy—and when?

- Aircraft lead time runs a normal 18 months, with complete design to delivery averaging eight years. GV's now being delivered come from FY 1961 money. Big new items will be the HRB-1 helicopter, (Boeing contract issued: \$8.7 million), the F4H, the ASH (Assault Support Helicopter—no contract yet), the F8U-2N, and A4D-5. Not included: the A2F-1, although Navy squadrons get some. Missiles are equally complex to build.

- Marine "Section M" kitty (expeditionary vehicles, support equipment, engineer items) normally runs \$1 million. Big jump this year is partly due to rough-terrain environment of SATS, partly a delayed modernization. Included (and all to be delivered by Jun '62) are:

- About 400 3/4-T 4x4x commercial pickups.
- Better, higher capacity, but smaller LOX (Liquid Oxygen) generator sets.
- "Pneuma-Tractors" (w/compressors).
- Rough-terrain materials handlers, including 3,000 and 6,000 pound forklifts and 3-T cranes.
- About 150 2 1/2-T M35 cargo trucks.

The \$8 million from Other Procurement, Navy, will buy a large chunk of matting for the Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) program. This will generally double present aviation expeditionary capability.

... Speaking of SATS

Test Site No. 1 (Bogue Field, N.C.) has been completed. 2dMAW completed 245 landings the first morning (2,046 by press time). Coming up: a better workout 2 Nov when 2dMarDiv and 2dMAW host students of both National War College and Armed Forces Staff College.

Test site No. 2 (MCAS, Quantico) is now being graded by friendly Sea-Bees. Site No. 3 (29 Palms) has been selected, won't be done until June. It's about five miles from MCB, should leave some space for artillery firing.

Stabilized Output

Marine Corps expected to reach 190,000 strength by end of year "without calling reserves and without forbidding retirements." Will influx of recruits (from accelerated boot camp) allow phased, or controlled, input to stabilize more units?

It's not that simple. It's no use buying a Cadillac if you can't afford the upkeep. Main problem is that in 1962 (FY '63) many enlistments end. New blood will about balance the losses, leave little extra.

There's another problem. In units not now stabilized, technical requirements are high, require experienced hands. You can't get them from boot camp. To get and keep them for a stabilized cycle will require billet evaluation to allow for normal promotions, changes to T/Os. Note that an extremely technical aircraft squadron gets stability by forming and training for a tour, deactivating at the end. That's not planned for ground units, but shows how skill-short MarAvn must rob Peter to pay Paul.

What can you do to help? Emphasize reenlisting good Marines.

Weapons Fronts

The XM-70, automatic-firing, 115mm boosted rocket launcher, got a hard look from DoD. It survived. Prototype models will be completed for limited service test. Better yet, emphasis will be added to boosted rocket program. Aim is to develop a model that can use large stocks of conventional 105mm how ammo, also a larger caliber weapon. The automatic firing principle is considered as important as the range boost.

Slippage of M73C vehicle-mounted 7.62mm machine gun continues. There are minor problems with gun, mount, and ammo. These could set back delivery to FMFLANT units as much as a year.

Figures on M-14 rifle scores by Basic School classes last month were correct, but there's a small joker. Some students swapped weapons, looking for pieces with a tighter group.

See October *American Rifleman* for a good run-down on M-14 production problems. Report points out great outcry in 1940 that M-1 could not be mass produced, was not accurate. Springfield later turned out 5,000 a day, also was able to match-condition M-1 in less time than '03 took. Also note that M-14 is more than a rifle, it's almost a light machine gun. One fired 3,080 rounds at 60 rounds per minute. Reason for quitting: pre-ignition of ammo, not the "rifle." Even so, the price (\$95) is less than that of a good sporting rifle.

Breaking Language Barrier

On the horizon is a solution to part of the language training problem: highly qualified and specially trained reserve teams. Test program (Russian) is underway. It works like this:

Five volunteer enlisted Reserves (college students and graduates readily available) are screened and selected. In one year they get boot camp, ITR, and special language training. They must join Organized Reserve unit as a team, then specialize in military skills (interrogator, translator), on a 48-drill basis.

Challenging the Peace Corps in a minor way, planners are thinking of making 30-day Annual Field Training (AFT) for language reserves involve a visit to a country speaking their language specialty.

Please turn to page 68 for more news about Marines.

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In Mercury Control Center room at Cape Canaveral, designed under supervision of Bell Telephone Laboratories, NASA flight controllers make all vital decisions concerning a Mercury mission. Large map displays equipment status at tracking and communications sites, preferred recovery areas, the position of the capsule and its "immediate impact point."

Bell System manages building of global communications network for Mercury spacecraft

On September 13, National Aeronautics and Space Administration first achieved the orbital flight of an unmanned Mercury spacecraft, using a new world-wide communications and tracking network.

Soon, will come manned orbital flight.

The Bell System has played a large role in the development of this scientific project.

Western Electric headed an industrial team on which Bell Telephone Laboratories also played an important part in building the world-wide network of tracking and monitoring stations.

This 60,000-mile communications route, the bulk

of which is teletypewriter and telephone circuits, ties together 17 tracking and instrumentation sites with the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Md., and the Cape Canaveral Mercury Control Center.

As a Mercury capsule orbits over the area covered by each site, the far-reaching communications network immediately begins feeding information received from the capsule with clockwork precision. So fast and efficient is this communications system, it takes only seconds for data to start flowing from any site through Goddard to Canaveral!

The Bell System is proud to have contributed its creativity and resources to this vital project and to the further advancement of global communications.



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TD or Not TD

► Proposed G/S Artillery Battery (FMF 1965: Sep '61) lists four TD-18 tractors. If this is correct then Artillery Regiment would rate 21, more than present Pioneer or proposed Engineer Battalion rate, which is 19. Typographical error?

I would like to offer two suggestions re bulldozers in artillery units. First some background:

- Tractors are used primarily for a few hours digging in guns, control centers, ammo dumps. Then they sit idle.

- When moving to new position low speed of tractors is a handicap.

- Tractors are considered MT items; as such usually lack trained Marines to operate and maintain.

My first suggestion is to get Artillery out of the tractor business. Let them call on tractor help from supporting engineers, as needed. This would better use Marines and machines. It would reduce division T/E by many tractors; if necessary EngBn T/E could be increased one tractor per company.

Second suggestion deals with Artillery keeping its tractors, but smaller ones. USMC could use a light tractor capable of being transported by 2½T truck for artillery needs. Army had a D-4 Cat in Korea for this. A TD9 or the Army D-6 [see *Block Buster*, GAZETTE: Dec '59] could well fill this need. This way, tractors could travel aboard standard battery vehicles, be ready when needed. A TD-18 is just too heavy and slow for future artillery needs.

I like first suggestion best.

GySgt D. J. McManus

138 Tarawa Blvd.
Tarawa Terrace, N. C.

Ed: No typo. TD-18s are intended to function as prime movers for 155mm howitzers in case 5T trucks can't cut the mustard, mud or sand. Proposed T/E is actually a decrease if compared with the old "L" Series of July 1954 B. H. (Before Helicopters). Then each 155mm HowBtry carried three TD-18 tractors, plus one in HqBtry; each 155mm Gun Btry carried four TD-18 tractors, plus one in RegtHq. Total: 23. Also, USMC is shopping for a new medium tractor to replace old models (see MCA Newsletter: Oct '61). It will be big enough to move Artillery's big guns as well as perform engineering, shore party chores.

Getting Acquainted

► In regards to 1stLt Warren's opinion of battalion commanders and company commanders marking fitness reports (OBSERVATION POST: Jul '61) I cannot visualize the lieutenant ever having served at a level above platoon commander. Never in my time have I met or served under a company or battalion commander who did not know the professional abilities of all company officers and SNCOs. Let the lieutenant sit in on the battalion commander's daily conference and I'm sure he would be surprised by how many squad leaders he knows.

Company commanders can and do com-

mand platoon sergeants. However, I have never known a battalion commander to issue orders directly to a platoon commander.

SgtMaj Elzy Kees, Jr.

H&S Co.
1/3 3dMarDiv

Area Fire

► In *Area Fire* (GAZETTE: Aug '61) Jac Weller wrote: "From classical times to Korea, ground has been taken and permanently held only by men on foot with weapons they carry into action." He might have

added that from Xenophon until gunpowder invaded war, infantrymen carried into action a shoulder weapon (the bow) so flexible that an individual or a unit could adapt it quickly to direct fire or indirect fire, as the situation dictated.

The next time you hear proud talk about our magnificent technological progress, please ask real loud when in hell the technology boys will give our infantryman a shoulder weapon as good today as the bow and arrow was in its heyday; that is, a shoulder piece wherewith the smallest tactical unit—detached and unsupported—can walk up to a mortar and a machine gun supporting each other in ordinarily strong defensive positions?

W. H. Russell

Naval Academy
Annapolis, Md.

Everybody's Business

► Recently, Officer Selection Officer, Washington, D. C., received a card from an offi-

QUESTION OF THE MONTH

► GAZETTE: Aug '61 asked, "Do we need team shots?"

Response was light; we're printing two letters—one pro, one con—will call it a tie and split \$25.00 between the writers. Question for November: "In what ways can we improve correspondence education as now offered by Extension School and Marine Corps Institute?" (Submitted by Maj R. J. Schening, MCEC, MCS, Quantico. Answer deadline: 1Jan62.)

► Team shots are not needed in the Marine Corps.

Speaking as a student at Basic School, 2-61, I feel that the amount and quality of marksmanship training I have received recently has made me proficient in the use of rifle and pistol, enough so to be able to apply this knowledge in combat, whether conventional or guerrilla type.

To me, this is the purpose of marksmanship training.

Will the team shot be better qualified for any type of combat due to his costly equipment and long hours of practice? I say he will not be.

We must keep in mind that in combat the enemy will not have rings painted on his shirt, nor a "V" over his heart. Nor will he be standing still so that we may zero in on him.

Primary need is to train Marines who know their weapons and can use them effectively.

I think that this need can be, and is being, met by our marksmanship training setup, and that team shots belong under a completely different category: Sports.

2dLt Antonio Mediavilla

Basic School
MCS, Quantico, Va.

► Question has been asked, and not for the first time, "Do we need team shots?" This question is one that must be resolved after years of criticism throughout the Corps. Our recent decline in competitive shooting has added substance to the argument and has fanned the flames of the controversy. We know, of course, that we can do without "big-time" shooting; but do we want to? Do we have anything to gain from a competitive shooting program? I think we do.

Only a few years ago, a Marine Corps station, with a range detachment of about 30 men, assigned nine of ten Station Rifle Team members to the range as marksmanship instructors. The qualification results, among the highest in the Corps, reflected the wisdom of providing the range detachment with a nucleus of professional shooters. Incidentally, this team traveled and competed on weekends, with the exception of the annual six-week absence to attend the Marine Corps competitions and several weeks at the National Matches. Practice was accomplished after the completion of normal duties.

Unhappily, examples such as these are all too infrequent. The solution to the problem is not in doing away with competitive shooting, but in placing "big-time" shooting in proper perspective to the marksmanship program. Proper employment of experienced team shooters as marksmanship instructors would, in itself, justify competitive shooting. Who could be better qualified to teach marksmanship than these professionals?

How do our marksmanship specialists gain their experience and know-how? "Big-time" shooting. Obviously, we are in the shooting business for keeps, so why compromise? We must go whole hog: shoot to win in competition and to kill in combat.

A sport? Perhaps, but only because marksmanship places us in friendly competition with our sister services in time of peace. It ceases to be a sport on the battlefield when we are in a deadly competition with a foreign enemy and there are no second place awards, only a winner and a loser.

Capt J. C. Klinedinst

US Naval Mission
Haiti

cer on the west coast nominating an outstanding high school senior for the Platoon Leaders Class. An officer attending college as a "Bootstrapper" recently sent one of the finest officer candidates seen in a long time. Both of these young men were enrolled and are set to commence training.

The above mentioned are rare. Officer Selection Officers travel around to the various colleges and universities throughout the United States. This is the general method of officer procurement. OSOs cannot possibly meet or contact all qualified young men. Inspector-Instructors, Marine officer instructors, recruiting officers, and reservists constantly feed names and referrals. What about other officers? OSOs throughout the country would be happy to hear from officers in the Corps with a prospective applicant in mind.

The outstanding high school senior, college student, or college graduate is the man of the hour. Should an officer on active duty, a retired officer, or a Marine in any status, not be familiar with the officer training programs available in the Marine Corps, a note to the nearest Marine Officer Selection Officer would be advisable and welcomed.

Selecting officers for the Marine Corps is a vital undertaking. Any outside assistance to the Officer Selection Officers would insure a more complete effort, and insure that the Marine Corps will continue to receive applications from the top young men of today.

Capt R. T. Smith

Officer Selection Officer
Washington, D. C.

Better Ask Benny

► I take issue with the statement that the 1st Sergeant normally stands JOOD in port watches and "a good gunnery sergeant develops a detachment into a smooth functioning unit" (*Marines Afloat*, GAZETTE: Sep '61). A Marine 1st Sergeant rarely ever stands a watch in the Marine Corps because of his position as the senior enlisted man in the unit. Why should he do otherwise simply because his unit is on a ship? He doesn't on *Bennington*. As for the statement that the gunny develops a smooth functioning unit, I may be a bit naive but I like to think of that as my job as the commander of the detachment.

1stLt D. E. Schaet

CO, MD, USS Bennington
FPO, San Francisco

Your Weight Problem

► Your struggles to reduce the weight and bulk of the combat Marine's equipment remind me of a similar experience here on Planet 782.

To increase mobility and ease the logistical strain, we, too, made weapons and equipment lighter. But, over the generations, our Marines became heavier and bigger—due to better nutrition and medical care. Through the years the total weight of each man and his gear remained about constant. To make matters worse, larger men demanded more food and water, larger and heavier boots, uniforms and equipment. They required more of everything, in fact.

Frustrated, we were forced to reduce the size and weight of the combat Marine himself.

This paid off logistically at once. Larger men were used on the home front for ceremonies and guard, or in the rear for support.

It wasn't until we trained a battalion of pygmies and two companies of midgets, however, that it began to pay off tactically.

Harder to see and to hit, these miniature martinetts fought viciously—probably to compensate for their size. Their motto: "It isn't the size of the Devil-dog in the fight . . ."

Now, these little Leathernecks with their little packs and little appetites are the biggest thing in our amphibious history.

If I can be of any further help, please do not hesitate to write.

An Observer

Ed: Interpreted and forwarded by Capt R. E. Andrews, E/2/1.

Rabble Rouser

► Capt Conway J. Smith certainly deserved a prize for his *Red China's Military Revolution* (Second best article published by GAZETTE in FY '61). I feel, however, that he brushed past a few important points in his background of the Communist forces and presented a false impression in his term "armed rabble of the Korean war" applying to them.

Numerous incidents of small unit actions revealed that in small unit encounters they fought well and knowingly. Many a patrol was most efficiently ambushed and in many of their planned major assaults they used both infantry and mortars in tactically sound methods. More importantly they could seize ground and dig in to hold in such short periods of time that our intelligence reports placed great emphasis on the need to counterattack immediately or the chances of recovery were going to be rough.

I think the prime problem they had was the change from long periods of guerrilla warfare to the big campaign. Many of the troop leaders had been involved in fighting that type of warfare from the age of 14— or less. Field grade officers had in many

cases been "little devils" with the memorable Communist 6,000 mile withdrawal to the North in China. When Korea came they were in their 30's and had been fighting almost constantly in between. This may have made them "rabble" but they didn't fit that description by most of those who fought them.

Capt Paul E. Wilson

73184 El Paseo Drive
29 Palms, Calif.

Non FMF Training

► My last duty station was a Marine Barracks where the training program went like this:

Exams twice a month usually covering one but never more than two subjects. Marines failing exams got extra instruction. Generally, exams required "fill-in" answers, never were answers multiple choice. When possible, exams were practical ones, grades forwarded to training officer by the company commander. Written exams were corrected by the training officer, returned to examinees immediately. In either case the training officer made page seven (SRB) entries promptly.

Classroom instruction was held to a minimum, self-study was encouraged. Bi-weekly training schedules specifically referenced the source for subjects covered by exams. Practical application of map-reading, tactics, first aid, hand-to-hand combat was abundant.

Does your training schedule read like this, or are you following traditional habit of quarterly exams, too frequent classroom instruction, too little practical application?

1stLt N. Morris

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
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
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Extension School CHALLENGE

BASIC

1 The Universal Transverse Mercator grid is standard for use on all U. S. military maps covering the area between:

- a. 45° north and 45° south.
- b. 60° north and 80° south.
- c. 80° north and 80° south.
- d. 90° north and 90° south.

2 The *main column* of a motor march organization is normally formed into three elements. These are the:

- a. Advance party, main body, and rear guard.
- b. Head, main body, and trail.
- c. Advance guard, main body, and follow-up party.
- d. Lead, column, and rear patrol.

3 You are the combat cargo officer aboard an APA. Your normal responsibilities include: (Select those applicable.)

- a. Being responsible for the maintenance of the gun batteries manned by the detachment.
- b. Performing liaison between the CO of the ship and the CO of troops embarked.
- c. Serving as airborne naval gunfire spotter.
- d. Advising the CO of the ship on matters pertaining to loading, messing, and billeting of transported units.

JUNIOR

4 The organization of the general support battalion does not permit the assignment of a direct support mission because:

- a. The minimum range of the weapons possessed by the battalion exceeds the normal requirements for close support employment.
- b. The batteries do not have the two-platoon structure which is required for continuous support during displacements.
- c. The battalion is unable to mass the fires of its batteries due to lack of a centralized fire direction capability.
- d. There are no forward observer sections in the battalion.

5 In an attack situation, artillery positions are:

- a. Echeloned in depth to provide for continuous fire during displacement.

- b. Well forward to exploit the range of the weapons and minimize displacements.

- c. Located out of the zone of action of the supported unit so as to avoid interference with the scheme of maneuver.

- d. Located as close together as possible so massed fires can be provided.

6 By law, the authorized strength of the U. S. Marine Corps is:

<i>Maximum Strength</i>	<i>Minimum Strength</i>
a. 200,000	Two Divisions/Two Air Wings/ Supporting forces.
b. 300,000	Three Divisions/Three Air Wings/ Supporting forces.
c. 400,000	Three Divisions/Three Air Wings/ Supporting forces.
d. 600,000	Four Divisions/Four Air Wings/ Supporting forces.

7 As the division tank officer you recommend that, in the mobile defense, the bulk of tanks should be employed with the:

- a. Security forces.
- b. Forward defense forces.
- c. Strong points.
- d. Striking force.

SENIOR

8 As the G-3 of a Marine division, you are engaged in formulating defensive missions for elements of the division. Since you are planning a mobile defense, you would position the:

- a. Bulk of your forces along a defensive line to warn of enemy approach, force his early deployment, and delay his advance.
- b. Larger portion of the forces in integrated defensive positions disposed along a MLR, with a third of the force held in mobile reserve.
- c. Bulk of the forces as a mobile striking force for counterattack or counteroffensive action, with the remainder manning the forward defense area.
- d. Reserve elements, at all echelons, as mechanized forces to increase their mobility and hold them in centrally located assembly areas.

(Answers on page 16)




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A Captain says of Organization and Role of US Marine Corps course: "Learned much which I thought I'd known all along—helped in clearing up some misinformation I've carried unchallenged for some time."

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VERTOL

DIVISION

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TOP PHOTO: FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT MOCKUP

THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 14)

Note: References designated as TIP (Tentative Instructional Precipis), SM (Supplementary Material), and MCS (Marine Corps Schools Publication) are manuals written by the staff of Marine Corps Educational Center as texts for MCEC schools.

BASIC

① c. Reference: FM 21-26, paragraph 82. The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid is standard for use on all United States military maps covering the area between the 80° N and 80° S parallels. The Universal Polar Stereographic (UPS) grid system is used on military maps of the polar regions, north and south of the limits of the UTM grid.

② b. Reference: MCS 1-28, paragraph 21. The *main column* of the march organization is composed of a head, main body, and trail (choice b.). The head is the normal control element of the main column. The main body is the principal element and consists of all vehicles, exclusive of the head and trail, which carry the bulk of the cargo and troops within the column. The trail is the last element of the main

column and consists of medical aid, maintenance, and trail control vehicles. Organization for a motor march generally includes provisions for an advance party, *main column*, and follow-up party. The advance party is used only when the situation demands and may consist of a quartering party, a reconnaissance party, a pioneer/engineer party, or a combination of these. It is detached from the main column to perform necessary functions in connection with passage of convoys en route, to establish and operate rest stops en route, and to arrange for the arrival of the main column at the ultimate destination. The follow-up party operates to the rear of the main column and may perform such functions as inspection of halt or bivouac sites, pickup of guides and route markers, investigation of accidents, disposition of dead and

wounded, and disposition of disabled vehicles.

③ b, d. Reference: MCS 1-17, "Service Afloat," paragraph 24a. The combat cargo officer's primary duty is to advise the commanding officer of the ship in matters pertaining to loading, messing, and billeting of transported units. He also performs liaison between the commanding officer of the ship and the commanding officer of troops embarked. On ships where a Marine officer is not assigned, similar duties are normally assigned to the ship's first lieutenant, a Navy officer. Choice a. is not correct because there is no Marine detachment aboard an APA. Choice c. is not correct because an APA has no aircraft.

JUNIOR

④ d. Reference: TIP (ARM)2, 37a. The intermediate support battalion provides general support and reinforcing fires for the division. It is not organized for direct support, hence there are no forward observers in the battalion.

⑤ b. Reference: TIP (ARM)2 48. Artillery firing positions in offensive operations must be well forward to exploit the range of the weapons, to support the attack as long as possible without displacement, and to establish and maintain required liaison and communications. Direct support artillery units normally occupy positions in the zone of action or tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) of the supported unit.

⑥ c. Reference: MCS 1-6, 93. Public Law 416 specifies that the strength of the Marine Corps shall not be less than three combat divisions, three air wings, with the necessary air and ground supporting forces, nor more than 400,000 except in time of war or national emergency.

⑦ d. Reference: TIP (MZ)2 (1959), 18c (3). The striking force has a mission of offensive nature; therefore, tanks are usually employed in its support to take advantage of their mobile firepower, armor, and shock action. Although they can be effectively employed with the other echelons, the requirement for tanks with the striking force is so overriding that other considerations usually become secondary.

SENIOR

⑧ c. Reference: FM 100-5, 287a. In the mobile defense, minimum forces are deployed in the forward defensive area with the larger portion of the defending force retained as a striking force in a condition of readiness to attack the enemy once he has been stopped or slowed down within a preselected killing zone.



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


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From the Director



BGen W. T. Fairbourn

MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Six Month Reserve Program has spawned a new breed
of Marine, and in considerable numbers. They're college
graduates who elect to serve as enlisted Marines, are admirably
filling billets of riflemen or wiremen

WHAT WOULD YOU DO, AS A COMMANDING OFFICER, OR first sergeant, if half of your troops were college graduates—including some with master's and Ph.D. degrees? Unless you anticipate service with a Marine Corps Reserve unit, you probably would not fall heir to such a situation; but ranks of the Organized Reserve are studded with educated Marines. And they make good ones.

Just recently, for example, I got a memo from one of our Inspector-Instructors listing certain achievements of his reservists. Admittedly, the units are located in a major metropolitan area, where educational facilities are abundant. On the other hand, the area is highly industrialized, and consequently much of the working population is in the skilled and semi-skilled categories. The units involved—a communication company and a rifle company—are outstanding in the basic ingredients necessary for a first-rate Reserve.

To start with, 88.5 per cent of the enlisted members of the two units combined are Six Month trainees. Total enlisted strength of the units stands at 401. Drill attendance during the past fiscal year was 96 per cent, a most commendable mark. Combined attendance at annual field training this past summer stood at 98.5 per cent, another notable achievement.

We have come to rely on such Six Month trainees as the Force-in-Readiness backing-up the regular establishment. Once they leave the recruit depots and advanced training, they return to their hometown units, as well trained as any regular with six months of Marine Corps service. We retain that edge with a training program designed to prepare our reservists for possible mobilization. That is the sole reason for a Reserve.

Units such as the communication and rifle companies

I have mentioned have a spirit comparable to that of any FMF outfit. At the rifle range, for example, the communicators managed 99 per cent requalification—with 39 per cent experts. The infantrymen came off the line with 47 per cent experts—and 96 per cent qualified. High reserve shooter for the entire summer training period at Camp Lejeune this year was a SNCO from the comm unit, who fired 245.

Getting back to the educational backgrounds of our reservists, these two particular units computed that the average PFC/LCpl has an equivalent of two-and-a-half years of college. Included are 18 lawyers and senior law students scattered throughout the units.


Qualified members of the two units, along with reservists from a communication support battalion, were recently selected to take aptitude tests for entrance to the Navy's Russian Language Course. Fourteen of 19 applicants came up with passing grades. A member of the comm company set a new mark when he achieved the highest score ever achieved in the Navy or Marine Corps, officer and enlisted, regular and reservist. He will be joined by five other local reservists picked to attend the nine-month course starting in January.

The obvious spirit and interest of the reservists in these units is reflected also in the disciplinary ledger, which records an "O". This is a condition that is prevalent in the majority of our units, again attesting to the quality of recruit who has been attracted to the Marine Corps Reserve.


The cited examples are only a part of the whole. The dedication of all reservists is a factor that does not rely on a college degree, but education and determination is a winning combination.

USMC

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
Corps Calendar			1 2/3 spearheaded landing of 3dMar Div on Bougainville. 1943 1stMarDiv's first contact with Chinese in Korea. 1950	2 Battalion of Marines sent to Brooklyn to put down Whiskey Riots. 1870	3 Marines began long fight to conquer Seminole Indians in Florida. 1841	4 Close air support by VMF-122 helped Army landing on Pulo Anna Island (Palau Gr). 1944
5 Detachments from four companies under Maj Smedley D. Butler captured Ft Capois in Vera Cruz after short fight. 1915	6 Sgt James Maguire reported for training at Annapolis, became first enlisted Marine in Naval Aviation. 1912	7 First action by Marines in Civil War took place at Port Royal, S. C. 1861	8 Postmaster General called on Marines for help in stopping mail robberies. 1921	9 VMF-212 Corsairs shot down five Japanese planes over Empress Augusta Bay. 1943	10 186th Birthday Observance. 1961 Continental Congress called for raising two battallions of Marines. 1775	11 1st Armistice Day caught 5th Marines in enemy territory across Meuse River (See p. 36). 1918
12 6th Marines landed in Shanghai to defend foreign concessions from attack during Chinese Civil War. 1926	13 Marine Corps emblem first recommended for adoption and use. 1868	14 Marines landed at Apia, Samoa when American consulate was endangered by revolution. 1888	15 Marines participated in seizure of Tampico, Mexico. 1846	16 Marines participated in bombarding and eventually destroying forts guarding Canton, China. 1856	17 Capts D. D. Porter and H. I. Bearss earned Medals of Honor for action against Moros in Samar. 1901	18 Marines guarded a diplomatic mission to Addis Ababa to sign a treaty with Emperor of Abyssinia. 1903
19 20 Marines routed 150 enemy at San Jose, Calif. during Mexican War. 1847	20 Col D. M. Shoup led 2dMarDiv ashore on Tarawa. 1943	21 Maj C. L. Fordney made a stratospheric flight in a balloon to an altitude of 61,237 feet, setting a new world's record. 1933	22 Tarawa secured after three days bitter fighting. 1943	23 Thanksgiving in Korea, temperature fell to 20 below. 1950 Thanksgiving Day. Marines everywhere sit down to turkey and all the trimmings. 1961	24 Final assault to secure Bougainville launched. Enemy resistance ended by sundown. 1943	25 Commandant Franklin Wharton issued a \$20 bounty for all top-rate recruits. (See p. 46). 1812
26 14th, 15th Marines commanded by Col R. M. Cutts, J. C. Breckinridge, respectively formed at Quantico. 1918	27 4th Marines left Shanghai closing out colorful era in Marine history. 1941	28 Samuel Nicholas was commissioned Captain by Continental Congress to become first Marine Officer. 1775	29 Eight Chinese divisions surround 1stMarDiv at Chosen Reservoir prompting heroic advance to Hungnam. 1950	30 You can't win 'em all! British forces under Capt Kidd routed barge loads of Marines in Chesapeake Bay. 1782	November	



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Typical of FMC's work in advanced military equipment is this new hydrofoil landing craft, designed to add speed and flexibility to Marine amphibious operations. Now in development under a Navy BuShips contract, the vehicle will skim on foils from ship to shore carrying combat troops and equipment at better than 35 knots, and move inland on retractable wheels at speeds over 25 mph.



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PUTTING IDEAS TO WORK FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

ADMINISTRATIVE TIME

Being a few words
by the editors
about the magazine you
write



Who says that 2% will never get the word? That used to be the average number of "no-address" members in our circulation file, folks who just up and left without telling us or the post office.

But we track them down, and just after big summer transfers had the figure down to 1/2 of one percent.

Don't rely on us, though. We can't act until we know there's a problem. Post offices sometimes hold up and destroy three or four GAZETTES before telling us they can't find you.

Save the FIX-O-GRAM in this issue. It's the last one. After this, you get a machine-coded FIX-O-GRAM when you join, or when you change address or rank. Also, if you write with a complaint.

Our motto: If you have trouble, HONK! But be calm, give us the facts.

Faithfully,

Mike M'Corps

To: Marine Corps GAZETTE
PO Box 1844, Quantico, Va.
Send sample GAZETTE to:

Compliments of:

WORDS AND PICTURES

• To Be or Not To Be . . .

. . . that is the question every November. Should we splurge on a special issue once a year, or try to make every issue the best we can? Last year we settled for "every issue." This year we set a high standard (with money, anyhow) beginning in January, promised ourselves we'd spend any "profits" in November. But so far this year, we're still basically non-profit. So this issue is about the same size, shape, color (and expense) as usual.

• 10 November . . .

. . . has not been forgotten, though. We hope that Bob Deveau's cover summons up the spirit of Marine Corps tradition for you. Then turn to page 36 and read The Eternal Spirit by yarn-spinner Capt Robert Asprey. We think it will tell you something of value about the Marine Corps way of doing things. Happy Birthday, Marines!

• Also in This Issue . . .

. . . an eyewitness account of fighting in Malaya, a new look at Boot Camp, and, particularly, a study in three articles of how the military writings of Contributor Capt B. H. Liddell Hart have affected military thinking. We're very proud that several chapters of Capt Liddell Hart's book Deterrent or Defense first appeared in the GAZETTE. In particular, we're proud of Marines and Strategy, the chapter which appeared in our July 1960 issue. If you missed it, look it up. It's the kind of statement about the raison d'etre for a ready amphibious force that we think John A. Lejeune was searching for when he founded the GAZETTE.

• In Months to Come . . .

. . . we plan important contributions by top military writers, including Capt Liddell Hart. On the lighter side, next month the story of Major Louie Cukela—need we say more?

WRITER'S CORNER

• Care About Our Problems?

. . . we must make mystic marks on every page of copy we send the printer (he's in Baltimore). That's why we ask that all contributions be typewritten, double-spaced, and with wide margins. Do NOT use all capital letters. Also, this helps tell you if your piece is the right length to fit in our rigid limits. There are about 250 words on one double-spaced page. You can get a closer count by checking five lines, then counting number of lines on the page.

• We'll Hack It Up . . .

. . . if necessary, to fit into 250 words for Message Center, 750 words for Observation Post. But we'll both be happier if you write to fit.

• Writer Incentive Award . . .

. . . winner this month is 1stLt J. F. O'Connor, USMCR. See page 44. How'd he get started writing? He sent in a short OP piece last year, got it printed. That's usual. Most writers who score with us get encouraged, try a couple more. Tired of the same writers? Don't chip your teeth; use your typewriter. You CAN write.

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
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INTERVIEW

With Capt B. H. Liddell Hart

By Robert E. Walters

Foreword


The Father of the Blitzkrieg Looks to the Future

♦ Capt B. H. Liddell Hart is one of the world's outstanding military writers but he is a great deal more—his writings actually influenced the course of WWII. He has been given major credit for formulating the underlying strategy of the *blitzkrieg*. Gen Heinz Guderian, who created and trained the German Panzer forces, says he obtained his inspirations from the writings of Capt Liddell Hart and MajGen J. F. C. Fuller, most especially the former, of whom he says: "Capt Liddell Hart—pioneer of a new type of warfare on the greatest scale . . . my first teacher in tank tactics and strategy . . . I was one of his disciples." Field Marshal Rommel wrote, "The British would have been able to prevent the greatest part of their defeats if they had paid more attention to the modern theories expounded by Liddell Hart."

By 1930 Liddell Hart had won a reputation as a sound military thinker. During the '30s various foreign governments, including the Soviet Union, consulted him on military matters. Being a political realist, he turned down the Communist offer. In this same period Liddell Hart pointed out (contrary to orthodox military opinion) that the Ardennes Forest region in Belgium and France was suitable under certain conditions for large-scale military operations. German invasion of the West in 1940 followed this route, as did the ebb and flow of the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, the originator of the battle plan that produced the fall of France, cited Capt Liddell Hart's prewar article as evidence to convince the German General Staff.

Capt Liddell Hart's objective insights into the study of war (Gen Sir Frederick Pile has given him credit for originating the idea of operational research) can be summed up in a statement by Gen Dittmar, "This man—with a pen from his study and in spite of his modest rank as a retired captain—has had world-wide influence on the military thought of our time . . . a philosopher of history in the same sense as Clausewitz." —R. E. W.

Fifteen years ago Capt Hart was asked where war was most apt to break out. He spun a globe and pointed to Korea. He's still making predictions today—and wise men listen.



"No expert on military affairs has earned a better right to respectful attention."

—President Kennedy,
Special book review
beginning on Page 30

Our interviewer visited Liddell Hart in England last year, asked these questions, got these answers on some vital military issues

Q. We Americans have been prone to ignore the study of military subjects. First, we have had little reason, but also there is the inbred feeling anyone who does is a militarist. Would you care to comment on this point?

A. The longer one thinks about war, the deeper one thinks into it, and if one's had personal experience of it, one ceases to be a militarist. There is nothing that makes one ultimately more peacefully minded. I've often said that the old saying, "If you wish for peace, prepare for war," is untrue. It's much truer to say, "If you wish for peace, understand war." People who get in the most trouble are people who fail to understand war, and they get into disastrous wars.

Q. You have said the waging of war must be controlled by reason. Doesn't this seem like a contradiction, that war which is generally madness should be tempered by reason?

A. If it isn't controlled by reason, it's no better than a struggle of a hate-mad mob. In that case you threaten to destroy the object you are striving for. War is often a physical act but its direction is a mental process and the better your strategy, the easier you gain the upper hand and the less it will cost you. On the other hand, the more troops you waste by passionate emotion misdirected, the more risk there is that you're going to lose the war; but even if you ultimately win it, you will lose the peace.

Q. You would, I take it, not agree with those people who say that in war one must use maximum force to defeat the enemy?


A. You might as well say you should always use a sledge hammer to crack a nut. In any case, if you use maximum force without any care to conserve energy, it's the surest way to exhaust yourself before you even reach the goal. Force has to be used with a conservation of energy and economy of effort.

Q. Many Americans believe the axiom that the best defense is a good offense. Do you agree?

A. It's a partial truth. Undoubtedly the attacker has the advantage of the initiative; he has a better chance of throwing the enemy off balance than the defender. On the other hand, it's a most exhausting form of action and if you can draw the enemy to attack you when you are well posted to meet his attack and to repel it—and for that your position must be flexible—then it's a much more strength-conserving form of action than attack. Nothing is more dangerous than to act blindly—you must get the balance between hitting and guarding and between moving and punching. Nothing is more distressing to morale than an attack that fails with heavy loss, and each renewal makes it worse. So it may even be said in certain circumstances that defense is the best attack, especially if repulse of the enemy is followed up by a riposte.

Q. What do you mean by "grand strategy" and how does it affect the soldier?

A. The role of grand strategy, or higher strategy, is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation or band of nations towards the attaining of the political object of the war. The goal is defined by fundamental policy. Grand strategy has got to calculate and develop



Capt Hart says Polaris subs like this one (*Patrick Henry*) play an important role as a deterrent, but that an unlimited submarine campaign "would almost certainly bring on a general nuclear war."

the economic resources and the manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. The fighting power is only one of the instruments of grand strategy. It's got to take account of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and moral pressure to weaken the enemy's will. Moreover, while strategy only looks to the end of the war, grand strategy has to look beyond the war to the subsequent peace. That becomes the real test.

Q. You have stated that the essence of strategy is the indirect approach. Could you tell us a little bit about this and how you came to see it?

A. Some 35 years ago I made an analysis of all the wars of history when I was military editor of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. During that investigation the impression became increasingly strong that throughout all history, effective results in war have very rarely been attained unless the approach has such indirectness as to assure that the opponent is unready to meet it. Now that indirectness of approach has usually been physical—but it's always psychological. In strategy the longest way around is often the shortest way home. More and more clearly does the lesson emerge that a direct approach to one's objective tends to produce negative results because it's the line of natural expectation for the enemy. You've got to throw him off balance. That is the objective of indirect approach.

Q. Do you think naval power will continue to play an important part?

A. It won't play an important part in war though it may, in the form of the Polaris, play an important part as a deterrent. I cannot see any future war in the old sense because that means, in the nuclear age, simply mutual destruction. I think it is some type of limited war that is possible and perhaps increasingly probable. Now there is a state of nuclear stalemate, or as I call it, nuclear parity-nullity. I think seapower plays and will continue to play an important part there. It provides amphibious flexibility, for instance, for intervention in dangerous areas. There again there is a possibility, as

I see it, of harassing and interrupting sea traffic that will stop short of unlimited sinking of ships, but could nevertheless make sea traffic, the movement of transports to any part of the world, very difficult and cause great complications in all those ways. Seapower remains, within those limitations, a very important factor.

Q. Does it appear to you that the submarine at present is a weapon for the denial of the use of the seas rather than for the control of the seas?

A. I would say in the last two wars it's been essentially a weapon for the denial of the use of the seas. If you are going to undertake the point of controlling the seas—now or in the future—I don't think it can be carried to the denial of the use of the seas in the old way. An unlimited submarine campaign of the WWI and WWII results would almost certainly bring on a general nuclear war. That is, again I say, not war but nuclear suicide. But I do see great possibilities of using submarines to create interruptions and harassing in the limited sphere of the war. They could be a great nuisance weapon. And I think that tentative naval opinion in the West has been especially started to examine these possibilities—that the Russians or their satellites might develop that way.

Q. You have been a pioneer in the advocacy of night operations. What was your logic in reasoning that night operations could be important?

A. It developed first not so much from reason as from experience. In the opening of the battle of the Somme, in which I took part as a company commander, in 1916, the attack suffered so badly from daylight operation that the British Army had the greatest day's loss it ever had in its whole history—60,000 casualties in one day. We did try a tentative night attack a fortnight later, in attacking the German Second Line. That was successful with very slight loss. The sight of No-man's-land on July 1st, 1916, covered with British khaki-clad corpses—ten at least to the German's one—contrasted with what I saw July 14th, when the proportions were almost reversed. This made the first great impression on me of

Liddell Hart's advocacy of night operations was born in WWI when attacks in fog usually turned out well. "You can't produce fog when you want it," he says, "but you can utilize night once every 24 hours."

the power of night attack. When I came to examine in detail the experience of WWI afterwards, I found that in every successful offensive, there had been conditions of obscurity. Usually in that war, they came from a fog cloaking the attackers at the time of the assault, because very little further attempt was made to develop night attack. But obviously night attack is an alternative to fog. You can't produce fog when you want it, but you can utilize night once every 24 hours.

Q. Do you think that night operations could be combined with amphibious operations?

A. Certainly. There are obvious difficulties because all amphibious landings are complicated proceedings, but the enormous advantage of attacking under cloaking obscurity in my opinion far outweighs the complications. All these problems can be resolved by careful preparation, planning, and good training. Under conditions of darkness, highly trained troops have an advantage four or five times greater than they have in daylight over less well trained troops.

Q. Do you think, after the great loss at Arnhem during WWII, that paratroopers have any future?

A. Yes, within limits. It depends essentially on surprise. Against a well-prepared defense and where there is no surprise, attack by paratroops is a gamble that's almost certain to fail. But if you can assure the all-essential element of unexpectedness, then I think that there is a considerable future for them provided that the airborne drop can be quickly followed up either by overland reinforcements or by a landing from the sea.

Q. Our services have developed one-man helicopters. Do you believe they might be better employed under cover of darkness than paratroops? There would, of course, be greater control over the landing.

A. I should think that they would have the advantage. But I'm a tactician and a strategist, not a technician, and this is really a question for the technician to answer. Helicopters, or any development of that kind, have always seemed to me to have a great future. I think they could be used more effectively than paratroops, in conditions of obscurity, and with more accuracy.

Q. In view of the development of nuclear weapons, do you feel that conventional weapons have a future?

A. Certainly. Of course, as I've already emphasized, if there is nuclear war, it isn't war in the organized sense we've ever known—it is merely mutual destruction. But because of this situation of nuclear stalemate that has developed, of nuclear parity that way, there is now greater opportunity for limited action that stops short of bringing on the all-out war. In that kind of action, aggressive or defensive, conventional weapons are much more important than nuclear weapons.

Q. Dr. Morganstern in his book, "The Question of National Defense," says nuclear war is more likely than not. Do you agree with this?

A. This is really a question of whether there's ever going to be another all-out war. Now any student of history cannot be very hopeful that it can be avoided—that if war comes people will be wise enough to stop short of using nuclear weapons. But on the other hand, there have never been any weapons before that could produce so quickly and instantaneously the complete destruction of both sides, and so there is some reason to hope that people will be wise enough to avoid this nuclear suicide.

Q. Dr. Morganstern also thinks that we in the United States should invest in building atomic shelters. Would you care to comment on this point?

A. Yes. Ten years ago, I took part in an international conference of civil defense experts in Paris and we there reached agreement on what was the minimum requirements to safeguard civil population of countries against attack with the limited number of atomic bombs then available. Not 1% of our recommendations of what was the minimum requirements have been carried out anywhere. The problem is now a thousand times or more as great. I can't see how any effort within the reach of possible budgetary expenditure could be of any serious value in diminishing the danger in all-out nuclear war with megaton weapons of the thermo-nuclear kind.

Q. Do you think limited atomic war is possible—that is, with small yield atomic weapons?

A. It's possible but not probable. If any atomic weapons are used, there is a tremendous risk and a probability that it would soon spread into all-out atomic warfare. It's very difficult to frame any theory or rules which would keep the use of atomic weapons within bounds.



Mr Walters, an assistant professor at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, has a keen interest in military history and strategy. He's also a friend of Capt B. H. Liddell Hart. These two ingredients resulted in this first-rate interview. Capt Hart, of course, is no stranger to GAZETTE readers.

Mr Walters got his B.A. from hometown Univ of Akron (Ohio) in '49, his M.A. from Kent State Univ (Ohio) in '50. Before joining staff of Naval Academy in 1957, he was an instructor at Univ of Louisville (Ky). In addition to his Academy work, he lectures at Johns Hopkins Univ, Baltimore.

But we have atomic weapons with us today—it's obviously unlikely that anyone will discard them. The important thing is to keep them under control and to reserve them as weapons of last but one resort—the final resort, of course, being strategic tactical weapons.

Q. Do you think the idea of the deterrent force of nuclear weapons has been successful?

A. It's very difficult to gauge. It's probably had a considerable effect in restraining aggression and expansion. But there are quite a number of political and social factors that may explain it just as well. The Russians could have overrun Western Europe any time after 1946 or 1947 with the greatest ease. At that time the United States had only comparatively few atomic weapons. Yet Russia didn't do so, and I'm inclined to think it was other factors—such as the unwillingness to expose their people to contact with the greater prosperity of the West and the effect that would have on their minds and on their willingness to obey the Soviet regime—that may have been quite as effective as the atomic threat.

Q. Do you think the concept of "massive retaliation" has been a good policy?

A. A completely foolish policy. I said that from the start when it was adopted in 1953-54, and with the mutual development of atomic weapons it becomes more and more foolish. The threat doesn't appear credible, and nothing is more foolish than to bluff unless you are going to carry through your threat.

Q. Would you say that air power was the decisive weapon in the last war?

A. Broadly speaking, yes. In the early stages tanks were quite as important, but in the later stages air power became increasingly the decisive factor.

Q. Do you think the doctrine of air power—that is, strategic bombing—was over-stated?


A. Yes. Its results were also enormously exaggerated. As I pointed out the last few years before the war, we went on in England expecting that even what small amount of bombing that our air force could do at that time would have quick results in bringing Germany's surrender. The event proves that even when the bombing force and the weight of bombs was multiplied more than a thousand-fold, it was still indecisive.

Q. Do you think that the West can hold its own against the Communists?

A. Militarily it could be said so if it makes much more effort to develop the proper shield force that can repel invasion and local aggression without bringing on a nuclear war. Now I think that is perfectly possible if the effort is made. The West has ample population to do it. It has the economic resources. It simply is not making the effort at the present time, especially the countries in NATO on the continent of Europe. It could be done because the threat is not so great under the nuclear shadow as has been imagined. Moreover, I also think that it could hold its own if the military effort is adequate, because the West can offer good conditions of life, prosperity with liberty, and that all has more appeal than prosperity without liberty. At the present time, we don't offer sufficient prosperity compared with the promises—the vague promises—held out by the Communists.

Q. You have said that the defense, in general, is superior to the offense. This seems to many people to contradict the lessons of the last war.

A. That was largely an illusion because they didn't



B-24 Liberator unloads on Berlin, 1944—the results of strategic bombing were “enormously exaggerated.”

understand the conditions of the collapse of the defense in the early stages of the last war, or because the defense was carried out by people who did not understand the new method of armored and air attack. If it had been understood, as it was understood within a year or two, the defense of a proper mobile and flexible kind could certainly have succeeded in 1940. More and more as the war went on, it became difficult for the attackers to succeed without a great superiority of force. When anyone talks of the relative value of effective strength of attack and defense, the essential point is that it must be judged *pari passu*. In other words, if the attacker requires more strength than the defense to succeed, then it is itself a basic proof that the attack is not so effective as the defense.

Q. Does this thesis of the superiority of the defense have a lesson for us today?

A. Here again I would emphasize that the superiority of the defense—which became very clear after the opening stages of WWII—once the defending side had come to understand the new technique of attack, was mainly a matter of mobile defense by mobile troops. In the later stages of the war the attacker was hardly ever successful unless he had a superiority of five to one or more. That certainly has a lesson for the West today, where it is commonly thought that the Allied forces cannot be made capable of repelling Russia's superior numbers unless they resort to the use of nuclear weapons. If the lesson were grasped and applied there would be a good chance of stopping a Russian invasion in a less perilous way.

Q. You have stated that the invasion of France in 1940 could have been halted very easily. How?

A. If the defense had been conducted by anyone who understood the new technique of attack. I had spent years in the 1920s and 1930s thinking out this new theory of blitzkrieg attack with armored forces, which Guderian and other German leaders have emphasized as the theory they adopted, so it became easy to see how it could be frustrated. Unfortunately the defense was conducted in 1940 by the French but with leaders who didn't understand this technique at all, who were always moving 24 hours too late or more. Winston Churchill, as well as the French military chiefs, was still living in the past. In his memoirs, Churchill frankly says, "... I did not comprehend the violence of the revo-

lution effected since the last war by the incursion of a mass of fast-moving heavy armor. I knew about it, but it had not altered my inward convictions as it should have done." Now, during those pre-war years, Churchill had a number of talks with Fuller and myself, so there's no reason he should not have understood it, except he was so governed by tradition and the traditionalists.

Q. Do you believe the Maginot line to have been a failure?

A. I was never an advocate of the Maginot line, or of static defense, but always of mobile defense and counter-stroke. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the Maginot line was a failure—because it was never tested. It only extended halfway along the French frontier and the Germans took care to avoid it, by out-flanking it with a thrust through the Ardennes, which the Allied leaders believed to be "impassable."

Q. At one time during the early 1930s you advocated a strong policy to stem the progress of Hitler but as war drew near you changed your point of view. Could you explain why you changed your mind?

A. I didn't change my mind. I changed my judgment as to how we could do it in the circumstances. I went on urging from the moment Hitler came in until the Munich crisis in 1938 that we should make a stand while there was time. When we failed to do this over Munich, I pointed out that it was folly to make a stand until we had restored the balance—certainly to do anything so foolish as the Polish Guarantee. I warned them over Munich that if we didn't make a stand then, we should lose so much by the disappearance of Czechoslovakia—German capture of all the Czech tank factories—that we would have to maneuver until we developed our own armament to compensate for it. The Polish Guarantee was the most foolishly provocative step that ever could be taken, because it was obviously impossible to fulfill any such assurance to a country out of our reach.

Q. The Germans since the war have been quite eloquent in their praise of you. Gen Guderian, who originated the idea of the "blitzkrieg," claims that he got most of his ideas from your pre-war writings. Could you give us an insight into the "blitzkrieg?"

A. The secret, as I defined years ago, lies partly in the tactical combination of tanks and aircraft, partly in the unexpectedness of the stroke in direction and time,

"The Polish Guarantee was the most foolishly provocative step that ever could have been taken, because it was obviously impossible to fulfill any such assurance to a country out of our reach."

but above all in the follow-through—the exploitation of a tactical break-through into a deep strategic penetration carried out by armored forces operating ahead of the main army. The pace of such forces, as I always emphasized, promised a decisively deep penetration so long as it could be kept up. It's that persistent pace, coupled with the variability of the thrust point, that paralyzes the opponent. In every stage after the original break-through, the flexible drive of armored forces carries simultaneous alternative threats. The threat that actually develops into a thrust takes place too quickly for the enemy reserves to reach the spot in time to stiffen the resistance before it collapses. In effect, both strategic and tactical surprise are maintained from start to finish. It's a high speed indirect approach to the enemy's rear. That is what Guderian epitomized in his shorter definition of the *blitzkrieg* method as "mobility, velocity, indirect approach."

Q. Some people have remarked that tank warfare is now old-fashioned in view of recent development with guided missiles, rockets, nuclear weapons, etc. Would you agree?

A. It is certainly out of date if nuclear weapons are used extensively—in that case warfare itself becomes nonsense, merely a matter of quick and mutual suicide. In a more limited kind of warfare there is still likely to be value in tanks as they are the most mobile, and *locomobile*, kind of land force. Moreover, on a battlefield where small nuclear weapons might be used, they would have more chance of survival and of operating effectively than unprotected infantry on their feet.

Q. Do you think Hitler's Russian campaign was doomed to failure?

A. Not necessarily. If the Russian road system hadn't been so primitive the Germans' wheeled transport might have been able to advance fast enough to obtain decisive results. Moreover, German armored forces were relatively primitive—they were far less advanced than the ideas that Fuller and I had advocated in the 1920's.

Q. Did any country ever have a "panzer division" or "armored division" as you had originally suggested?

A. In my view none of the armored divisions seen in WWII, or after, were really armored forces in the real sense of the term. They comprised 3,000 vehicles or more, of which barely 200 were tanks, and only a small additional number were armored and capable of moving cross-country, off the road. About nine-tenths of them were unprotected and road-bound trucks. In a real armored division every vehicle should carry armored protection and be capable of moving across rough ground. They ought also to be capable of swimming rivers instead of having to depend on the slow process of building bridges.

Q. Do you think Field Marshal Montgomery's critical comments concerning the way the war was handled in Europe have any justification?

A. Some of Montgomery's criticisms are borne out by historical analysis of the campaign, but in others he is too inclined to look at the campaign from his own particular angle and comparatively narrow field—with scant regard to the wider considerations that weighed with Eisenhower and the pressure to which *he* was subject. In criticizing that the basic political object of the



Gen Heinz Guderian, builder of Germany's Panzer forces, frankly admits he got his primary inspiration from Capt Liddell Hart's pre-WWII writings.

war was overlooked in concentrating on the immediate military aim, Montgomery is certainly well justified by the precarious state of peace that has followed the war, but it is questionable whether he was much wiser at the time than the other Allied leaders, military or political.

Q. Montgomery said he had warned that the Ardennes region was too lightly held prior to the Battle of the Bulge. In view of the fact that this had been the place where the Germans broke through in 1940, was it not predictable that Hitler may have wanted to repeat his earlier sweeping victory?

A. It certainly was predictable—indeed I myself sounded a note of warning about such a contingency in things I wrote during the week or two before Hitler launched his counter-offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944. There was too much confidence on the Allied side that the Germans were incapable of any comeback, despite the evidence from intelligence reports that most of their panzer divisions had been withdrawn from the battles on the other sectors.

Q. Would you say that not too many Allied leaders were aware of the secret of the "blitzkrieg?"

A. I do not think that any of the Allied leaders were fully aware of it, or really understood it, except for a few like Patton and John S. Wood, who commanded Patton's spearhead, the 4th Armored Division.

Q. You were contacted at one time in the 1930s to act as an adviser to the Red Army. I understand you turned this offer down. Is that true?

Guderian, like Hart, believed in the "indirect approach," a philosophy which now has taken root in other military circles. (See "Unorthodox Israeli Army," P. 33)

A. That was in 1932 at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. What they wanted me to do was to become an adviser to the Red Army on mechanized forces, but I declined.

Q. Do you think your writings have influenced any of the Russian military thought?

A. To some extent. My books are translated and have had a very large sale there, I am told. I have never had any royalties from them. On the other hand, I don't think they ever have influenced Russian military thought near as much as they influenced German, or, in more recent times, Israeli.

Q. Do you think a lot of our knowledge of Russia is mostly guesswork?

A. I think we have fairly good knowledge and information about what is happening in the forward areas, particularly in the satellite countries. But when it comes to what is happening in the depths of Russia, I think that guesswork is largely inevitable and that many of our estimates of their strength are based on very vague information.

Q. Do you feel that the menace of Communism will mellow in time as did the French Revolution or do you think it is bound to lead to a third World War? (There are other alternatives, of course.)

A. I think the menace may pass if we've got patience to hold it in check. In the Middle Ages, the Western countries were always under the shadow of the menace of Mohammedan expansion, yet the tide ebbed. In the 16th and 17th centuries, Christendom was split and Western civilization almost wrecked by the wars of religion between the rival fanaticism of Catholicism

and Protestantism. Yet, after much mutual devastation, this seemingly insoluble problem faded away. Tension so intense as it has been during the last decade is almost bound to relax eventually if war is postponed long enough. As has happened often before in history, situations change—they never remain static. It's always dangerous to be too dynamic and impatient in trying to force the peace. A war-charged situation could only change in two ways—it's bound to become better eventually if war is avoided without surrender. The best safeguard of all is for all of us to keep cool. Indignation and exasperation are the prime risks, because such emotions all too easily produce the fatal explosion. Nothing can be more fatal than the feeling, "It's bound to come, let's get it over." War isn't a way out from danger and strain. It's a way down into a pit of unknown depth, and that's become clearer than ever in the nuclear age.

Q. You have suggested the use of gas as an alternative to the use of atomic weapons. Could not this, however, lead to the same unlimited destruction of life?

A. It could but it need not. When you're using atomic weapons, they can only destroy and devastate. But with gas it's possible to use non-lethal gases that will paralyze, that will delay and will even change ferocious fighting spirit into a mild mood. There are new gases that can even turn a cat from jumping at a mouse, to running away from it.

Q. Do you feel that missiles and rockets will replace manned aircraft?

A. Yes, but not so soon as people have imagined. There is still scope for the next few years, I think, for manned aircraft as part of the deterrent. There will continue to be a scope for them in the limited action that is possible in a defense—that is, in the situations that may arise in different parts of the world where there is a limited aggression that has to be extinguished quickly before it can spread into an all-out war.

Q. One last question, Capt Liddell Hart. You have been given credit for always telling the truth even when it hurt. Is this why you have never aligned yourself with a political party?

A. Yes. I cannot see how it's possible to reconcile party aims with the necessary spirit of really objective search for the truth. You're bound to be pleading and pushing a political party cause, which is quite a different attitude and aim from that of scientific investigation of the facts.

US & MC

★ ★ ★ ★

Now He's Posted

✻ FOLLOWING A BRIEF lecture on his duties as guide, the sergeant assumed the position.

The parade went well until the Adjutant barked out, "Guides, POST."

All guides smartly faced left in marching and advanced one pace. All, that is, except the inexperienced sergeant.

Again the Adjutant commanded—still no movement.

Over his shoulder the Company Commander saw what was happening and whispered, "Guide, take your post."

Muttering, the sergeant knelt, jerked the number two stake from the ground, and resumed the position of attention.

The parade continued.

\$15.00 to Maj T. D. Parsons



✿ NO EXPERT ON MILITARY AFFAIRS HAS BETTER EARNED the right to respectful attention than B. H. Liddell Hart. For two generations he has brought to the problems of war and peace a rare combination of professional competence and imaginative insight. His predictions and his warnings have often proved correct.

In his *Deterrent or Defense* (Praeger, \$4.95) he examines the military position of the West, and he offers his prescription. The book weaves together three essays which Capt Hart wrote in 1952, 1954, and 1956. They have a remarkable consistency and retain validity and freshness in 1960.

The central problem we face is clear enough. The Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery anywhere on the face of the planet now makes certain that a nuclear war would be a war of mutual devastation. The notion that the Free World can be protected simply by the threat of "massive retaliation" is no longer tenable.

On the "New Look" Policy

On these grounds Capt Hart attacks the Eisenhower Administration's New Look policy and quotes Richard Nixon as saying: "We have adopted a new principle. Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars, we will rely in the future on massive mobile retaliatory powers." Hart adds, as his opinion: "Any further threats or proposals along the 'Nixon line' would be the surest way to break up the Atlantic Alliance and open the gates to Communism."

A review

of B. H. Liddell Hart's

1960 book:

Deterrent

By John F. Kennedy

The grand theme of Hart's book comes to this: the West must be prepared to face down Communist aggression, short of nuclear war, by conventional forces. He advocates an expansion of such forces under NATO command, an increase in the mobility of conventional forces to deal with conflicts outside Europe, and the creation of a United Nations standby force of about 20,000 men including reserves.

Behind this theme is a judgment: that responsible leaders in the West will not and should not deal with limited aggression by unlimited weapons whose use could only be mutually suicidal. This has, of course, also been the theme of books in this country by responsible military leaders such as Generals Gavin and Taylor.

I share Capt Hart's judgment; and, whatever our military theories have been, since 1945 we have, in fact, dealt with limited aggression by limited means—from the Berlin airlift to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. But I would put our problem in a somewhat different way. I believe the central task of American and Western military policy is to make all forms of Communist aggression irrational and unattractive. From this basis of strength, I believe we must press on with more vigor—and a greater sense of hope than Hart would allow—to seek in negotiation with the Russians effective means of arms control.

Hart—like many Europeans—underestimates the American task of maintaining the security and effectiveness of the American nuclear deterrent. We face a real

Four chapters appeared originally in the Gazette and here's a timely sequel written by the President last year while serving in the Senate

nt or Defense



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problem over the next several years in guaranteeing that our deterrent is safe from sudden attack and capable of effective penetration of Soviet defenses. We have no right to tempt Soviet planners and political leaders with the possibility of catching our aircraft and unprotected missiles on the ground, in a gigantic Pearl Harbor. This is our first defense problem.

Second, we must bring into being as fast as our resources permit the new generation of mobile missiles, notably Polaris and Minuteman. We need these missiles not merely to provide an untargetable Free World deterrent, but also for a more constructive reason. The relative security from attack which the new mobile missiles allow should diminish the need for hair-trigger decisions and should give the United States, and the world as a whole, a greater degree of stability.

Expansion of NATO

Third, as Hart makes very clear indeed, we must think through afresh the military mission of NATO. Gen Norstad desires to see his force expanded modestly to 30 divisions. The purpose of this expansion is not to fight a conventional war in Europe. It is to provide a persuasive deterrent to the Russian temptation to seek a limited advance in Europe, on the assumption that the West's only protection is a nuclear attack the West would not use. Here we should note a point Hart emphasizes repeatedly: the European members of NATO have a larger population than Russia. He concludes: "It makes no sense that the NATO countries should

continue to live in mortal fear of a nation inferior in population and material resources, and remain impaled on the horns of a defeat or suicide dilemma."

Hart believes the course of wisdom might be for the European nations to abandon atomic weapons and concentrate on conventional forces, leaving to the United States the task of deterring Soviet atomic strength. There is some basis for this view; and, in any case, the bulk of the job of deterring Soviet nuclear capabilities must continue to be with the United States. It is more likely, however, that the European nations will prefer another solution. Our partners may wish to create a NATO deterrent, supplementary to our own, under a NATO nuclear treaty. Unless the Russians agree very soon to an effective arms control system, with adequate inspection provisions, nuclear knowledge and weapons will spread. This inevitable trend must be effectively and responsibly organized. It would be uneconomic and unwise for each of our partners to build a wholly independent nuclear system. We need arrangements which would permit the rich scientific talents and rapidly expanding economic resources of Western Europe to contribute to the deterrence of nuclear war, without increasing the instability of the military position and without wasting European resources in the futile efforts of each nation to create its own nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities. Each of these objectives must be kept in mind in a new approach to the organization of NATO.

Fourth, as I have repeatedly proposed, we should take

steps to give greater mobility—by air and by sea—to our conventional forces in the Army and Marines. The purpose of such steps is not to fight unlimited wars but to remove the temptation to Moscow and Peking now represented by their immobility. Our troops dribbled into Lebanon in 1958 over a period of several weeks in a manner that would have been extremely dangerous if hostilities had occurred.

NATO and Mobility

Fifth, United Nations forces must be ready for instant movement. Our experiences in the Middle East and, more recently in the Congo underline the importance of such a force and its mobility.

The creation of this range of deterrents cannot be, simply, the avoidance of war. It must exist to provide a stable and secure base for the active pursuit of an arms control agreement.

Hart discusses the question of arms control in his final chapter, entitled "The Most Hopeful Road to Peace." Although his discussion is incomplete, the chapter should be widely read; for he emphasizes some of the real difficulties we confront, notably because of the pace of technological change in weapons and the possibilities of concealment from inspection.

Those, like myself, who believe a much greater effort should be made to create proposals for arms control and to place them in negotiation have a duty to make clear that the task is extraordinarily difficult and technically complex. There are no easy paths out of the arms race in which we—and all humanity—are caught up; and the sober counsel of men like Hart should be heeded. On the other hand, we must try.

The design of an arms control system is as complex a task as the design of a military system. It must be approached with all the professional skills we can command: technological, military, and diplomatic. And these skills must be unified in the Executive Branch under the President's direction. If we are to achieve effective arms control, it will not come about in a romantic moment of human redemption. It will come about because we have carefully designed new forms of controlled military systems and methods of mutual inspection; and because we have persuaded the Russians that it is in their interest as well as ours to accept them and to make them work.

Arms Control Depends on US Strength

Is it likely that we can persuade the Russians to enter into an effective arms control agreement?

They are not going to take arms control negotiations seriously if they calculate the United States may be vulnerable to a surprise attack during the gap period.

They are not going to take arms control negotiations seriously unless they are convinced that we shall soon have an invulnerable, mobile deterrent.

They are not going to take arms control negotiations seriously unless they know they face a Free World which has the unity, the will, and the resources to deal with limited aggression and with nuclear blackmail.

They are not going to take arms control negotiations seriously unless the United States presents to them careful, detailed and well-staffed proposals which evidently

have the full backing of the President, the Executive Branch, and the Congress.

They are not going to take arms control negotiations seriously if they are enjoying success in penetrating Free Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America by a mixture of nuclear blackmail, economic penetration, and ideological attraction.

The United States and the Free World have a long agenda of common action if we are to create the conditions for a serious negotiation of an arms control agreement. But if we fulfill these conditions, I am not without hope. That hope is based on two solid facts.

First, the march of modern science and technology is presenting the Russians and ourselves with an apparently endless flow of new possibilities for mutual destruction. Now missiles; soon, perhaps, extremely expensive forms of missile defense; before long further possibilities for mutual destruction by the military exploitation of space. So long as the arms race goes on, each side is under unrelenting pressure to exploit these possibilities for fear of the disadvantage that would result if the other side got ahead. But sober, human common sense argues—and will steadily argue—that a means be found to call a halt.

Second, the knowledge of nuclear weapons is spreading and it will continue to spread. The instabilities that might result from this diffusion of nuclear weapons are equally dangerous to Russian and to American interests. They raise the possibility of a nuclear war triggered by some third party.

Reason for Hope

No cheap optimism is justified on the basis of these facts. But there is an area of overlapping interest between Russians and Americans. It is the duty of American statesmen to exploit that overlap.

In following this course, we should bear in mind a few impressive lines of advice from Hart's book: "Keep strong, if possible. In any case, keep cool. Have unlimited patience. Never corner an opponent, and always assist him to save face. Put yourself in his shoes—so as to see things through his eyes. Avoid self-righteousness like the devil—nothing is so self-blinding."

I have faith that the human race can make its way through the treacherous mine field represented by the arms race in weapons of mass destruction. If it is to do so, however, American political leaders must not mistake slogans and discourtesy for strength; and Russian political leaders would be well advised to avoid the same error.

The Russian leaders must understand that we are men who are committed in every fiber of our being not merely to protect our nation but also to struggle for the cause of freedom on the world scene; that we are not men who can be pressed, by blackmail or by force, to accept the transfer of territories and peoples to Communist rule.

In the 1960s it is our work, not our rhetoric, which constitutes the real test of our survival. In this age a responsible course includes equally a strengthening of the Free World's defense and new, purposeful efforts to bring the weapons of mass destruction under effective international control. This is the real strategy of peace.

US & MC

Israel is a new nation with new ideas on military organization and she, also, has felt the influence of Liddell Hart



Extracted from *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, Dec 1960

☛ IT IS THE CUSTOM TO START AN ARTICLE BY TELLING the readers what one purports to achieve in it. I find myself slightly in difficulty about that. Any army reflects the nation it serves and its peculiar defense problems; the fact that the Israeli Army has succeeded twice in a decade in disposing of a threat to the nation's existence—this fact only proves that we have realized so far a satisfactory formula for our own needs; it does not mean that this answer is necessarily the right one elsewhere. I shall do my best to be objective and point out weaknesses where I can see them—but as an insider, I may be blind to some.

The Counter Guerrilla Stage

From 1921 to 1936 the British Mandate Government did not allow the Jews to have a self-defense force while at the same time refraining from fighting the Arab side when the onslaught came. This compelled the Hagana to be an underground army, introducing habits of night operations, quick moves. It had to develop methods based on fast raids on the enemy bands, aiming at their destruction and getting rid of local threats. This also necessitated a particularly strong emphasis on the

gathering of intelligence material, as one had to know for certain where and when to strike.

It was in the third of these periods of local war, in 1936-1939, that the Hagana had the privilege of being helped actively by a junior British officer, Capt Orde Wingate (he was allowed to do it by Gen Wavell). The tactics I have described, or as we call them, Gideon tactics, fitted entirely his own notions, and he certainly improved our performance greatly. The similarity between Wingate's deep penetration techniques in Ethiopia and in Burma and the Israeli penetration raids in 1954-56 and the Sinai Campaign itself is obvious. And it is a fact that all the Israeli Chiefs of Staff up to this day are men who fought with and under Wingate in 1937-38, including Generals Yadin, Dayan, and Laksov.

The Regular Touch

During WWII Hagana cadres got their formal training and also their first acquaintance with administration and logistics. As in fact more than 30,000 men joined the British forces (besides those units of the Hagana that remained in Palestine) out of a population of 450,000; this was relatively an important effort—and



Israeli field officers—in the field. Officers are young by US standards. Present commanders of the Navy and Air Force are both in their thirties.



British MajGen Orde Wingate, shown here in Burma before his death in 1944, served with the Hagana 1936-39 as a captain and had a profound influence

also had a strong return effect in the shaping of the future Israeli Army.

One of the most important efforts deployed by the Hagana, in accordance with British requests, was the creation of special forces of a raiding nature. Both the long-range desert patrol, the SAS of David Starling, and the Royal Marine Commandos, contained Hagana trained elements, and a special Hagana company supplied men who were parachuted into the Balkans and Central Europe on individual missions. Here again was a source of unorthodox tactics that has left its mark.

Doctrine

Faced with the need of having a maximum mobilizational capability, the Israeli doctrine has had to make a choice between fuller mobilization for a shorter period and lesser mobilization for a larger one. Even such ideas as to scrap the Navy entirely, as it was not vital to quick victory, the battle being a land battle, were considered at the time. The final result has been a semi-total mobilization but still keeping enough of our vital services, munitions productions, and a Navy, so as to be able to replenish partially at least and sustain a relatively long conflict. There is even the possibility of going over to a prolonged defense, provided we have at least reached better positions, mainly in the center. The Navy's function will then be to defend our lines of supply from abroad, which would then assume utmost importance. Again, any Israeli slowness in reaction might mean being faced with superior odds from the start. This has led both to the development of a fast mobilization system and to a defense policy of trying not to let ourselves be played into such a situation. It has also meant developing quick tactics, dynamism, and drive in leadership, taking risks whenever necessary—with the objective in mind at all times.

Basically, we have to provide for two missions: a

shield to contain enemy penetration, and a quick moving counter-stroke force capable of taking over the initiative immediately and removing the threat altogether.

Now for the strategic counter-stroke. We cannot achieve a high superiority in numbers, but we have available ample room for maneuvering—as the armies on both sides are relatively small compared to the length of the front. We can therefore build up a counter-offensive by utilizing the indirect approach and striking at the forward bases of the aggression—or farther into their main bases (perhaps with the exception of the Egyptian delta and Iraq). In fact, there is a circle of desert or high mountains passing at about 100 kilometers from our borders, which, if occupied, would provide a good defensive obstacle, sufficient to make it clear to the other side that his aggression had failed.

The Air Force belongs both to the shield—covering the mobilization and interdicting the main axis of the flow of enemy forces—and to the striking force. By trying to create a favorable air-situation, it can help the main counter-offensive, as also by isolating the chosen battlefield, or supplying forward forces in a quick move and taking part in airborne operations.

The Navy's role lies mainly in achieving a favorable naval situation so as to enable us to keep our link with the rest of the world in case the war tends to prolong itself. It should also be able to protect our merchant navy, a national venture which has been quite successful. (We started from zero in 1948 and have now in operation some 250,000 tons.)

Looking at the Sinai Campaign, one can check if the practical results are in accord with the theory. In fact, the offensive in Sinai made full use of these strategical notions, annihilating the Egyptian forces in Sinai and the Gaza Strip by a very wide flanking movement, working "backwards" from the canal to Gaza.

Leadership in the Field

Everybody in the Army knows that when it proves possible we should try to achieve our result with the minimum losses—by an indirect approach (Liddell-Hart is greatly admired and studied in Israel) or avoiding enemy positions. But if the order to conquer an enemy position is given, this means it is a must, and the fate of the battle will depend on it. It is generally customary for the higher commander to see it in person that the urgency of his order is understood by the existing unit. In the Sinai Campaign, after our armor had penetrated behind the main enemy position of Abu-Aweigla, by using a flank that had been opened by the infantry, the Egyptians rushed in their main Armor reserve of about 150 tanks and motorized infantry brigade. There was some danger of our armor becoming stuck and cut off, and Gen Dayan decided that the main position would now be attacked frontally, too, so as to cut through it towards our armor. The reserve brigade that got this order was slow in its execution, though being a reserve brigade had nothing to do with it, as all the rest were also reserve units. It thus didn't achieve much progress during the first night after the command had been given. Though there were two levels of command between the CinC and the brigade (front and division), Gen Dayan was there in the morning, dismissed the brigade commander and appointed another who took Abu Aweigla the next night.

Again, it is the task of the company and the platoon commanders to lead their men under fire; the order of assault is "after me." It is a fact that out of the 180 men killed in the Sinai, one-third were officers or leaders at NCO level. This is a very high proportion but it explains why very few assaults failed, why the tempo of the advance was kept up—and why we came out victorious in a campaign involving 30,000 men on each side with only 180 men lost. It creates a relationship of complete confidence of the men in the officers.

The Age of the Cadres

I come now to the age problem. In this aspect the Israeli Army is certainly an exception. When created in 1948 the average age of the officer corps was very low, quite naturally. But in 1960 it has still not gone up. Although the legal retiring ages are the same as elsewhere, the policy has been one of a much shorter career. A lieutenant is about 21-24, a captain 23-28, a major 27-32, a lieutenant colonel 29-35, a colonel 30-40, a general 35-45. Since 1949 the Chiefs of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, when appointed, were aged 34, 32, 40, 37. The present Commanders of the Navy and the Air Force are both in their thirties, and so is one of the three front commanders, the two others being in their early forties. The same goes for the generals heading four departments of the General Staff.

I would compare this with the rule, enforced in most Navies, of a maximum age of 35 or 36 for a submarine commander. The Israeli Defense Forces have to react like a submarine and quick reflexes and the full ardor of youth are demanded from the leadership. A lot may be lost by the non-utilization of the kind of experience that comes with age, but it has been thought less important in the defense of a country whose capital is on

the front itself and whose main center is at 15 kilometers from it.

This could have created a deficiency in the economic re-absorption of these cadres when they leave the forces at 40, but the continuous expansion of the economy, because of the influx of immigration, has solved that problem. To cite an example, an ex-chief of staff, Gen Maklev, is now at the head of our phosphate-works, our national airline, etc., and it has been similarly relatively easy to deal with the lower ranking officers—although this was never a legal obligation of the Government. The men have had to find their way almost without help, and I can summarize this aspect by stating that the Armed Forces do not appear as a career in Israel, but rather as a mission, a moral obligation.

Assault Tactics

As a result of the historical development I sketched at the start, there is a lot of confidence in night operations. As night provides many advantages in the advance to assault positions, or in infiltration tactics, you will find that 80 per cent of infantry attacks have been night-attacks, both in 1948 and in the Sinai Campaign. Whatever artillery support is available, we always prefer the cover of night—plus the use of artillery by night wherever possible. Surprisingly it has not been too difficult to continue in this tradition of night operations, even after the generation of ex-anti-British commando operators had been sacrificed in the 1948 war. New immigrants who knew nothing of the country or had been town-dwellers all their lives, were indoctrinated, with every effort tending to make them feel confident by night, and good results have indeed been achieved.

Battalion and company assaults, and sometimes even brigade assaults, are generally based on deep penetration tactics and attacks from the rear. In fact, the general infantry doctrine looks rather like commando tactics. The same goes for the smaller units. A platoon or even a section is often sent deep behind the enemy position to cut off a road, blow up a bridge, or to meet other units in a converging infiltration aimed at starting the attack from the inside. All this is possible under the cover of night, but demands a peculiar training at NCO level. In fact the difference between NCOs and officers in the fighting arms is rather one of stages of development than one of conception. A section leader undergoes a course lasting 3-4 months, after having finished his training as a private, the aim being to teach him to lead his men in battle, whether independently or within a platoon. An officer is a man who has passed that course, served another year as an NCO and has then been sent to an officer's course lasting about 6-8 months, and has had a year's experience commanding his platoon afterwards. He has to agree to a prolongation of his national service so as to have a full year of experience before going over to the reserve. This is a condition of admission to the officer's school. In practice, therefore, an officer's national service lasts about 3-3½ years. There is no entry other than from the ranks and through the section leader stage. Another remark about training is that there is very little emphasis on drill.

USMC

They went to France to fight. They fought, and returned to infuse in a later generation of Marines the aggressive spirit that characterized the Corps in WWII and Korea—as it does today.



Erskine


Cates

Lejeune



Holcomb

Hermie



The Eternal



Pershing to Lejeune—Legion of Honor and DSM

"This high name of distinction and soldierly reputation are Marines today have received from those who have also received from them the eternal spirit which"

THE SECOND ASSAULT OF THE BATTLE KICKED OFF EARLY on 19 July 1918. From the forest and through thick wheatfields sprinkled with red poppies and yesterday's corpses came fresh regiments of Gen Mangin's Colonial Army; came French legionnaires and black Zouaves and the 1st and 2d Divisions of American Regulars with their brigades of soldiers and the 4th Brigade of Marines—came thousands and thousands of men intent on gaining victory from a German enemy at a place in France called Soissons.

Yesterday the 5th Marines had attacked, had gained their objectives and been shot to hell. Today it was the turn of the Brigade's other regiment, the 6th Marines and today the objective was the town of Vierz.



Shepherd

Rockey



H. M. Smith

Waller



Hunt



Daly

Quick



O. P. Smith

Noble



Bearss

al Spirit

By Capt Robert B. Asprey

ldierlyrepute we who
those who preceded us in the Corps. With it we
pirit which has animated our Corps from generation to generation . . ."— John A. Lejeune

Down at Battalion headquarters the major commanding watched his captains and lieutenants stand and in feigned nonchalance blow whistles and wave canes to the advance. The major's name was Thomas Holcomb. Eighteen years later he would be named Commandant of the Marine Corps, but of course he didn't know that. He was thinking of nothing more than the immediate future while feeling that mixture of pride and sadness that by now was all too familiar to him. Then the battle closed in to shut from his mind everything but what he must do to help win it.

Similarly, when the Boche cannons and Maxim machine guns cut loose through the wheatfields to challenge individual survival, other men holding other





Marines on the move in France. Most of them hadn't served in the Corps long. They learned to fight the hard way—in combat—and the Germans found they resented comparison with other rifle regiments.

thoughts forgot them for the fight. The only answer they knew to the challenge lay in moving forward—a maxim that to the new men had sounded simple enough in training, but now seemed very complex in the bewildering fury of death.

Still, there were veterans to keep the show going. When, as had happened in other assaults, a captain commanding the 96th Company of Holcomb's battalion fell, a young lieutenant replaced him and the assault continued. To this lieutenant, as to his men, the battle mounted until each minute of life seemed like a wonderful gift. For an instant he wondered how he or anyone else could survive the morning.

The Issue Was in Doubt

At that point a bullet caught him in the shoulder. He had been hit, gassed in other actions, and now he kept going towards his objective, binding the wound as best he could. Then German artillery found him. A shell fragment caught him in one knee. The shell killed most of his people and its concussion blew off his trousers.

More dead than alive he found some cover, organized a defense, and wrote this message to Maj Holcomb:

"I am in an old abandoned French trench bordering on road leading out from your CP and 350 yards from an old mill. I have only 2 men out of my company and 20 out of some other company. We need support but it is almost suicide to try and get it here as we are swept by machine gun fire and a constant barrage is on us. I have no one on my left and only a few on my right. I will hold.

Cates, 2d Lt., 96th Co."

The spirit behind this message is made the more remarkable by the man who wrote it. One might expect such an attitude from, say, a professional like Foch (who four years earlier had written similarly to Joffre); or from Dan Daly, a hard-bitten Marine NCO whose immortal shout, "Come on, you sons-of-bitches, do you want to live forever!" had rung through Belleau Wood but a month before. But Clifton B. Cates, although destined 30 years later to be named the 19th Comman-

dant of the Marine Corps, on that particular morning at Soissons was 25 years old—a veteran of just over one year's service.

He was not alone in his newness. In 1916 Marine Corps strength had amounted to 344 officers and 9,921 enlisted; now, in mid-1918, it was fast approaching its peak strength of just over 75,000 officers and men. Many of them were to become as important to the Corps as Cates. Fighting in the 4th Marine Brigade were such junior officers as Graves Erskine, Lemuel Shepherd, Keller Rockey, Leroy Hunt, Leo Hermle, O. P. Smith, and Alfred Noble, to name only a few. Like Lt Cates, these officers and their men only months before had been college students, farmers, lumberjacks, lawyers, and businessmen—then awkward, gangling recruits unfamiliar with their rifles, displeased with heavy gas respirators, bewildered by terms like Irish pennants and scuttlebutt, and annoyed by their NCO's constant attention to their rifles which they kept clean or else.

Yet these same troops in less than two months, at Belleau Wood and Soissons, had earned a great fighting reputation. The French renamed a vast forest in honor of their Corps and henceforth until the end of the war would use them solely as assault forces in the final offensive actions. Fighting like wildcats they ignored mud and slime and wounds to etch the globe-and-anchor forever in the pages of military history. Cates himself was wounded seven times. He was recommended for a Medal of Honor, awarded a Navy Cross, a Distinguished Service Cross with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Croix de Guerre with Two Palms and a Gold Star, and the Silver Star and Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Clusters!

Much of the credit, of course, must go to the young officers and men involved. But much credit must also be given to the cadre of professional officers and NCOs whose superb leadership instilled such an unconquerable *esprit de corps* throughout the Brigade in such a short time. The achievement of men like Thomas Holcomb, H. M. Smith, Fred Wise, Hiking Hiram Bearss, Littleton W. T. Waller, Jr., John Quick, and Dan Daly—again to name only a few—is the more remarkable because war on the Western Front was as new to the

Nobody thought the inexperienced American Marines could stop the veteran Germans, but they did—and established a reputation that altered the future of the Corps.

old-timers as to the recruits. The former simultaneously faced and solved the enormous problem of adaptation. Yet they effectively trained their troops to the extent that from the beginning they pounded veteran German legions into the dust.

This achievement alone removes the record in France from the dustbin of history—as will be seen, it completely altered the future of the Marine Corps. But to understand this is to grasp something of the spirit behind Cates' words, "I will hold." It is to understand something of the fighting in France.

Lt Cates, like most other combat Marines in France, was a member of the 4th Marine Brigade which consisted of the 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion—about 250 officers and 8,200 enlisted. The Brigade fought as part of the 2nd Division of the American Regulars which included the Army's veteran 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments and which was finally commanded by a Marine, John A. Lejeune.

War for Lt Cates and the Brigade began in March, 1918, with on-the-job training in sub-sectors of the Verdun front. There Marines were shelled and gassed, bitten by cooties and scared by trench rats until May, 1918, when the 2nd Division graduated into ready reserve—a very important state.

Like an orange tree bursting into bloom before death, the German had resumed the offensive in the spring of 1918. By May, 40 of his divisions were charging down the Marne Valley towards Paris, an offensive challenged by a few worn French divisions which only could fight futile rearguard actions.

While Marshal Foch was struggling to find more French troops, Gen Pershing aided him by giving him temporary command of all American troops in France. Foch threw elements of the 3rd and 28th Divisions into a new defensive line at Chateau Thierry, then ordered the 2nd Division into a defensive position to the northwest. By 1 June 1918 the first elements of the Army and Marine brigades had deployed across the Paris-Metz road not far from a place called Belleau Wood.

The eyes of France stared on the Americans and though everyone prayed they would stop the dreaded Boche, few believed they could. Had the French evalu-



Cates: "... we are swept by machine gun fire and a constant barrage is on us. I have no one on my left and only a few on my right. I will hold."

ated the Marine Brigade, they likely would have remained unimpressed with its combat readiness. They would have pointed out that this was war, not isolated company or platoon action against Chinese fanatics. Filipino insurgents, Nicaraguan or Haitian rebels ill-led by such as Aguinaldo, Christopher, or Charlemagne. In such actions Krag-Jorgenson rifles and sometimes Colt 6mm machine guns had won the day against rabble armed with obsolete rifles and bamboo cannon.

No, this was real war in France—sophisticated war in which divisions fought divisions and armies fought armies. Poison gas and tanks and heavy artillery were the order of the fighting day, an environment totally unfamiliar to the Marine old-timers. They, like their recruits, struggled with awkward gas respirators and tripped over themselves in narrow, low trenches and had to learn about rolling barrages and no-man's land and star flares and the Hotchkiss machine gun and French attack formations. Nor had they any more experience with the enemy than their recruits. And the enemy was sophisticated, trained in Mauser and Maxim, backed by 77s and 105s and the bigger stuff. The enemy knew all about gas and knew, too, the day was not far away from a battlefield of growing wheat and blooming red poppies into which he would debouch in a strength made the stronger by recent victory.

If the Marines, themselves, held any doubts they



BGen C. A. Doyen (left), Maj H. M. Smith, France

hid them well. Units formed, moved into position, dug in, and waited. There were a few skirmishes, some casualties. Lt Lemuel Shepherd got hit in the preliminaries, but he had heard a lot about tradition and refused to be evacuated. Other men also learned. When the French fell back on the new line, one of their officers ordered the retreat of the 5th Marines 51st Company. The Marines laughed at that and a Marine officer, without knowing his words would add to the tradition, answered, "Retreat, hell, we just got here."

Attack Hit 5th Marines

The German hit them hard on the evening of 4 June, his main force striking the 5th Marines. Division artillery met the attack far out and hurt it, but the green-gray soldiers kept coming on through the fields. Their advance was covered by a fan of artillery which the Marines soon learned was distressingly accurate. The Marines, crouched variously against exploding shells, watched their enemy come, and while they watched their fingers crept around Springfield and automatic rifle triggers. Nervous machine gunners checked sights, men chewed tobacco, some sweated, others cursed quietly until ordered to open fire.

Everyone but the Marines was surprised when enemy forms began dropping 700 yards out. This was disciplined rifle fire and it caused the Boche to pause, to wonder what was happening. Then the wonderful little French 75s caught the range and sprouted the fields with white clouds of death. When the enemy moved forward to escape the lethal air the Marines opened up with chaut-chauts, machine guns—and still the riflemen sighted in and squeezed off. The Boche broke.

That day the French learned a few things about the Marines. They learned that men could be trained into a tradition in a few months—or at least that part of a tradition that made men wait for an enemy, then kill when he came. They learned for the first time that rifles were something more than objects on which to fix bayonets (they had missed the example offered by superb British rifle fire from 1914 on). Their astonishment was reported by Maj Frank Evans, Adjutant of the 6th Marines, who wrote to the Commandant:

"... The French, who were in support of the Fifth Marines and at one time thrown into the line, could not, and cannot today, grasp the rifle fire of the men. That men should fire deliberately and use their sights, and adjust their range, was beyond their experience. . . .

The French would witness more of that rifle fire and so would the Germans—and they would continue to be impressed in the first case, damaged in the second.

The German was stopped but not beaten, and the new defensive line had now to be straightened, certain strongpoints taken. The 5th Marines were given Hill 142 and Torcy of Belleau Wood. The 6th Marines were to take the eastern edge of the wood and the village of Bouresches.

They kicked off at 1700 on 6 June 1918. Someone recalled that it was a "wonderful day—the twilight is so long here that it was practically daylight." After a short but furious artillery and machine gun barrage, platoons moved out in four waves of 12 men each at five-yard intervals, 50 feet between waves. This was the prescribed French tactic—and it immediately proved the worst possible formation for open country assault. A survivor later wrote about it:

"We moved forward at a slow pace, keeping perfect lines. Men were being mowed down like wheat. A 'whizz-bang' [HE shell] hit on my right, and an automatic team which was there a moment ago disappeared, while men on the right and left were armless, legless, or tearing at their faces. We continued to advance until about fifty yards from the woods, when something hit me and I spun around and hit flat. . . . I heard later that my company had 1 officer and 29 men left when we reached the objective. We had gone to the sector with 8 officers and 250 men."

The experience was common to both regiments. Capt Duncan, commanding the 96th Company of Maj Holcomb's 2ndBn, 6th Marines, was wounded almost immediately (and later killed when a shell struck his dressing station). By the time his lieutenants, Cates and Robertson, reached Bouresches with 23 men, Cates had been wounded once. While Robertson rushed off for reinforcement, Cates organized a defensive position around one chaut-chaut and somehow managed to hold

until Robertson returned with some men. The objective was taken. Similarly, although other infantry waves were decimated they refused to break. A few men got through, a sergeant or corporal stayed alive to take over, and finally it was hand grenade and bayonet and the Boche outposts were pushed in.

Marines won the day, but they paid for victory. Battalions were reduced to companies, companies to platoons. The men who fought on found their positions painfully weak, in some cases all but surrounded by the enemy. The latter, at first startled, then scared, fell back, re-formed, and discovered he still had strength and the will to fight. Knowing this, the Marines called for replacements.

Because the German is nothing if he is not stubborn and because he did not want to lose Belleau Wood, the fight continued in earnest and the Marines again and again called for replacements. Until 26 June when a Marine major notified Brigade that Belleau Wood was "U.S. Marine Corps entirely," men fought with rifle, bayonet, chaut-chaut, and Hotchkiss; men were gassed and shelled and shot and many died and many more were wounded.

From the first day's assault the pattern of the battle and of future battles was established. Now the French learned that the spirit of the assault was part of the tradition, was everywhere rampant within Marine units. Although the Marines soon abandoned the French attack formation and avoided suicidal frontal assaults on machine gun nests, they sacrificed nothing of their ag-



Disciplined, accurate rifle fire was the decisive factor. Enemy forms began dropping 700 yards out.

gressive dash. If an attack were held up or stopped, they dug in, fought fierce counter-attacks with calm, accurate rifle fire. Then they again took the initiative. When their officers dropped, and many did, junior officers moved easily into vacant commands, and when these dropped, senior NCOs stepped forward. It was not uncommon to find corporals leading platoons by the time an assault was driven home.

The German was as surprised as the French. Midway through Belleau Wood the enemy noted that:

"the various attacks by both of the Marine Regiments were carried out with vigor and without consideration of losses. The moral effect of our firearms did not materially check the advance of the infantry. The nerve of the Americans is still unshaken."

When the German captured a few Marines he learned that:

"the spirit of the troops is high and they possess an innocent self-confidence. A characteristic expression of the prisoners is 'we kill or get killed' . . . The prisoners consider their membership in the Marine Corps as something of an honor. They proudly resent any attempts to place their regiments on a par with other infantry regiments. . . ."

Early in the fight a German soldier, Private Hebel, noted that:


"We are having very heavy days with death hourly before us . . . we have Americans [Marines] opposite us who are terribly reckless fellows."

A Lt Tillman of the famed Prussian Guards found the night of 9-10 June "the worst night of my life. [The Marines] fight like devils."

The spirit bred commonplace heroics. During a German gas attack on the night of 12-13 June, Lt Cates watched a gunnery sergeant named Stockman rip off his own gas mask to put it on a wounded private whose mask had been torn. Of course, the sergeant later died. Cates himself was badly burned by the gas but when his company was evacuated he joined another one and led a successful defense against two enemy counter-attacks.

Daly and Shepherd Hit

Nearly all the Marines at Belleau Wood were gassed or wounded. Dan Daly was hit and evacuated. Lt Shepherd was hit a second time, this time evacuated. Lt Worton was gassed and badly wounded, eventually sent home. Maj Cole, commanding the Machine Gun Battalion, was killed early. Capt Osterhout took over until Maj Littleton W. T. Waller, Jr., relieved him. Lt Graves Erskine was wounded but stayed to fight. Twenty days of vicious forest fighting made death and pain handmaidens to those who survived. The Marines suffered more casualties at Belleau Wood than any other American brigade would suffer during the rest of the war. Of the 2nd Division's 1,811 battle deaths in this action, 1,062 were Marines; of 7,252 other casualties, about 3,615 were Marines. Although a high price to pay for the objectives, far higher prices had been paid for offensives fought by the French, British, and German *without* the objectives being taken. Moreover, the Marines were ready to keep right on charging. Soon



MajGen O. P. Smith, visiting 1stMarDiv cemetery in Korea, typifies the fighting spirit that spanned the years from Soissons to the Chosin breakout.

after the fight Maj Evans wrote the Commandant:

"The men have learned that the officers will lead them anywhere, and the men worship them."

One of the troops, Pvt Wahl, wrote of his fellows:

"They walk right into rifle and machine-gun fire in the most matter-of-fact way. They have just taken the *Boche* off their feet. We haven't given them a minute's rest."

The grim determination of successful assault that permeated the Marine ranks was not lost to the French who now viewed the 2nd Division and its Marines with almost mystical respect. Overjoyed at the victory—a miniature First Battle of the Marne—French officialdom vied in honoring the Division and the Marine Brigade. Both were named in French army orders, as were numerous officers and men who also were heavily decorated by their own government. Village civilian mayors close to the fighting sent letters of gratitude. Topping the honors was the order issued by Gen Degoulette, commanding the French 6th Army:

" . . . Henceforth in all official communications the Bois de Belleau will bear the name of Bois de la Brigade de Marine."

The spirit displayed at Belleau Wood was repeated at Soissons by both the 1st and 2nd American Divisions of which Gen Mangin later wrote:

"You rushed to the attack as to a festival. Your magnificent courage completely routed a surprised enemy and your indomitable courage checked the

counter-attacks of his fresh divisions—91 guns, 7,200 prisoners, immense booty, 10 kilometers of country liberated; this is your portion of the spoil of this victory.”

For the Brigade, August passed quietly with a week or so on the Marbache Sector followed by training for the St. Mihiel offensive. The Marines fought this one from 12-16 September. Transferred to Gen Gouraud's 4th French Army, they next spearheaded the assault of Blanc Mont, a victory created by the strategical brilliance of John A. Lejeune who had assumed command of the 2nd Division in July. Transferred again, this time to the 1st American army, the division began the Meuse-Argonne offensive that ended on 11 November 1918, with units of the 5th Marines occupying the heights on the enemy's side of the Meuse.

Gen Lejeune Reports

At the turn of 1919, Gen Lejeune proudly summed up Marine Brigade operations in a special order:

“It fought five pitched battles or series of battles, always defeating the enemy, and it has won the right to have inscribed on its banners the names of the brilliant victories won by it at Chateau-Thierry, Soissons, St. Mihiel Salient, Blanc Mont and Argonne-Meuse. Its casualties were 732 officers and 23,653 men, total 24,385. This was about ten percentum of the total casualties of the American Expeditionary Force.”

Today, of course, none of the officers who fought in France fill our atomic age ranks, nor do the weapons, tactics, or strategy of 43 years ago offer much help in modern wars. Yet one of the constant factors that helps to win battles is spirit. It is a fortunate fact that the spirit that was theirs is ours today. It is also very logical.

The older Marines who went to France took with them a deliberate belief in the value of the assault. Their astounding success confirmed everything they heretofore had believed. Henceforth the character of the Marine Corps was to be clearly established to the American nation. Under the aegis of John A. Lejeune, Commandant from 1920 to 1928, the Corps constantly sought and inevitably found its proper aggressive role.

Two of Lejeune's officers, LtCol Earl H. Ellis and Maj Charles D. Barrett, both veterans of France, were instrumental in this development. Ellis wrote an operational study that predicted a new war against the Jap-

anese and suggested how it was to be fought by the Marines. Integral to the forging of the actual instrument was Barrett, who, aided by junior officer veterans of France (for instance, Alfred Noble) wrote the first Landing Force Manual.

Then in 1936 Thomas Holcomb was named Commandant, which meant that five years later he was faced with precisely the same problems of expansion and adaptation that confronted the 1917 fathers. Integral to all subsequent operations in the Pacific was Holland M. Smith, who had held a variety of staff and command jobs in France, and who commanded FMF Pac with such brilliance and intrepidity in WWII that “Howling Mad” Smith became a household word.

So much for the older Marines. To the younger officers who fought in France the experience exercised an ineluctable influence which couldn't be dampened in the lean budget years of the '20s and '30s. Diverse as were these veterans in character and personality, they all left France mindful of the necessity of aggressive spirit if battles were to be won. Scattered throughout posts and stations, none lost an opportunity to spread the philosophy of the offense to their juniors, who in turn saw it pay off in the banana wars and other expeditionary actions of the interim years.

They Carried On

At the beginning of WWII, these same officers were majors or lieutenant colonels and it is probably safe to say that not one operation in the Pacific was fought without at least one of them occupying a key combat command. Cates, for example, was a colonel commanding a regiment at Guadalcanal while Erskine served first as Chief of Staff to H. M. Smith. On Iwo Jima the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions were respectively commanded by Graves Erskine, Clifton Cates, and Keller Rockey. No one there will forget the drive that was demanded (and gained), nor the aggressive spirit that ruled the fighting.

Nor should any American forget the similar spirit that ruled the 1st Marine Division in Korea. It is more than fitting that Gen O. P. Smith, who fought in France, should have instructed his officers and men that there would be no retreat from the Chosin Reservoir: “We will walk out of here as a Marine Division, taking with us our wounded, our dead and our equipment.”

USMC

Eternal Spirit—Eternally

☛ IT WAS A SMALL, friendly officer's club on a Saturday night. Some were singing around the piano, others just relaxing.

We struck up a conversation with a Major who was soon to retire after 30 years of active duty. The Major spent a good deal of the time talking about his experiences in the Banana Wars, WWII, and Korea. He had served with many of the Corps' legendary figures. He spoke nostalgically of Butler, Puller, Diamond, Buckley, Basilone, and others.

Finally we prevailed on the Major to tell us who in his opinion was the greatest of all Marines. The old man's body straightened and he became erect as he listened to what seemed to him an incredibly stupid question.

“I was,” he said without hesitation.

\$15.00 to Capt D. D. Finne



By SgtMaj Benjamin F. Dutton

The IG and S

I RECENTLY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE TRANSCRIPT of a final briefing by the Inspector-General's Team on an inspection of a major unit. Certain items struck me as being of special interest to all Staff NCOs. These items are not directed at any particular unit. However, they impress me as being of sufficient importance to warrant soul-searching consideration by all of us.

I am listing here a few of the deficiencies noted by the IG, together with my comments on each. Blame for these discrepancies should not be placed entirely upon the SNCOs. Because I feel so strongly the position of the SNCO within our Marine Corps rank structure, however, I believe some comments are in order.

Item: Four hundred SNCOs stood the uniform inspection. Their appearance varied from outstanding to below average. SNCOs of two subordinate units were mentioned as being exceptionally well turned-out.

Comment: At first reading my reaction was to throw out my chest in pride because certain of our SNCOs had been singled out for special notice. Then, I wondered, why weren't *all* of them similarly cited? Could it be that we have some "below average" SNCOs in my outfit? We, as SNCOs, are responsible for showing in ourselves "a good example of subordination, courage, zeal, sobriety, neatness, and attention to duty." Can we then excuse or condone any one of us for being "below average" for a uniform inspection? Is this the way to discharge our responsibilities?

Item: Many steel locker doors had been bent and disfigured by forceable entry. This distracted measurably from the appearance of the barracks. Also, many of the bunks lacked proper springs and were in a general state of disrepair.

Comment: Can such conditions exist if the platoon sergeant and the section chief are doing their jobs? Do we see the men under our charge only in formation? In the field? In the classroom? Or in the shop or office? Do we ever get in the squadbay? When a locker door belonging to one of our men is discovered forced open, do we take immediate action to determine just how it

was done? Do we take disciplinary action against the offender? Do we take prompt steps to have the door removed and straightened? (Preferably by the offender.)

In this matter of bunk springs, are we still lifting the mattress at least once a week to see that the bunk frame and springs are kept clean to guard against vermin? If we are, how can a man be found short of bunk springs or the supporting steel straps? When these items are missing, do we take immediate action to see that they are replaced? (Any supply man or police sergeant worth his salt has a number of bunk springs, supporting straps, and nuts and bolts on hand for the repair of bunks and lockers.) Then, after we have initiated this action, do we check back to see that it has been done?

Item: Some of the discrepancies noted were cracked shoes, highlights on service insignia, eccentric haircuts, dirty shirts and neckties.

Comment: It is true that such deficiencies reflect on the unit. However, what is more important in my mind, they cast a more serious reflection on the professional ability of the SNCO directly responsible for the Marines involved. I don't believe such conditions can exist without the SNCO's knowledge.

Item: Some of the more common discrepancies noted were: helmets with the sweat bands improperly mounted; helmets without the liner chinstraps; shelter-halves without all the footstops; clothing not marked or improperly marked; First Aid packets without the notation to destroy the sulfanilamide.

Inspection of clothing and equipment of an alert unit revealed a few unserviceable shoes. Several men didn't have water in their canteens. A few didn't have all the required clothing and individual equipment. Some finish other than linseed oil was being used on rifle stocks, and in some instances poor application of the proper finish detracted from the appearance of the weapons.

Comment: Again, I feel that such conditions are basically the fault of the SNCO directly responsible for the individual. We may be required to mount out

400 SNCOs stood the uniform inspection. Their appearance varied from outstanding to below average. Asks the author: "Can we excuse or condone any one of us for being below average?"



Staff NCOs

on a "hot-war" mission with very little notice. If the combat equipment and individual weapons of our men are not in proper shape, how can we expect them to survive in combat? The man who must use his hands to keep his helmet on while charging through the jungle cannot be using his hands at the same time to fire his weapon. The man whose rifle stock cracks or breaks from drying out—or whose weapon fails to feed or fire because of a malfunction—is lost to us in a fire-fight. If he happens to be the man on your immediate right or left, these things could well cost your life as well as his.

Do we still teach the "Rifleman's Creed"? Do we have men with faulty equipment? If so, survey it. Do we have men short of equipment? Requisition it—and then, instead of sitting back and waiting, continue to keep after the source of supply until they produce it.

Item: This report mentioned 14 fatalities and 12,468 man days lost, costing the government more than \$957,300, and indicated further improvement was desirable.

Comment: Are we, as SNCOs, bearing down enough on safety practice? On the range? In the field? In garrison? The monetary loss indicated in the IG's remark would keep the average unit of regimental size in supplies and equipment for the next six years.

Item: Questioning of enlisted men on basic military subjects indicated that the training program should emphasize the following subjects: map reading, history and traditions of the Marine Corps, bacteriological warfare.

Comment: Can we, as SNCOs, underestimate the importance of map reading to the Marine? Can we possibly forgive failure to indoctrinate thoroughly any Marine in such a subject as the history and traditions of the Corps? Do we know enough about bacteriological warfare *ourselves* to instruct our men properly? We can take care of the "A" and "C" but let's not forget the "B." Just because it's something new and unused to date, we can't overlook the potential of such attack.

Item: In his closing remarks the IG said he left

feeling personally confident that the unit inspected could carry out any assigned mission of either the cold-war or combat type.

Comment: This we can read with pride. Unfortunately, however, in any combat mission there are always those who don't come back. Properly trained, disciplined, and equipped troops have a better chance than those who aren't. As SNCOs we must insure that every man under our supervision is the finest trained, most thoroughly disciplined, and the best equipped combat Marine human effort can produce. We must give each of them the best possible chance of coming back. If we show in ourselves "a good example of subordination, courage, zeal, sobriety, neatness, and attention to duty," we must exercise every quality of leadership known. We must be leaders in correction of such deficiencies as are mentioned above.

It is not enough that we should shrug our shoulders and pass the buck, or the blame, to the company/battery commander, the platoon leader, or the supply officer. I believe we have an equal responsibility to take the initiative in correcting any discrepancy reflecting on our unit. We are not commanders—we are teachers, counselors. But above all, we are leaders. USMC



SgtMaj Dutton stood his first "IG inspection" before shoving off for the Bandit Wars in Nicaragua in '27. After one hitch he joined civilian ranks, stayed 10 years before WWII got him back in haversack (w/4th Mar Div) at Saipan and Iwo Jima. A Philadelphian, he returned there after WWII, wore two hats: Sgt Maj, 1st 155HowBn, USMCR, and City Dept of Recreation employee, until his return to full time active duty in 1950. Hobby: Golf (low 80's). He is now serving as Sergeant Major, Personnel Dept, HQMC.

WANTED:

Hairy Fisted

By 1stLt J. F. O'Connor, USMCR

☛ "I WANNA JOIN THE MARINE CORPS."

"Why, Lad?"

"I wanna learn a trade."

This conversation may not have taken place yet but it soon will. Not too long ago such dialogue would have ruined a recruiter's digestion and possibly one spit-shined toe. Today the response would have to be different. The youth involved would only be answering an ad—a Marine Corps ad.

After nearly 185 years of unparalleled success in using a challenge theme, Corps recruiting posters and literature are beginning to read like excerpts from trade school brochures. The title of one recruiting pamphlet, for example, is *What the Marine Corps Offers You*.

For the first time in its history the Corps has joined the ranks of services which offer everything from a new green uniform to a college degree.

The new theme ignores one all-important fact—there is little more than one basic ingredient needed to make a Marine. That indispensable element is desire.

Throughout its history, the Corps has recognized and exploited this fact. Its recruiting has been based on it. No matter what the medium, Marine Corps procurement has maintained a central theme. It has hurled a challenge at the potential recruit. It has dared him to serve.

Over the years, such slogans as "You're Not Good Enough to be a Marine," "Only 100,000 May Serve," "Want Action? Join the U. S. Marines," enhanced the challenge theme.

Before gray flannel became the uniform of the day on Madison Avenue, the Corps practiced shrewd advertising. It directed its message to the men it wanted.

Because Marine recruiting posters and literature posed a challenge, only the bold responded. Conse-

quently, our ranks were filled by the cocky and the adventuresome. Since we offered little materially and demanded much in devotion and service, we attracted those who wanted to serve.

The change in recruiting approach, characterized by such pamphlets as *What the Marine Corps Offers You*, has probably been inspired by those who argue that the Corps today competes in the market place for men. Time and circumstances have changed tactics and strategy but they have not altered the Corps' appeal.

A youth's reasons for joining a particular branch of the Armed Forces can be, and usually are, varied. Customarily these reasons are directly related to that service's advertising.

A young man may join the Air Force to learn a trade. He may enlist in the Navy to see the world. He may join the Army to sit in front of a radar screen as depicted on that service's recruiting posters. But American youth have enlisted, are enlisting, and will continue to enlist in the Marine Corps for something else. Either they think they are tough and want to prove it or they want to become tough.

Marine recruits come from varied backgrounds. Some are rich; others are poor. A certain number are well educated; many are not. Some have been choir-boys; others know more about reformatories than church. No matter where or what they come from, however, they want to prove something. They want the rugged status that the wearing of the globe and anchor can give them.

If the Corps begins to follow the trend established by other services, it will also encounter similar problems.

Other services have long abandoned pride or challenge as procurement inducements. They no longer emphasize the facts of military life. Little or no men-

d Marines



U.S. MARINE
POST OFFICE BLDG

RECRUITING STATION
CENTERVILLE U. S. A

The kind of advertising that attracts the kind of recruits we want, the author says, is the kind that says "fight," not "learn a trade"

tion is made of stringent discipline, rugged living, or pride in bearing arms. Instead, they have developed a new approach.

Because the public regards education and technical training as a panacea, some services now try to outdo our universities. They've tried everything but growing ivy on barracks walls. In answer to the public's desire for security and fringe benefits, they offer more gimmicks than an insurance salesman.

Their many promises do attract recruits, people who want what is offered. If, by chance, these enlistees don't receive the assignments or schooling for which they joined, disillusionment sets in hard and fast. Because they enlisted for something entirely different, many of the disgruntled will never make fighting men. As far as they are concerned, a rifle or discipline wasn't part of the deal.

The story in the Marine Corps, until this time, has been a completely different one. Recruits joined to fight and to undergo rugged training. The Corps offered and gave nothing more than a chance for them to prove themselves equal to the name, Marine.

In other services, one complaint is heard above all others. Recruits aren't the same caliber they used to be. The modern youth is soft and self-seeking. He wants security. He wants to learn a trade. He approaches a recruiter as if he were browsing through a supermarket.

Some recruiters moan; others curse. The resigned philosophize about the effect of the modern age on youth.

If anyone or any institution is to blame for this condition, it is the military. Instead of emphasizing patriotism, *esprit*, and the facts of military life, the services offer specialist training and more handouts than a welfare state.

If the Marine Corps changes its appeal, if it drops the challenge theme, it will no longer draw the same brand of recruit. In contrast, it will attract those interested in vocational guidance. Drill instructors would then rightfully be replaced by counselors. Parris Island might well become, as comedian Jonathan Winters ironically described it, "One big fun sandpile."

The life's blood of any military organization is its men. Strategy, tactics, supplies and even today's science-fiction weapons mean nothing without men.

The Romans Had a Way

Since ancient times, the military has acquired recruits in various ways. The barbarians replaced casualties by forcing prisoners to serve. The Romans recruited in much the same way we do today. The fleets of the world occasionally impressed seamen. From the days of the Romans, through the American Revolution and on to the more recent times of the Chinese warlords, the military hired mercenaries.

For thousands of years, men have been recognized as the prime asset of any armed force. Unluckily, on occasion, some have confused quantity with quality. Invariably, when the caliber of recruits declined, defeat became imminent. This story has been told time and time again in the pages of history.

Analyzing the Roman Valens' defeat at Adrianople in 378 A.D., historians concluded, "Contributing causes to the decadence of Roman arms . . . proceeded from a progressive decline in the quality and spirit of the troops and in the original rigid requirements anciently essential to acceptance in the military service."

At the height of their military power, the Romans placed great emphasis on selective recruiting. Theorizing that peasants were inured to physical hardship, and consequently adjusted more easily to the rigors of military life, they preferred rural youth to city boys. The Romans considered the proper enlistment age to be at puberty. They felt that instruction was more readily absorbed and more lastingly imprinted on the mind at this age. Vegetius writes that the ancients favored the tallest men they could find. They waived this requisite, however, in favor of strength.

Although Roman standards seem unrealistic, their attitude toward procurement was eminently practical.

Commenting on the decline of the Roman military, Vegetius wrote, "An army raised without proper regard to the choice of its recruits was never yet made good by length of time; and we are convinced by fatal experience that this is the source of most of our military misfortunes."

Centuries after Vegetius, another military writer evaluated the US Armed Forces. In a 31 October 1953 *Saturday Evening Post* article, Hanson W. Baldwin

opined, "Indeed service morale today—the Marines excepted—can only be described as negative." The N. Y. *Times* military editor attributed the decline in attitude to an emphasis on non-essentials.

He contended that the basic function of an armed force, to develop effective combat units, had been "subordinated." He noted that the services had emphasized re-enlistment bonuses, information and education programs, offers of security and vocational training, and other enlistment inducements instead of *esprit*.

Real Objective Forgotten

His words about the Marine Corps might well be used on a recruiting poster. "The Marines have shown that it is possible with proper policies, proper training, to rise above the ruck . . . And they live tradition; the United States Marine bears upon his shoulders the nation's past and the nation's hopes for the future."

In 1775 at Tun Tavern, a free round of drinks, a few sea stories and some hardy handshakes passed for recruiting. Unfortunately, changing circumstances have made it less intimate.

As early as 1798, Marine recruiters used newspaper advertising. A Lt Wynkoop described his technique of advertising in a town's paper before his arrival. Lt Henry Clay Cochrane, a Chicago recruiter, vintage 1866, wrote to the Major Commandant outlining his plans for weekly advertisements in the *Chicago Tribune*.

Since that time, the Corps has effectively used every communication medium. Regardless of means of transmission, its message has been the same—challenge. The message has gotten across. The public has formed a



mind's eye picture of Marines, based largely on the record and, to a degree, on our recruiting message.

Whether we like it or not, and we should, the public entertains this image of the Corps:

"You don't think of the Marines when you associate the military with learning a trade or seeing the world. You may do either in the Marines, but it's strictly secondary. Marines are and have been tough, highly disciplined fighting men, ready at all times to meet any enemy. Their casualties are expected to be among the highest. They live with their rifles, and they know how to use them. Their shoes are shined and their dress uniforms immaculate. Their military bearing reflects pride in the tradition that marks them as experts in the messy business of modern warfare."

This characterization was part of an editorial which appeared in the *Savannah Morning News* on 11 March 1957.

Any change in recruiting theme will alter the foregoing image. More important, it may change the Corps' combat performance. If the Corps changes its message, it will draw a different type of recruit. In short, if it begins to offer, it will soon attract those who want to receive. These belong on the dole, not in the Marine Corps.


The recruiting pamphlet entitled *What the Marine Corps Offers You* enumerates many inducements. Among these are education and the learning of specialties. Some of the fields cited are plumbing, baking, and musical instrument repair. Nowhere in the two-page list of specialties is the title, rifleman, even mentioned. Nowhere can there be found the words, amphibious assault.

Let's Don't Blur the Image

The public, including our youth, entertains an image of a Marine which, fortunately, does not include plumbing and baking.

The Corps has bakers and cooks. They won prominence in Korea with their rifles, not pots and pans. They were able to fight when needed because they joined to fight, not primarily to keep house.

In a November 1957 issue of *Holiday Magazine*, William Manchester wrote, "Other branches stress security, travel, a chance to learn a trade. The ultimate Marine Corps bait is a poster with a clenched hairy fist and the legend, 'You're Not Good Enough To Be A Marine.'" Since the first Continental Marine recruiting station in a Philadelphia slopchute, the Corps has been daring men to become Marines. The pitch attracts candidates who are interested not in milling machine skills or retirement 30 years hence, but in status."



1stLt O'Connor (USMCR) thinks November a good month to remind Marines ("in a small way") that the Corps attracts a different breed of young man. Since this is so, why, he asks, must we "compromise our recruiting policies?" There's only one reason why a young man joins the Marines, says the author: "Because he wants to be a Marine." Lt O'Connor decided he wanted to be a Marine after graduating from St. John's Univ (Brooklyn) in 1956. Before release to inactive duty he was a PltComdr 3/8, ExO of 3/8, ExO of 2/6, CO of G/2/6, CO N/3/1 (1st ITR). He lives in New York City.

Even if the Marine Corps wanted to, it could not honestly offer the innumerable highly technical billets of the other services.

The Corps is a unique and elite organization. Within limits prescribed by law and the ingenuity of its men, it must strive to retain its character. Unification and recruiting regulations have dictated the lowering of certain enlistment requirements. No longer may physicals be tougher than those of other services. National policy directs the acceptance of enlistments from each GCT group.

These restrictions mean little if our recruits still have desire. Men who want to serve can be trained.

Now, if ever at all, recruiting posters and literature must challenge. The Corps can discriminate among enlistment candidates by selective advertising. It can send its message to the type of man it wants.

Procurement that stresses the Marine Corps role, its pride and *esprit*, its challenge, will pay dividends. It will appeal to those who want to be Marines. It will eliminate the unmotivated before they reach the recruiting office. Selective advertising will minimize time and money spent on disciplinary problems caused by disillusionment.

More than any other service, the Corps stresses individual quality in contrast to vast manpower. It has always emphasized the proper training of the individual. With equal care, it must insure the selection of the proper recruit.

American youth has not changed so much that it has lost its pride. Youth will still answer the Marine Corps' challenge.

USMC



Wrong at That


As part of the usual crash program attendant to preparing for an IG inspection the CO had his men fall out without arms and walked through the ranks asking questions he thought the IG might ask.

"How many counts does it take to get the rifle to left shoulder arms," he asked a corporal.

The Corporal was a little hesitant so the CO told him to simulate the movement. The Corporal did it correctly counting aloud the four counts.

As the CO moved on to the next man we were startled to hear the Corporal count four again, loud and clear. This time he simulated returning the piece to order arms.

\$15.00 to Capt G. A. Rilling



P.I. TODAY

By George McMillan

✿ NOBODY EVER ACCUSED THE PROUD OLD MARINE CORPS of being indifferent to the uses of publicity. But, as all of us do sometimes, the Corps goofed the other day. It issued what it thought was going to be a dull, routine press release, and woke up the next morning to find the story on page one across the nation.

The story described some changes in the Marine fitness program. These amounted to some new strength tests, and a weight control program under which a Marine can be hospitalized if he fails to get the fat out of his waistband.

That is not exactly the stuff of headlines, even at a time when the whole country seems to be diet-crazy. There had, in fact, to be something else—and there was.

Behind the headlines stood the two words, Ribbon Creek. Editors and the American public have not forgotten how Marine Sgt Matthew McKeon led his recruit platoon into the waters of that creek on 8 April 1956 and left six of them behind, drowned, in a pointless tragedy.

McKeon's later conviction did nothing to answer the question which his defense raised into a raging national controversy:

Was brutality necessary in the making of that classic mold, the United States Marine?

Nothing has happened in the nearly four years since McKeon's conviction to answer the question satisfac-

torily. The Marine Corps has remained silent for what are probably its own good reasons.

Thus the question is still a good one. How has the Marine Corps answered it? What has the Corps done about its "medieval," "sadistic," "bestial," training methods since 1956? Has it gone back to its old ways? Or has it "softened up"? Has it taken the bite out of its training—and the fiber out of its men?

The simple answer is that the Marine Corps has done neither. It has discovered that the alternatives with which it seemed to have been faced in the public forum were not the real alternatives it faced on the drill fields of Parris Island.

The Probe Went Deep

In these four years the Marine Corps has probed into every minute aspect of what has been going on at its South Carolina base. In a spirit of ruthlessly honest self-examination, that in itself deserves praise, the Corps has reviewed everything—from the smallest squad drill maneuvers to the most far-reaching and intangible aspects of its traditions and institutional characteristics.

They are agreed now, from general to private, that they know what went wrong and they are sure, as only Marines can be sure of themselves, that they have righted it.

"It was McKeon who was wrong, and not the system

at Parris Island," one of the Corps' highest-ranking officers told me recently.

"There was nothing wrong with Parris Island until guys like McKeon fouled it up," a chevron and service stripe-encrusted Marine sergeant said to me.

The more they have examined, the more they have sought to rationalize it, the more sure Marines became that their training system—whose mainsprings they had never really looked critically at before—was good, even magnificent, in its essentials.

It had simply turned sour through neglect—that was what Ribbon Creek proved, that and nothing else.

By 1956, Marines, in the haste of expanding for two wars, had forgotten the warning in Capt Flagg's classic directive to Sergeant Quirt:

"Feed 'em up and give 'em hell," the Captain rasped in the drama, *What Price Glory?* about WWI Marines. "Teach 'em where they are. Make 'em so mad they'll eat steel rather than get another dressing from you. Make 'em hard but don't break 'em."

Today that last sentence might well be hung over the gate at Parris Island. They are making them hard down there without breaking them.

For those who say it can't be done the answer of one Marine is this:

"What's happened at Parris Island is like what happened to professional football," he said. "The less brutal and dirty it got, the faster, the tougher, and the better it got."

"The Marines we are turning out at Parris Island today can cut the mustard with any Marine who ever lived and fought," says one of the sharpest mustard cutters who ever wore the Globe and Anchor, the present Commandant, General David Shoup.

Parris Island in 1961 is not a radically different or changed place from what it was the day McKeon led his men past the rifle range out into the creek on their fateful march. In appearance, it never was a military snake pit.

In its outward shape and structure Parris Island is very much like, say, Great Lakes, the Navy boot center, or Fort Jackson, S. C., one of the Army's basic training centers. It has a typical military organization with a base commander and a Recruit Training Regiment. There are four recruit training battalions and, under them, the usual echelons, ending with the recruit platoon, usually made up of between 60 and 70 men.

The 12-week training program (3½ forming days and 68 actual training days) is worked out to the last minute. Of the total of 565 training hours, 455¾ go to instruction in military subjects while the remaining 109¼ hours are spent in administrative activities.

The program is divided into five distinct phases. In the first (Forming Period) a recruit gets his military clothes, takes his shots, take aptitude tests, and is interviewed by a psychiatrist. In the second (Basic Recruit Training) he learns close order drill, care of his clothing, the rudiments of military justice, military customs, first aid, and guard duty.

In the third (Marksmanship Training) the recruit goes to the Parris Island rifle range for three weeks to learn to fire infantry weapons. In the fourth (Messman Training) he does a week of mess duty. In the fifth (Advanced Recruit Training) he gets a conditioning

The Marines they're turning out at Parris Island these days are better than ever before. That's the conclusion of former Marine Combat Correspondent McMillan after paying a visit to his old troop and stomping grounds.

hike, an overnight bivouac, learns hand-to-hand combat, and undergoes some final physical strength tests.

It is designed to produce a Marine, to create situations which force a man to accept a wholly new identity.

Parris Island is designed to produce a disciplined fighting man whose outlook is professional—as against another kind of training which accepts the lesser goal of simply guiding the civilian through a temporary military metamorphosis.

The difference between Parris Island and other military schools is in *quality* of discipline (and discipline is not the same thing as brutality) it teaches and exacts. It is the Army man who boasts of the trials of physical endurance he has undergone in his training—the 40-mile hikes, for example. The Marine remembers the instant obedience and precision he was expected to show in a march around the block.

As Thomason Put It

The instrument that creates this difference at Parris Island is the same today as it has always been. It is (as Col John W. Thomason saw the process in WWI) "the old breed of American regular," regarding "the service at home and war an occupation," who transmits his "temper and character and viewpoint" to the recruits.

Today as then the image of the old breed at Parris Island is the drill instructor—the famed "DI" who has been the subject of two feature length films, a dozen magazine articles, and hundreds of thousands of words in the nation's newspapers.

Under his electrifying and exacting tutelage the formal phases become dynamic. As the pre-McKeon DI manual put them, and as today's DIs still execute them, they are transformed into: "Shock," "Awakening," "Reasoning," and "Group Association."

It is an intense and ego-jarring experience for the recruit. "But it's not brain-washing," a Navy psychiatrist assigned to Parris Island told me. "The psycho-



Mr McMillan is a free lance writer who is particularly deft with Marine Corps subjects. One reason might be his close association with the Corps during WWII (as a Combat Correspondent). He authored "The Old Breed," a comprehensive history of 1stMarDiv during WWII. What about the "new breed?" He

wondered, too, and on assignment for NY Times revisited his old boot camp. What he found probably won't have Old Breed readers weeping with nostalgia but it's an up-to-date report on how today's Marines are cast to fill a role that really differs little from 1775.

logical content of the DI-Boot relationship is constructive and very positive."

In his paraphrase, the *mystique* of the DI, and the Parris Island training, is this:

"First the DI says, 'You are nothing!'"

"Next he says, 'Be like me, if you can!'"

"Then he says, 'Be like me, and be a man!'"

"And finally he says, 'If you can be like me, and be a man, you're a Marine!'"

The overall scheme was good, no doubt about that. Parris Island turned out 41,000 men during WWI, including the heroes of Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood; it turned out 205,000 men in WWII, including the heroes of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan and Iwo Jima; and it turned out 138,000 men during the Korean war, including the men who marched back from Chosin Reservoir.

In the past three years the Corps has bent itself to the task of saving for the DI his awesome authority while rooting out every reason that might cause him to abuse it. Almost all of the changes at Parris Island, and there have been many, can be traced to this objective.

If, for example, brutality is not an essential of the DI's scheme, precision and snap in *everything* are vital. Excepting the Eightballs and Knuckleheads, there are always some men who honestly cannot maintain the pace the DI must set.

Today at Parris Island elaborate steps are taken to see that the DI does not have to put up with these men. He can pack them off the minute they flag. He simply dispatches them to the Special Training Branch. There the inept boots are assigned either to the Strength Platoon (where they are taught to use their muscles); the Motivation Platoon (where they carry on a limited military training program while undergoing a series of psychiatric interviews); the Conditioning Platoon (where fat boys are slimmed down and thin boys fattened); to the Special Instruction Platoon (where slow learners get special instruction); or to the Hospital Platoon (for men who turn out to have undiscovered physical defects). When a man is considered fit—and not before—he is sent back to a regular recruit platoon. If he is not capable of making the Parris Island pace he gets a discharge.

One of the things that bred trouble in the old days

was the fact that the DI got no relief. A dynamic, 24-hour-a-day job, it was too much for one man. Today at Parris Island *every* platoon has three DIs—one senior and two juniors who get intermittent breaks.

In the past Parris Island was Siberia for an ambitious Marine NCO. Naturally it did not always attract the best; some simply weren't qualified for the DI job. "Everybody used to tolerate these offbeat characters," a Marine told me. "Today guys like that can't exist here."

For one thing, they can't *get* there. Today's DIs are selected by teams of doctors, psychiatrists, and officers who travel to other Marine bases to interview the cream of the NCO crop. It has become an honor to get the DI assignment, and a tour of duty at Parris Island has become a high mark in the eyes of promotion boards.

For another, they couldn't stay if they did get there.

The whole administrative structure of the recruit battalions has been fleshed out with full complements of officers and NCOs. One of the important new echelons is a "series lieutenant," an officer who maintains close supervision of four platoons.

One of the DI's daily worries in the old days was the job of trying to teach a variety of specialized subjects like field sanitation, gas warfare, etc. Today he has been relieved of that, and the job is done by a special teaching staff—in air-conditioned classrooms.

"Our recruits today are capable of learning something, and we give them something to learn," a Parris Island captain told me proudly. "They even take six weeks' tests, just as if they were in high school."

Now that the dust has settled, and the issues can be more clearly seen, there can be little doubt that Parris Island is a far better institution than it has ever been, and that it is turning out better and more rugged Marines.

Of course, no Marine on earth would ever admit that. It's not in the nature of the creature to do so. Ask a Marine about his tour at Parris Island and he'll insist nobody ever had it as tough as *he* did.

There is an old Marine squad room story that illustrates this point, and says a lot about Marine *esprit*:

When the first American Marine was recruited at Tun Tavern in 1775, he was told to report aboard a ship then lying in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The officer of the deck had never heard of a Marine.

"You go aft and rest against the bulkhead until I figure out what to do with you," he ordered.

Soon the second Marine reported aboard, and the O. D. gave him the same word.

When he joined the first Marine, however, he got this timeless greeting:

"Boy, you shoulda been in the *old* Corps."

This is the kind of thing that never changes, nor probably ever will as long as there is a Marine Corps.

When I visited Parris Island recently I stopped by to see a friend of mine who "went out on 30" and is living by choice near the base. I asked him how things were going over on the island.

He looked at me ominously.

"Mind you," he said, "I'm not making a federal case or anything. But I'll tell you that things are gettin' sloppier and slacker over there all the time. It's not like the old Corps."

USMC



Translation from *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 19 October 1960

The day at the US Marine Corps training base at Parris Island began as usual. Companies and platoons were assembling. Sergeants were loudly shouting their commands. Marines, yawning and huddled together to protect themselves from the cool morning breeze, were taking their places in the ranks.

- Education platoon, halt!
- Strength-building platoon, halt!
- Illiterates, attention!

In response to these commands, one platoon falls in—a platoon of sullen youths, Marines with degenerate faces, cut-throats with roving eyes and smirks on their faces. Nearby, a sergeant vainly tries to line-up another platoon, three tenths of whom are recruits with “chicken necks,” stooped shoulders and arms hanging like loose ropes. Outwardly, the Marines in the third platoon look normal. But one cannot see in their faces that they can barely read or write and that the only notion, if any, that they have about arithmetic is the equation “one dollar plus one dollar equals two dollars.”

After some time the company was finally lined-up. Sergeant Wilkins commanded, “Forward March,” and the platoons moved out for their training.

What is this strange company which has appeared at the Parris Island training base? This unit was organized at the beginning of 1959. Officially it is designated the 1st Special Training Company. Unofficially, among the base personnel, it is better known as the “reform unit” or the “company of dubious recruits.”

The company consists of three platoons: general training, strength-building, and elementary education. Recruits who, prior to their enlistment, demonstrated a lack of discipline or immoral behavior or who were

convicted of crimes are assigned to the first platoon. The second platoon consists of physically underdeveloped, puny, sickly Marines. The third platoon—these are the semi-literate and illiterate recruits.

As is known, the US Marines are assault troops. The Corps fulfills the role of gendarme-police forces which the US imperialists have used in the past and intend to use in the future for frightening the workers of its country and in the fight against national-liberation movements in colonial and dependent countries. From the Pentagon point of view, Marine Corps contingents have always been the most trustworthy. Only the select, politically and physically, have joined this widely publicized and privileged Corps in the past.


The decision to establish these “special companies” imbues the military commands with optimism. With bureaucratic optimism, the *Army-Navy-Air Force Register*, for example, states that three fourths of the “dubious recruits” become “good soldiers” after completion of training in the special companies. It is necessary to understand what is meant by the term “good soldiers.” To the ruling circles and militarists in the US, this means a senseless killer, prepared, on orders, to commit any crime. It can be seen that such soldiers are being developed in the US out of the morally bankrupt “seekers of false ideals,” out of semi-literate ignoramuses.

While the American diplomats at the General Assembly and in the committees of the UN vainly attempt to dress the bosses of the “cold war” in the fake robes of peace makers, it is not silently that these commands fall at Parris Island:

- Education platoon, halt!
- Strength-building platoon, dress!
- Illiterates, attention!

US MC

Philippine Marines



Eleven years ago this month, the first Philippine Marines began boot training—and spent the last eight weeks of the course in combat

By Carl Strandberg

BORN IN THE HEAT OF NATIONAL TRIAL, AS WAS OUR own Marine Corps, the first Philippine Marines were in combat before they finished boot camp.

The need for a Marine Corps was recognized early in 1950 by the late President Ramon Magsaysay, who was then Philippine Secretary of Defense. Recognition of the need brought action and the Philippine Marines came into being on 7 November 1950.

Formed as a ready sea-borne force to fight dissidents and outlaws, the Marines were trained and equipped to conduct landing operations against strongholds accessible only from the sea.

The Republic of the Philippines in 1950 was locked in a life or death struggle against Communist-inspired Hukbalahap guerrillas. The Marines came into being at the height of the campaign to fight alongside other branches of the Philippine Armed Forces.

The initial unit organized was a company. Designated the 1st Marine Company, it adopted the 13-man USMC squad as its basic unit. Platoon and company organization was kept flexible to suit local situations and probable missions.

The 1st Marine Company consisted of six officers and 230 carefully selected enlisted men. When the unit was organized, it was supposed to receive 24 weeks of intensive training before seeing action. This was not to be. The Marines spent their last eight weeks of boot camp in action against the enemy.

Most of the 230 volunteers who made up the enlisted strength of the 1st Marine Company were NCOs in the Philippine Navy. Most of them were also WWII veterans of the Philippine Scouts or the Philippine Army. The rest were high school graduates selected from

among several thousand applicants by competitive examination.

Commanding officer of the original 1st Marine Company was then Lt Manuel A. Gomez, a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, the Off-Shore Patrol Training Center, and the Armored School at Fort Knox, Ky. During the early days of WWII, Lt Gomez served as a Junior Officer of Q-Boat 112, fighting against the Japanese during the Bataan Campaign. After the war, prior to formation of the 1st Marine Company, he was the Philippine Navy Intelligence Officer.

Lt Gomez kept the command until 1952 when he was relieved by Lt (now Commander) Gregorio L. Lim, who had been Executive Officer since Organization Day. Commander Lim still commands the now much-larger Philippine Marine Battalion.

The Huk Campaign

In the Anti-Dissidence Campaign (operations against the Huks) the original members of the 1st Marine Company operated mainly with battalion combat teams of the Philippine Army. The Marines participated in every major operation undertaken. In some instances, they operated alone for extended periods, supported by ships of the Philippine Navy. Today the colors of the Philippine Marines fly the streamers of both the Anti-Dissidence Campaign and the Jolo Campaign that followed.

On 7 November 1955 the Marine Battalion, Philippine Navy, was activated. It was organized similarly to a US Marine battalion, slightly modified to suit prevailing conditions and requirements.



US Marines have helped train Philippine Marine Corps since it was organized in November of 1950

Now a major unit of the Navy, the Philippine Marines have three principal missions:

(1) To provide Marine Forces of combined arms for service with ships of the Navy. (In this capacity they are charged with the conduct of land operations essential to Naval campaigns. They may also, in this capacity, act to augment other branches of the Philippine Armed Forces.

(2) To provide security detachments aboard Naval vessels, stations, and bases. (In this mission they are charged with maintaining discipline, law, and order.)

(3) To develop landing force tactics and techniques for amphibious operations in coordination with other units of the Philippine Armed Forces.

These duties, it will be seen, closely parallel the missions of the US Marine Corps.

The Philippine Marines rely on the Philippine Air Force for air support, as do all other elements of the nation's Armed Forces.

Officers of the Marine Battalion are Philippine Navy general line duty officers with infantry training. Presently, 80% are graduates of the Philippine Military Academy. They receive advanced training in both Philippine and US service schools. All are volunteers.


Enlisted Marines are all volunteers, also. All must be at least high school graduates. Selection is accomplished by competitive examination and a series of rugged physical endurance tests.

After acceptance, fledgling Philippine Marines are assigned to a special training unit within the Marine Battalion. Here they receive 14 weeks basic and progressive unit training. Specialist training is given to selected members at certain Philippine Navy and Army service schools. Some Philippine Marines also attend US service schools.


Philippine Marines and US Marines have cooperated in many training exercises. In 1952, after continuous field operations since their organization, the 1st Marine Company was retrained by a small USMC detachment provided by COMNAVPHIL.

Recent coordinated training exercises have included amphibious operations with the 3d Marine Division, and training in amphibious reconnaissance with the Division's recon battalion.

US MC



Many joint exercises have been held. These are Philippine and 3dReconBn Marines at Subic Bay.



Terrorist Activity In Malaya

By J. A. C. Reynolds

✦ FROM JANUARY 1955 TO DECEMBER 1957 I SERVED IN Malaya as a lieutenant in the Federation of Malaya Police. Having spent nearly three years in the country, I was particularly interested in Maj B. F. Meyers' *Malaya Jungle Patrols* in the October 1960 GAZETTE. I firmly share his disappointment over lack of contact with the Communist Terrorists (CTs). Many times I suffered such disappointments myself.

During my stay in Malaya I was attached to the Number 3 Police Field Force. I commanded the 4th Platoon.

There were seven such Field Forces in Malaya at that time. Number 3 was based at Setapak, five miles outside Kuala Lumpur in the state of Selangor. These Field Forces were para-military organizations. They were developed to seek out and destroy an enemy who was retreating deeper into the jungle due to increased patrol activity of the Security Forces. Made up of groups formally known as jungle companies, these Field Forces were to become the elite of the Federation of Malaya Police. They specialized in deep jungle penetration. Their primary task was to locate and eliminate Terrorist hideouts, supply dumps, and food production centers. (The CTs often cultivated areas of the jungle for food production.)

The Number 3 Police Field Force was composed of a headquarters company and 11 operational platoons. The Force was commanded by Deputy Superintendent of Police, J. V. Garrett. The platoons were commanded by Police lieutenants and inspectors.

Each platoon was made up of a platoon commander, platoon sergeant, orderly, runner, two radio operators, and three sections of one corporal and ten men each.

When operating in jungle where visibility is limited, automatic weapons are the most practical. And as Maj Meyers pointed out, contact with the CTs was apt to be extremely brief. For these reasons platoon firepower was based on the following weapons: three automatic Bren Guns (.303 cal), one per section; six semi-automatic shotguns (12 gauge), two per section; eight automatic Stirling LMGs (9mm), two per section and one each for platoon commander and sergeant. The rest of the platoon carried US M-1s and M-2 Carbines except the radio operators, who carried Webley Revolvers (.38 cal.)

In addition to basic weapons, M-38 hand grenades and a two-inch mortar were carried. The latter (intended for illumination) was seldom used.

The pack used by Police Field Forces was similar to the "Bergen Pack" described by Maj Meyers except for a metal frame. It is interesting to note that this frame, which supports the pack, frequently got tangled in the foliage, impairing movement. A similar problem faced the wearer of army jungle boots, which had a "hook type" front not unlike Marine combat boots do. These hooks also became entangled and often tripped the wearer. Police boots didn't have hooks.

Operations undertaken by the 3d Police Field Force lasted from five days to as long as two months. Platoons were re-supplied by air, courtesy of the RAF, which also operated the helicopters used to lift platoons into their operational areas.

Use of air support in Malaya was limited until about 1955 when the idea of bombing and strafing Terrorist hideouts became an obsession, so to speak. The Royal

For nearly three years before he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1958 the author fought Communist Terrorists as a lieutenant in the Federation of Malaya Police. Here he renders a first-hand account of jungle tactics used on both sides.

Australian Air Force, using a system of converging radar beams, proved to be formidable. Thousands of pounds of bombs were unloaded on suspected CT hideouts. The only flaw in this method was that the Air Force had to rely on accurate map references supplied by the unit requesting the bombing. Since this was not always properly complied with, aircraft frequently missed their targets.

Primary jungle has a thick canopy of tangled foliage about 200 to 250 feet above the ground. This canopy, plus the huge trees found in primary jungle, can form a force powerful enough to deflect a 500-pound bomb as much as 400 feet away from its original point of entry into the canopy.

But despite the drawbacks, bombing in Malaya was successful—and a definite morale breaker. I recall the statement of one surrendered CT who had experienced a near-miss bombing raid a week before. He said the blast had lifted his nine comrades and himself (who were sleeping at the time) approximately eight feet into the air. It was the first time they had experienced a bombing and it had such an effect that three of them left their unit and surrendered.

Tactics employed by Field Force platoons varied, of course, to meet particular situations. General practice, in areas suspected to be occupied by CTs, was for patrols to adopt the "walk ten, listen five" method—i.e., walk ten minutes, stop and listen for unusual noises for five minutes. This method was almost always used by the CT himself. On three occasions we were rewarded with contacts. Twice during these listening periods we heard

the sound of chopping (also mentioned by Maj Meyers), and once the sound of loud coughing.

The action taken by the platoon on these three occasions netted us five kills and two captures. It is interesting to note that the coughing we heard was caused by a CT suffering from acute TB.

If I were ever asked what is the most important thing to remember while operating in the jungle, I would say: SILENCE!

Ninety-five percent of the CT force was made up of Chinese; the other five percent was a mixture of Malays, Javanese, etc. Their leaders were, and undoubtedly still are, hardcore Communists. The remainder was a mixture of Communists and Communist sympathizers, some of whom wanted out but were afraid to leave. Their leaders were brutal when it came to dealing with would-be-deserters and non-believers.

CTs have the ability (either through fear or belief) to endure tremendous hardships. As the pressure was put on by Security Forces, their activities became limited. They were constantly on the move. They had little or no food. Many were riddled with disease. Syphilis, TB, malaria, and typhus were widespread.

One Terrorist leader named Ho Lim Seng, who operated his dwindling platoon in the state of Selangor, was totally blind as a result of syphilis and had to be led about by the hand. This man insisted on giving an hour-long lecture on Communist doctrine to his platoon every night.

As a result of the 18 odd years some of the CTs had spent in the Malayan jungles, they were highly experienced. They moved with great care, concealing their tracks with a skill that sometimes baffled the "Iban" trackers we often used. When attacked they scattered to the four winds and later assembled at a pre-arranged point.

When the CTs were in an aggressive mood, or needed weapons or ammunition, they could be responsible for some of the most diabolical ambushes devised by man. Home-made mines were often employed. Bamboo spikes concealed in the vegetation, on which ambushed platoon members might impale themselves while seeking cover, were also used. When laying an ambush, the aim of the CT was 100% annihilation. They often achieved



Author, front and center, with part of his platoon



Sgt Reynolds (USMCR) was born in England in '35, grew up in West Australia (Perth), joined the Marines in Seattle in '58, served a three-year hitch at Camp Pendleton. He now lives in Pasadena, Calif. How he spent his time from Jan '55 to Dec '57 is the subject of his article. Five years ago this month as a lieutenant in the Federation of Malaya Police he was fighting Communist guerrillas in the jungles of Malaya. He wrote of his personal experiences after reading Maj Bruce Meyers' "Malaya Jungle Patrols" (Gazette: Oct '60).

"If I were ever asked what is the most important thing to remember while operating in the jungle, I would say: SILENCE."

this. Upon completion of a successful ambush the CTs would naturally feel elated and sometimes took time out to mutilate the bodies.

More than once our patrols blundered into CT camps, sometimes with favorable results. Swift action on the patrol's part might result in total or partial annihilation for the surprised CTs. Often, however, an alert Terrorist sentry would spot the patrol, kill the leading man, and by doing so warn the camp of the presence of Security Forces in the area.

Another common practice was for the CTs to place one of their sentries in a tree. He would have a series of vines hooked up between his post and the camp. By tugging on the vine he could warn the camp of an approaching enemy. The CTs might then attempt an ambush, thereby turning a possible attack into disaster.

In event a Terrorist camp was located by a patrol, the patrol leader had two courses open to him. He could attack, or return to the platoon CP, report the camp location, and go back with a larger force. In either case the attack would probably get underway at dawn. This time produced the best results. The CTs generally abandoned the use of sentries at night, since movement in the jungle is practically impossible without excessive noise.

This was the attack procedure. We moved as close as possible to the CT camp, before darkness, always allowing for the probable presence of enemy sentries. At first light a half encirclement of the camp was at-

tempted by the attacking force, which was divided into three parts. The central sector contained the attack force. Left and right sectors laid down a base of fire which was lifted by a pre-arranged signal. The attack force swept rapidly through the camp, laying a wall of concentrated fire before it. The attack force continued to pursue any fleeing CTs for at least 500 yards, then returned to the camp, warning of their approach by a prearranged signal (usually whistle blasts). A hasty defense was then set up, and an immediate search of the camp site undertaken. Dead and probable wounded were counted. When possible, wounded CTs were taken care of and turned over to a special branch for interrogation.

All documents and items of interest were removed from CT dead and wounded, and carefully wrapped in a bundle. A landing zone was cleared by means of collapsible chain saws and Parangs (machetes.) Documents, dead, and wounded were then "heli-lifted" out for identification.

During the three years I commanded the 4th Platoon, the platoon accounted for 11 kills and three captures; destroyed 16 food dumps and three food production centers; and generally assisted in the crushing of Communist aggression in Malaya. We spent 20 months in the jungle to achieve these results. Throughout this entire period the 4th Platoon suffered only one battle casualty.

USMC

★ ★ ★ ★


Highly Recommended

THE LIEUTENANT COLONEL IN THE NEXT OFFICE supervises recruiting in 13 mid-western States. This includes officer procurement. He has all the attributes necessary for success in his job, including a sense of humor. This attribute sometimes gets buried and reappears at unexpected times in different ways.

One dark afternoon when the quotas were running high and the recruiters were toughing it out, the colonel came into my office. He had been screening applications for Officer Candidates Class when he came across a letter of recommendation he insisted I read.

It came from the applicant's former employer, a contractor and Naval Reserve officer who knew what the Marines were looking for. It went something like this: "John is highly recommended for the Marines. I served as a Naval Officer during WWII and saw many Marines. When John first came to work for us on the construction job, we were digging a lot of deep ditches. John worked hard and dug pretty good. It rained often and John had to stand around in mud and water. He adjusted to this easily and did not complain very much. I think he will make an ideal Marine."

\$15.00 to LtCol Roger D. Peterson



BASEPLATE

Mc GURK



High school grad? Rent past due? Wife expecting?
Mother-in-law expected? When it comes to his men, a good
leader has the answers

ONE EVENING RECENTLY, WHILE WAITING FOR THE Ale and Quail Club to assemble, I decided to take advantage of a rare opportunity: have a long chat with Bertram-the-bar-keep before the premises became cluttered.

"Bertram," I said, "let me ask you something. During and since the Second War, there's been a lot of research and thought given to Leadership. As a result, we know more about it. Now, here's my question: how did you characters in the Old Corps maintain such high discipline and esprit since you didn't know nearly as much about leadership as we do?"

Bertram carefully inspected the brandy snifter he was polishing and casually asked, "How many men in your platoon are high school graduates?"

"Beats me!" I said, "but don't try to tell me you had better educated troops in your day."

"How many of your squad leaders have financial or personal problems?" Bertram persisted.

"Now wait a minute, dammit!" I said, feeling kind of foolish. "What's this got to do with leadership? I might not know this trivia, but I sure know how to lead my platoon. Believe you me, Cousin, I know leadership principles from aardvark to zymurgy!"

"Not in my book you don't," Bertram growled, "but don't feel bad—few of your playmates do either. Some of you will learn in time the one principle most often ignored. Then again some will never learn. Most often a young idiot simply grows into an old fool."

"Spare me your homespun philosophy and get specific," I snorted.

"O.K., put it this way," Bertram said laying down his bar rag and taking his driver's license from his bill-

fold. "This little paper doesn't mean I'm an authority on automobiles. Likewise your commission doesn't mean you're an authority on men."

When I nodded in agreement, he continued, "Now a hot mechanic knows more than just how to drive his car. He knows everything there is to know about it. When it starts to act up, he can spot trouble before it develops into something serious. Once found, he knows what to do about it."

By this time Johnny and Tex had joined us and were listening attentively. Even Paddle-foot Pinkleton had checked his nightly assault upon the popcorn. The joint was as quiet as a general's anteroom.

Relentlessly, Bertram then posed some real gassers.

"How many of you," he asked, "really know everything there is to know about every man-jack in your platoon? If you don't have this information, how can you spot trouble before it develops into something serious? Furthermore, if it does develop into a real personal crisis for one of your men, how can you take appropriate action if you have no 'feel' for him as an individual?"

"I hate to admit it, but I guess Dusty is the only one who can qualify," Johnny said slowly. "He keeps a separate 'dope' card on each man in his platoon."


"Right!" Tex agreed. "Whether or not his system is the best doesn't really matter. Main thing is: he always knows everything he needs to know about every man in his outfit."

"Well, Mr. Baseplate," Bertram said proudly, "there's your answer as to how we in the Old Corps muddled through. Maybe we didn't know a lot of the high sounding names for what we did. But one thing for certain: we sure as hell knew our men!"

US MC

FMF 1965

Proposed Organization and Major Equipment



H&S COMPANY AMTRAC BATTALION

CONCEPT—Organized to provide for a BnHq, Comm Sect, Service Support units, CoHq, Mine Clearing Plt (provides LVTE1 for use by combat engineers), and a Maint Plt.

Comm, firepower, medical and service units function in operational roles with entire battalion; are normally employed in support of tactically disposed AmTracCo and AmHowCo.

MISSION—To provide battalion CO with facilities for effective command and control; to provide service support for subordinate elements of battalion.

COMMUNICATIONS—Limited to telephone and messenger.

FIRE POWER—Battalion-level fire power consists of 12 LVTE1 each having line charge and a M73C MG.

Security elements are armed with light infantry weapons for defending Bn CP against infiltration by small groups of the enemy.

MOBILITY—Provided by organic LVT (AmTracSect) and by trucks and small GP vehicles organic to MT Sect.


MAINTENANCE—All elements of company provide their own organizational maintenance (1st echelon) on assigned equipment. 2d echelon maintenance is provided by MaintPlt on vehicles, LVTs, and ordnance (less fire control instruments).

Comm Sect maintains all battalion comm equipment.

ADMINISTRATION—S-1 Sect maintains personnel records for battalion; in combat, when required, furnishes Marines for division administrative center.

MEDICAL—Bn Medical Sect provides emergency treatment, prepares battalion casualties for evacuation, operates field dispensary, supervises measures for control and prevention of disease.

SUPPLY—Supply Sect provides for distribution of supplies received from division; CoHq handles supplies for internal support of H&S Co.



AMTRAC COMPANY

CONCEPT—Consists of CoHq and four AmTrac Plts, each having 10 LVTP5. Company is employed to land and carry inland the assault elements of one BLT, less D/S artillery; with help of other AmTrac Plts can include D/S artillery.

Company may be employed to augment other AmTracCos.

COMMUNICATIONS—Voice radio plus messenger, wire and visual devices. Company voice radio net links with AmTracPlt Hq; AmTracPlt has organic tactical voice radio net linking platoon commander with individual LVT.

FIRE POWER—Provided by one M73C MG mounted on each LVT. Co Hq has light infantry weapons for local security.

MOBILITY—Provided by LVT on land and water. Land mobility is augmented by organic wheeled vehicles.

INTELLIGENCE—AmTracCos collect information by direct observation and uncovering the enemy and materiel. There is no specialized recon or surveillance capability within company.

SUPPLY—Carries a basic load only.

MEDICAL—Provided by battalion.

MESSING—Capable of providing company mess in garrison and field.

AMHOW COMPANY

CONCEPT—Consists of CoHq and three AmHow Plts, each having six LVTH6. (Two per section.)

Company is employed to provide direct fire support for surface landing of one MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force).

Each platoon provides fire support for surface landing of one BLT.

Company or platoons provide field artillery fires in support of operations ashore, and direct fire support to mobile task forces.

COMMAND AND STAFF—Organized to permit company to operate in support of MEF, or individual platoons to operate in support of separate RLTS or BLTs.

COMMUNICATIONS—Same as AmTracCo.

FIRE POWER—Provided by weapons of 18 organic LVTH6. Each LVTH6 has a 105mm howitzer, a M73C MG coaxially mounted with main armament, and a 50cal MG.

MOBILITY—Same as AmTracCo.


INTELLIGENCE—Same as AmTrac Co.

SUPPLY—Same as AmTracCo.


MEDICAL—Same as AmTracCo.

MESSING—Same as AmTracCo.

PROPOSED



"M" SERIES



MEDIUM TANK COMPANY

CONCEPT—Consists of CoHq and four platoons of five tanks each.

Company is employed to provide shock power, assault and antitank fire power to infantry. Normal employment is in support of an infantry regiment. Company may be employed as part of tank battalion or with other tank companies.

MISSION—To provide combat support for Marine infantry units, using mobility, fire power and shock to close with and destroy enemy forces.

COMMUNICATIONS—Voice radio plus messenger, wire and visual devices. Company voice radio net links with TkPlt Hq. TkPlt has organic tactical voice radio net linking platoon commander with each tank.

INTELLIGENCE—Same as AmTrac Co.

FIRE POWER—Provided by weapons of 22 organic tanks. Each tank has 90mm gun, M73C MG, coaxially mounted with main armament, and a 50cal MG.

CoHq has light infantry weapons.

SUPPLY—Carries basic load only.

MEDICAL—Provided by battalion.

MESSING—Capable of providing company mess in garrison or field.

HEAVY TANK COMPANY

CONCEPT—Consists of CoHq and four platoons of five tanks each.

Company is employed to provide heavy antitank and assault fire power to division. Company may support infantry regiment, division as a whole, or be employed as part of tank battalion.

MISSION—Same as MedTkCo.

COMMUNICATIONS—Same as Med TkCo.

INTELLIGENCE—Same as AmTrac Co.

FIRE POWER—Provided by weapons of 22 organic tanks. Each tank has 120mm gun, M73C MG, coaxially mounted with main armament, and a 50cal MG.

CoHq has light infantry weapons.

SUPPLY—Carries basic load only.


MEDICAL—Provided by battalion.

MESSING—Capable of providing company mess in garrison or field.


NEXT MONTH—FMF 1965 winds up in December GAZETTE with a look at proposed Engineer Battalion (H&S Co, EngSuptCo, and EngCo).

EDITOR'S NOTE—Major points of difference between current structure of Tank Battalion and that proposed are addition of one MedTkCo (four platoons) addition of a fourth platoon to existing three TkCos; placing TkBn in division T/O. To overcome ammo resupply problem of having 120mm tanks in division, planners have recommended providing proposed TkBn with ten 5-ton trucks.

PROPOSED



"M" SERIES





OBSERVATION POST



This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment: \$30. Length: 250-950 words.

New Approach to Leadership Training

By Capt E. H. Utley

ALL OF US IN OUR MARINE CORPS careers have had experience coping with actual leadership problems from which we have learned a lot not taught in school. Problems may have occurred when we took over our first platoon, squad or PX, or when we ourselves were on the short end of the stick. Perhaps some of these problems came up later in our careers at a time when we really thought we knew the ropes. All of us can think of one or two past situations which were of real significance. Multiply this by fifty or sixty thousand, and we can see that there is a wealth of experience available to Marine leaders as a group.

A philosopher many years ago defined a fool as someone who learned only from his own experience. We are mighty foolish if we don't make use of this available material.

The way to use it is through study of leadership by case method. This method has probably gained its widest acceptance in the graduate schools of our best known universities. That doesn't mean that there is anything especially complicated about it. Industry has used this same method to develop and train its lowest level of foremen. A few hours of instruction or study plus a few do's and don'ts will put almost any intelligent instructor in the business.

Army, Navy and Air Force have used this method through filmed cases, but this requires a movie hall, projector, operator and screen. Although the case method could be readily used in formal school training, particularly Basic School and NCO schools, we need it in its simple, written form so that it can be used during a "break" in the field or while embarked aboard a transport as well as in garrison.

What is the case method? It's simply using a factual account of a real (but disguised) incident which required some form of leadership action. Often only the facts are presented with no hint of the action taken. If the action taken is

presented, it is usually the wrong one; the student must present a better solution. There are often a few questions at the end of the case to stimulate discussion, but there is *never* a "school solution."

Cases are discussed by groups of contemporaries. They must be categorized according to the level of leadership that they are aimed at: NCO, SNCO, company or field officer. They should concern problems which the student might reasonably expect to meet—not bizarre, once-in-a-lifetime events.

In discussing cases, facts (most of the time there are too many) must be sifted to bring out those which actually bear on the problem. All possible solutions are considered. The student gets a chance to try his wings when his mistakes don't count; he learns the importance of developing facts.

He does this himself, the instructor acting only as a moderator. However, the role of the instructor must not be underestimated. He must be prepared to guide skillfully the discussion by use of questions so that all important points are covered.

Problem in getting the ball rolling is in developing case material. It could be done in at least three ways. First of all, the Marine Corps might publish case-books as a training aid. Or major commands and formal schools might make their own for their own use. Or you can "do it yourself," but be warned that writing worthwhile cases is harder than it might seem, and a moderate amount of library study in the use of the method will be required.

USMC

H&HS 17, 1stMAW
FPO, San Francisco

Commander's Check List

By 1stLt T. C. Johnson, Jr.

Why is it that many commanding officers fail to screen Marine personnel who are assigned to fill school quotas; particularly highly technical, extended courses of instruction at Joint Service Schools? It appears that, in many cases, primary consideration is given to filling "a quota" and secondary consideration to the individual and his qualifications.

To illustrate my point I cite the Petroleum Products Analysis Course which is a fourteen-week Army class conducted by the Petroleum Department, Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia. Since 1956 a total of 73 Marines have been enrolled and of this total 20 have failed to satisfactorily complete the course. It is significant that the reason for failures in 15 of these cases stems from an inadequate background in the prerequisites set forth in MCO 1500.12A. In other words, these men should not have been assigned to the course and expected to complete it.

Assigning individuals to a technical course, or for that matter, any course which requires a substantial background, with "token screening" is a waste of Marine Corps time and money. It is certainly an injustice to the individual who through no fault of his own is committed to a task beyond his capabilities.

It is suggested that commanding officers responsible for filling these quotas review their current policies in this area and alter them to an extent which will permit the Marine Corps to yield a return on their professional education investments and will give the individual marine a "square deal."

USMC Liaison Office
Ft Lee, Va.

Tradition: Curse or Blessing?

By GySgt A. W. Szuch

TRADITION. WHAT IS IT?

The dictionary defines tradition as the handing down of customs, beliefs from generation to generation. The recruit is exposed to a manual which exhorts him to consider tradition as much a part of his equipment as his pack and rifle. Another publication, for officers, speaks of tradition with almost religious reverence, in fact uses the analogy of religious pageantry to hallow tradition. Is military tradition a necessary spiritual equipment, or is it an ancient anathema which should be exorcised?

In this present world our duty is to survive. The rapidly developing technology of death precludes the carrying of unnecessary impedimenta, spiritual or physical. We cannot lag with one foot in the past and one in the present. We must keep one foot in the future.

Tradition breeds conservatism which begets stagnation; we need dynamism if we are to survive. Independence of thought is stifled, and imagination strangled by the tentacles of tradition.

We all know that thinking is difficult, that reverie and recall of the pleasant past is easy because the mind tends to forget unpleasant happenings. How easy to fall back on the past, the old school solution, time honored and tried. The easiest methods are not always the best as it is natural to take the least line of resistance. How often we hear of the old way. Let's look at some areas where the dead hand of tradition holds.

TRAINING

Approximately nine hours of recruit training is used to teach tradition and history. Sample questions: "What Marine officer made the first outside loop?", "Who was Bigfoot Brown?", etc. Not enough time is allotted to properly clean weapons, or to teach supply economy, etc.

How many hours are devoted in marksmanship training on positions with the loop sling, of sight adjustment? How often is this used in field firing, in combat? A study to implement a more realistic firing technique would save money, time, lives and produce more enemy casualties. Let's train Marines to fire under all conditions; not at known distance targets from set positions. Colonel West's article (GAZETTE: Oct '60) proposes a Transition Course. A forward step. This would probably mean a change in weapon design, (the "new" M-14 is but a hybrid of the M-1 rifle and the M-2 carbine.) New weapons would create new tactics, new tactics would

produce new concepts, a chain reaction we could surely use.

Our present CMC wisely laid the controversial squad drill to rest, but how often do we hear the wails of some mourners—DIs who should know better. Most of us have forgotten the meaning and purpose of drill, Lt Rider in *What You Can Do About Drill* (GAZETTE: Dec '60) makes an imaginative iconoclastic proposal. How many hours are used at various posts and stations on rehearsal and execution of parades and reviews?



FMF Landing Force, Circa 1934—"can't afford to waste time on past glories, methods and equipment."

To impress whom? Is this pomp and ceremony necessary or can we not be a symbol of alert readiness without it like the city fire department?

UNIFORMS

Why do we cling to some of the old uniform designs and colors? Khaki was great for the British fighting in arid spots of India. What about the jungle in Laos? Incidentally, the British use a sock material over 100 years old. As hungry as the textile industry is for new business it is inconceivable that it cannot produce a durable serviceable material for a field uniform far better than any we have worn in the past. As for design, if specifications were drawn for a uniform deleting the traditional folderol and furbelows that commemorate or venerate some event, individual or vestigial uniform of the past we could have a uniform which would be functional for fighting. Let us relegate the expensive befrogged, epauletted dress uniforms to the museum. We now have 4 or 5 types of footwear in the supply system; a field shoe with a detachable gaiter would eliminate three of them. Any ideas? Overcoat, raincoat, trenchcoat, great coat, parka or boat cloak? In 1954 we resurrected another anachronism—the sword—when we should have been thinking about fire power. How many valuable hours are spent practicing to flourish this museum piece?

Modern methods need records and reports on which to base budgets, determine results, but must everything be printed, multi-produced, and filed for posterity? Why must every upper echelon order be paraphrased, requested and amplified by each echelon down to the company? How many reports are the result of a one-time question by some curious or clever IG or his representative? Once we made a forward step in paperwork efficiency when the PA Form NAVMC 10274-PD was initiated. What

a wonderful statement: "Its use only limited by the imagination of the originator." What happened to the rubber stamp endorsements, the pen changes? The traditionalist quill driver had to bring back the old time-honored perfect military epistle; otherwise, someone might take his coffee cup away and give him a rifle. Paper management reports are interesting if not entertaining reading, IF you are not one of the reporters. Bring in the modern simplicity of good efficient writing, not the archaic language of long ago.

SUMMARY

Time is one thing we haven't got plenty of, thus we cannot waste time on the past glories, past methods, fight wars with weapons and tactics of yesteryear. Let's look forward not back. Let's hear of the old tradition once a year on November 10th and teach the new Marine new methods so he in turn will think of newer ones. How many for formal guard mount, or Mess Night? How about a seminar on Soviet tactics? Tradition is great for furniture or hand crafted rugs, but not for an organization that must keep the free world free. Do you agree?

USMC

WTB Range Co
MCRD, San Diego



OBSERVATION POST

CONTINUED

Let's Keep 81mm Mortar

By 1stLt Leon Cohan

☛ **WHATEVER HAPPENED TO 81MM MORTAR?** I recall several months ago *GAZETTE* asked readers where the best place was for 4.2" mortar or HowTar, infantry or artillery regiment? That this question should be posed indicates to me that

81mm mortar is not doing its job. And with this I couldn't agree more.

But let's put the blame where it belongs—not on the weapon, but on our misuse of it, particularly in training Marines to use it.


With the exception of size the 81 and four-deuce are very similar. Both use the same sight, the same methods of laying, same fire commands, FO procedure; and both FDCs have many techniques in common. Yet 81 platoon commanders are assigned indiscriminately with no previous training except inadequate familiarization at Basic School. The situation with SNCOs is even worse. Any 0369 is considered eligible for duty as section leader. Contrast this with the artillery crew chief who started out as last ammo man and has 6 to 10 years experience on the gun. I'm well aware that any infantry man is inherently superior to any artillery man, but this is carrying it just a little too far. I won't press this further, however, because with the present system of stabilized input battalions, a mortar platoon could be properly trained, on the job, from scratch. It's just more difficult and wasteful of time.

I recommend assigning SNCOs a mortar MOS, either primary or secondary, and keeping them in that job. Also some type of prior schooling for officers assigned as mortar platoon commander. I further recommend a three-point program for all crew served weapons:

- 1) More live fire (this includes increased ammunition allowances and improved range facilities).
- 2) Competition.
- 3) Recognition. Competition and recognition are the very backbone of our small arms program, yet do you ever remember seeing the picture of a machine gunner or mortar Marine being awarded a prize for good shooting? What better way to increase unit pride and instill teamwork and precision than to pit the mortar platoon of one battalion against that of another? Why not have competition for the top mortar squad in the Marine Corps?

It is my belief that a properly trained and employed 81mm mortar platoon would be ready, willing, and able to satisfy any battalion commander and leave the four-deuces available for the Sunday punch. USMC

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Weigh Your Words

By Capt R. E. Andrews

OUR READY-TO-MOUNT-OUT RIFLE COMPANY carries over 400 pounds of *required* paper work and related equipment. How do I know? I weighed 'em on a set of bathroom scales!

Publications and directives weighed in at 185½ pounds.

SRB's, IRC's, files, forms, field desk, logs, typewriter and a minimum of administrative apparatus completed the surprising total.

Eyeing the ominous pile of paper and paraphernalia, I lacked the heart to weigh our training manuals and supply records.

Conclusion: More words than we can carry.

The Marine Corps is aware of the problem and is probably testing all sensible solutions. We know that most spontaneous solutions are impractical. For example: using smaller print on thinner, lighter paper; distributing fewer or abbreviated directives to fewer

companies; replacing paper with microfilm, tape recordings or television.

Gradually our own attention turned from the paper, the gear and the procedure, and focussed on the real villains: the WORDS. For, after all, the intangible, nearly weightless words are the heart and purpose of the entire 400 pounds.

Glancing through directives, we easily divided the words into two groups. Words requiring action or giving essential information we placed in one group. In the other group fell words which repeated well-known, written authority, dealt with the obvious, the nice-to-know, the unnecessary and the jargon. We estimated that with the right diet the 185½ pounds of words could be trimmed to a lean and mean 75 pounds—easier to carry and to obey.

With a few slight changes to the Marine Corps Directives System, the weight-conscious originator could function as

follows:

1) Write the *Purpose* paragraph. Then, sure that you know why you are writing the directive, discard the *Purpose* paragraph. For addressee the *Subject* line is enough.

2) Write the *Action* paragraph. Remember: accuracy, brevity and clarity.

3) Ask yourself: Is there anything else that anyone must know to carry out this directive, or that everyone doesn't know already? If the answer is "yes," rewrite the *Action* paragraph or consider other means of broadcasting the extra words—verbally, GAZETTE, or in a Marine Corps newspaper. But first, whip through the Navy Regs, The Marine Corps Manual and other publications to make sure that your extra information isn't common knowledge. If the answer is 'no,' sit back and admire a work of military art.

USMC

E/2/1 1stMarDiv
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

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News Roundup

1stMarBrig's 1stSqd, 2dPlt, H/2/4 literally brought home the bacon after taking top honors in 4th Annual Unit Marksmanship Competition at Quantico. SqdLdr Sgt Paul A. Dean, MCA Trophy gently cradled under one arm, used his other hand to present a pound of Virginia-cured bacon to his Bn CO, LtCol R. C. Kuhn. . . . 3d 105mmHowBn (Birmingham, Ala.) is enrolled *en masse* in MCI, surely biggest group study ever attempted by a Mar Corps unit, regular or reserve. . . . Autumn chill means little to Maj R. D. Sears' 1stReconBn, after two-weeks at Pickel Meadows. Bn stayed warm scaling lofty Sierra-Nevada peaks.

Operation SILVER SWORD trying something new in amphibious exercises, planned to kick off an assault on Maui beaches one minute after midnight. . . . Many 3dMarDiv Marines will see and hear their loved ones this Christmas via remote control; dependents in CamPen area should contact base ISO for family photo and to record message to be aired on AFRTS (Armed Forces Radio and Television Service), Okinawa. . . . Air reserves are now using "buddy training system" year around: CherPt's VMT-1 sent three pilots in F9F-8 to NAS, Floyd Bennett Field, N. Y.; while there they trained pilots of VMF-131, 132 and 313 in instrument flying. Normally regulars and reserves train together only during Reserve summer training. . . . Those four enlisted Marines serving on GySgt selection board are: SgtMaj Andrew Panuska, MGySgt Charles R. Heard, 1stSgt John J. Grzeskowiak and MSgt Lowell D. Wilcox. First two are voting members. Board is expected out 1Dec61, with names of 1,800 new GySgts. . . . LtCol J. S. Chambers' 1/5 were aggressors for Operation SAND STORM, an action-packed training thriller at 29 Palms. Opposing: Col C. T. Hodges' RLT-1 (4,000 Marines), supported by fighters, helicopters (Col E. E. Anderson's MAG-36) and attack aircraft of 3dMAW. LtCol J. L. Cooper, 1stMarDiv ISO reports the exercise was well named: "Winds up to 50mph blowing sand into food, water and rifles. Soaring daytime temperatures of 110 degrees, dropping to 50 degrees at night."

A 190,000-Marine Corps is in the bag as far as 1stMAW is concerned; 1,000 of its Marines said they would extend overseas tours in answer to HQMC query. Is duty that good in Iwakuni? You better haha breeve. . . . 20 pilots of HMR-161, including CO LtCol E. F. Price, have completed carrier reguals aboard USS Princeton. . . . First Ontos airlift was successful. Doing the job: LtCol D. E. Pierce's 1stAntiTkBn aboard GV-1 from CamPen to San Clemente Island. . . . Wheel fuel cells (they look like giant dual tires) holding 1,000 gal of gas are being tested by 2dServBn and 2dAntiTkBn at CamLej. These rubber tankers can be towed by 2½T truck, five in a series. Fuel is tapped either by gravity or hand pump. . . . One of MajGen R. K. Rotter's last duties while CG, 2dMAW: Presenting CNO Annual Safety Award to VMGR-252 (Since getting GV-1 22 Sep). Award was for 11,633 accident-free flying hours. Accepting: Col B. G. Myking, Sqd CO. . . . LtCol J. D. Smith, Jr. and his 3/5 are back at CamPen after transplacement tour with 3dMarDiv. . . . First MAG-31 squadron to report for duty at MCAS, Beaufort: VMA-324, commanded by LtCol J. H. Wilkinson. At press time the new squadron had eight A4D, formerly belonging to VMA-224 at Cher Pt. First group commander of new MAG-31 is Col William Lundin. . . . USS Thetis Bay (LPH-6) was set to join Atlantic Fleet 1Nov61. Since converting from escort carrier to helicopter platform she has been in the Pacific. USS Valley Forge (LPH-8) shifts from Atlantic to Pacific. One reason for the shift: Valley Forge is faster, can span Pacific quicker in an emergency. . . . CMC has okayed formal school training for VTUs (inactive reserves). A pilot program has been started at Long Island University. . . . Army has awarded two contracts (\$9 million) to Raytheon Co for engineering service on Hawk missile system. . . . About the same time General Electric got a \$5 million contract for Sidewinder guidance and control sections. Sidewinder, an air-to-air missile, has been in the Corps arsenal for several years.

When 2/11 enroute from CamPen to 29 Palms for SAND STORM, got tied up in traffic they sent a message to Banning, Calif., Lion's Club to keep its snack bar open "until convoy arrives." Message was fastened to a beer can (used), dropped by helicopter. Snack bar stayed open.

NROTC Changes

Two changes to NROTC program, another being tested.

Hereafter, "regular" students will be just that. By law they must apply to resign after completing obligated service (five years). This is same rule as service academy graduates.

A "contract" student must now serve three years, not two. This does not apply to those now in the program.

The test (at University of California) will offer a summer program to qualify college students to enter NROTC contract program in junior year. They now join for four college years, but only regulars are paid during first two.

Management Improvement

Hoping the paymaster will make a mistake in your favor?

In FY '60, at least \$222,000 wrong payments were made. But Disbursing On-Site Examination program (begun in 1959) caught them early.

Use of a pencil to correct OCS enlisted IRC cards after commissioning is now allowed. It saves 4,000 "pieces of paper."

To get "more fight from our plight" FMF units will have to handle 1,500 military billets to help MCBs and MCASs. Planners don't think it's the best solution possible, but . . .

Needed: A Ship Stretcher

There's a lot less "listlessness about our listlessness" but it still takes a lot of shipping to land a fighting team on a foreign shore.

G-4 planners, looking ahead at programs for the next 10 years, found more bunk spaces, but less cargo space. Old EmbarkOs know that could be critical. Solution: stretch the ships?

It's being tried. BuShips experts think possibly 40 feet could be added (mid-ships) to the 510-foot LPD without needing more power. It would double available cargo space. They're checking it out.

186 Years Young

It's just what I wanted: a real LPH. USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2), first of its kind (there is no LPH-1), ought to make a good birthday gift from Uncle Sam to the Corps that has "more fight than we can ferry." You know how it is with getting fast delivery on gifts, but Iwo Jima should make it.

As of press time, figure filberts calculated she was 97.8% completed.

★ General Officers ★

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Berkeley, J. P., CG, MCB, CLNC.
Hayes, C. H., Dep C/S (Plans), HQMC.
Lucky, R. B., CG, FMFLant.
Mangrum, R. C., CG 2dMAW.
Rottet, R. K., Dir, MCEC, MCS, Quant, Editor-in-Chief, Gazette.
Weller, D. M., Dep Cdr FMFPac.
Wieseman F. L., CG 2dMarDiv.

Transfers

Wieseman, F. L. 9903
Fr HQMC
To FMFLant By3Nov

Colonels

Permanent Promotions

Deatrick, G. B. Sep
Reshian, R. Sep
West, H. B., Jr. Sep

Temporary Promotions

Baughman, L. D. Sep
Campbell, R. A. Sep
Curtis, W. W. Sep
Dowell, C. H. Sep
Fisher, T. H. Sep
Grady, T. T. Sep
Hahn, P. H. Sep
Hay, H. Sep
Irish, H. J. Sep
Leineweber, T. M. Sep
Maas, J. B., Jr. Sep
Maguire, J. B., Jr. Sep
Matsinger, H. Sep
Payne, J. S. Sep
Peltzer, V. A. Sep
Prowell, J. P. Sep
Sachs, C. A. Sep
Teller, R. W. Sep
Wolf, G. F., Jr. Sep

Transfers

Harris, A. W. 9906
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To MCRD SDiego
Roach, M. E. 9906
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To HQMC
Thompson, E. N. 9906
Fr Stf CINCEUR
To 3dMarDiv By1Dec

Deaths, Retired

Beam, J. L. 29Aug
USNH Key West Fla

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Adams, H., Dir, DivSchools, 1stMar Div.
Altman, S. J., Ass't CofS, G-2, 1st MarDiv.
Andruska, B. J., Ass't CofS, G-2, FMFPac.
Bruford, R. S., Ass't CofS, G-2, FMFPac.
Carey, J. F., CO, MAG-16.
Kelley, P. W., CO, MTS-253.
Knapp, H. E., G-4, CLNC.
LaHue, F. C., Ass't Dir, Jr School, MCS, Quant.
Lavel, J. W., Engineer Liaison Officer, Okinawa.
Maas, J. B., Jr., ExO, MCAS Beaufort, S.C.
Moore, J. B., G-4 Officer, FMFPac.
Picardi, R. J., Depot SpecSer Off, MCRD, San Diego.
Rickett, R. W., Base Inspector, MCB, CLNC.
Stallings, R. L., Ass't CofS, G-1, FMFPac.
Stewart, F. R., Jr., Ass't CofS, G-1, MCRD, PISC.
Watkins, W. M., CO, H&HS, MCAS, Beaufort SC.
Wycawski, R. W., Wing Inspector, 1stMAW.
York, H. A., Ass't CofS, G-3, MCRD, San Diego.

★ Lieutenant Colonels ★

Transfers

Ervin, R. M. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To FMFPac
Faught, R. T. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To NAS Alameda
Legan, S. F. 3002
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To MCSC Barstow Cal
Lindsay, J. A. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To 3dMAW
Mabry, C. J. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To MCS, Quant
Matsinger, H. 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To 1stMarDiv
Page, L. L. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv WDNov
To MB NB Subic Bay
Vaughan, W. P. 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To MCS Quant
Voss, W. G. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To MCAF Santa Ana

Retired

Anderson, R. L. 7304
2dMAW 30Sep
Doyle, G. B. 7335
HqBn HQMC 31Oct
Fogg, J. E. 0802
HQMC 30Nov
Shoop, W. G. 0302
HqBn HQMC 30Sep

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Williams, F. L., Jr. Sep

Deaths, Reserve

Owen, C. B., Jr. 18Sep
St. Petersburg, Fla

Deaths, Retired

Hatfield, G. D. 6Sep
Coral Gables Fla

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Atwater, W. L., Jr., CO, VMF(AW)-15.
Beasely, C. B., H&HS-2dMAW.
Doty, W. C., Ass't Dir 1stDiv Schools.
Holmgren, E. S., Instructor, Sr School, MCS Quant.
Hurst, T. C., CO, MABS-24.
Kohler, W. J., Ass't CofS, G-4, 1st MarBrig.
Pickle, K. B., ExO, WTBn, MCRD, San Diego.
Prescott, R. E., CO 3/5.
Wilkinson, J. H., CO, VMA 324.
Yerkes, D. W., PubGroup, MCLFDC, MCS, Quant.

Permanent Promotions, Reserve

Kennedy, A. J., Jr. 019477
Owensby, T. C. 019545
Williamson, J. C. 010409
Coleman, G. F., Jr. 017375
Reigel, L. W., Jr. 018270
Stinson, T. D. 018792
Schreiber, E. J. 018804
Roscoe, J. H. 020796
Bopp, J. M. 020389
Tara, J. M. 020573
Rockwell, W. C. 018747
Armstrong, F. G. 020349
Thompson, E. B. 020581
Price, J. R. 019344
Hanner, W. B. 020435
Parker, J. F. 020379
Reall, A. C. 020523
Adam, J. B. 020409
Keller, R. D. 020551
Kelley, D. W. 020519
Parmenter, G. E. 019341
Cameron, J. A. 020370
Miller, B. W. 023739

Landenberger, M. A. 020823
Mulligan, J. J. 018172
Rummans, W. D., Jr. 018724
Baldwin, W. R. 018292
Audette, E. A. 016735
Chilcott, R. E. 014488
Self, K. C. 017361
Gadmer, C. J., Jr. 019965
Greely, J. U. 018661
O'Connor, J. J. 018488
Garriott, J. P., Jr. 019163
Burkard, J. W. 021919
Boonen, S. P. 048504
McDonald, T., Jr. 020331
Clifton, E. R., Jr. 020326
Simmon, H. K. 020334
Sackett, E. W. 019578
Meadows, C. S. 019525
Vanschooneveld, W. H. 019615
Rodd, W. G. 019570
Schlossberg, H. B. 019581
Lipton, M. H. 019501
King, S. W. 019483
Dunlevy, J. J. 019413
Depalma, J. J. 019405

Majors

Transfers

Brown, W. P. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To 3dMAW
Cavalero, J. H. 1302
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To MB NS SFRan
Cook, R. H. 7335
Fr MCAF Santa Ana WDNov
To 1stMAW
Cowie, F. G., Jr. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDOct
To MB NS SFRan
Crowley, R. W. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To MCS Quant
Davis, P. L. 3302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To 3dMAW
Foster, T. J. 7336
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To 2dMAW
Gardiner, J. C., Jr. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To 3dMAW
Geissinger, R. S. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To MCB 29 Palms
Gill, J. R. 7332
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To 2dMAW
Golleher, G. M. 1803
Fr 6th MCRRD WDNov
To ForTrps FMFLant
Goodiel, C. D., Jr. 0802
Fr USS Canberra WDNov
To FMFLant
Hodde, G. V. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To 3dMAW
Hoffman, R. W. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To 2dMAW
Hudson, F. G. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv WDOct
To MB NS SFRan
Kelly, J. G. 7305
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To MAD NATTC
Maas, P. A. 0130
Fr 12th MCRRD WDNov
To MCS Quant
O'Callaghan, T. P. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To MCRDep PISC
Parsons, T. D. 0302
Fr 9th MCRRD WDNov
To 3dMarDiv
Ritter, D. L. 7333
Fr MCAS Kaneohe Bay WDNov
To China Lake Calif
Roberts, H. G. 3302
Fr MCAS El Toro By18Oct
To MCS Quant
Robinson, K. L., Jr. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To Vallejo Calif
Sherwood, J. H. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To 1stMarDiv
Somerville, D. A. 7335
Fr Buweps WDNov
To 3dMAW
Stuckey, H. B. 7305
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To 2dMAW

Wears, L. G. 3002
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To MCB CampPen

Retired

Gilmore, R. G. 0302
MCRDep SDiego 30Sep
Kylander, W. F. 7335
MAD NAATC NAS CorpC 30Nov

Permanent Promotions, Reserve

Adamowitch, C. Sep61
Adams, F. W. Sep61
Albert, W. G. Sep61
Allen, F. P. Sep61
Anderson, E. A. Sep61
Anderson, G. R. Sep61
Anthonisen, N. C. Sep61
Anton, A. J. Sep61
Baker, J. Sep61
Ballentine, F. J. Sep61
Balzer, V. A. Sep61
Barber, W. N. Sep61
Barron, H. L. Sep61
Barton, T. J. Sep61
Bass, L. N. Sep61
Bechtol, W. H. Sep61
Bennett, E. D. Sep61
Benton, C. W. Sep61
Benton, B. L. Sep61
Best, H. H., Jr. Sep61
Betts, J., Jr. Sep61
Biehl, J. W. Sep61
Billingslea, R. K. Sep61
Billings, J. L. Sep61
Blackwell, W. R. Sep61
Blomness, D. Q. Sep61
Blum, R. W. Sep61
Bobik, J. Sep61
Bohner, R. J., Jr. Sep61
Bontempi, W. D. Sep61
Botsford, H. G., Jr. Sep61
Bourg, E. J., Jr. Sep61
Bourke, T. E., Jr. Sep61
Bradshaw, J. M. Sep61
Brimberry, D. L. Sep61
Brooks, H. H. Sep61
Brown, R. Sep61
Brudzinski, A. Sep61
Campbell, J. L. Sep61
Cannon, F. K. Sep61
Chiarazzi, G. T. Sep61
Chop, C. J. Sep61
Clise, A. H. Sep61
Cook, W. L. Sep61
Craddock, J. W. Sep61
Darling, W. W. Sep61
Davis, R. B. Sep61
Davis, R. H., Jr. Sep61
Davis, T. L., Jr. Sep61
Dawson, H. C. Sep61
DeCamp, L. W. Sep61
DeCamp, J. M. Sep61
Dean, B. T. Sep61
Demeter, R. F. Sep61
Devlin, W. Sep61
Dodson, G. W., Jr. Sep61
Doherty, T. C. Sep61
Doherty, J. R., Jr. Sep61
Dulworth, E. V. Sep61
Ellickson, D. L. Sep61
England, E. V. Sep61
Eskell, L. W. Sep61
Fisher, J. W. Sep61
Flaherty, M. F. Sep61
Fontaine, C. C. Sep61
Freeman, R. H. Sep61
French, J. H. Sep61
Friedrich, R. E. Sep61
Gaines, W. S. Sep61
Gertz, J. A. Sep61
Gibson, R. J. Sep61
Gilchrist, L. W. Sep61
Gillespie, W. B. Sep61
Gleason, J. C. Sep61
Godfrey, F. E. Sep61
Goodie, W. F. Sep61
Gregory, K. E. Sep61
Griffith, T. J., Jr. Sep61
Grue, L., Jr. Sep61
Hall, N. G., Jr. Sep61
Hardaway, R. J. Sep61
Hand, H. G., Jr. Sep61
Harding, C. O. Sep61
Haring, D. G. Sep61
Harnner, H. L. Sep61
Hersch, J. E. Sep61
Hibbett, J. A., Jr. Sep61
Holaday, R. E. Sep61
Hollis, A. B. Sep61
Holmes, D. C. Sep61
Hope, H. F., Jr. Sep61

Hopkins, R. A.
Horn, R. M.
Hornung, J. W., Jr.
House, F. C.
Hudson, J. B.
Jackson, F. R.
Jackson, J. J.
Jackson, W. H.
Jacobs, H. E.
Jelcick, E. D.
Jenks, S. C.
Jobusch, W. E.
Johnson, D. F.
Johnson, C. F., Jr.
Jones, R. D., Jr.
Kebeck, A. B.
Kelley, J. M.
Keller, R. E.
King, T. M., Jr.
Klein, J. P.
Knapp, J. E., Jr.
Knight, J. E., Jr.
Kovach, A. J.
Larson, A. L.
Larson, R. W.
Leboeuf, J. W.
Lee, E. S.
Lehm, F. M.
Leighton, V. L.
Lisman, M. O.
Logan, C. P., Jr.
Love, E. W.
Lowe, J. H., Jr.
Lynch, W. R.
Maltese, D.
Martin, O. P.
Matthews, C. C.
McCarthy, D. F.
McCain, H. A.
McDevitt, F. J.
McEachern, D. R.
McEvoy, J. K.
McGee, J. B.
McMahan, H. L., Jr.
McMeans, H. L., Jr.
McQuay, T. E.
McRae, O. C.
Mirth, R. F.
Mitrushl, P. P.
Molle, E. P.
Montgomery, C. W.
Moreski, J.
Morgan, A. M.
Muller, K. E.
Murphy, E. F., Jr.
Murray, J. W., Jr.
Nielsen, A. G.
O'Brien, B. J.
O'Brien, W. E.
O'Connor, R. P.
Owen, R. L.
Pauls, A. A.
Pollock, O. K.
Pugh, D. H.
Quinn, J. J.
Ramage, A. B.
Reilly, R. B.
Richardson, P. R.
Roth, J. M.
Ryan, J. J.
Saari, M.
Sagehorn, J. K.
Sanders, R. P.
Sands, E. A.
Saturday, H. K.
Schall, R. S., III
Shannon, C. M., Jr.
Shaw, J. H.
Shelley, A. G.
Sherbondy, W. E.
Shick, J. N.
Sims, J.
Sinclair, R. G., Jr.
Skinner, D. P.
Slagle, M. F.
Sloan, M. E., Jr.
Smith, H. M., Jr.
Snodgrass, M.
Sparrow, J. T., Jr.
Speary, W. A.
Sprows, R. A.
Stead, B. L.
Steele, R.
Strybing, E. H.
Suser, G. E.
Tenney, H. M., Jr.
Tharp, M. J.
Thomas, D. H.
Thompson, R. H.
Thompson, D. D.
Tracy, J. F.
Urquhart, J. C.
Utegaard, J. H.
Vaughan, C. H.
Vogel, J. F.
Walde, M., Jr.
Watson, L. M., Jr.
Watts, E. L.
West, B.
Wetterborg, G. P.
Wildner, F. O.
Wildman, R. H.
Windsor, O. H.
Wines, F. A.
Witte, H. E.

Sep61 Wolcott, J. A.
Sep61 Wood, A. T.
Sep61 Wright, T.
Sep61 Wrynn, J. J.
Sep61 Zimmerman, D. A.

Selected for Promotion

Sep61 Smith, E. L.
Sep61 Keim, R. M.
Sep61 Pearce, J. T.
Sep61 Rash, R. S.
Sep61 Fenton, D. L.
Sep61 Dorsey, J. A.
Sep61 Edelmann, G. J.
Sep61 Rowe, C. D.
Sep61 Cline, R. W.
Sep61 Bland, R. L.
Sep61 Rooney, J. J.
Sep61 Fink, G.
Sep61 Muller, G.
Sep61 Crew, E. B.
Sep61 Riffe, J. C.
Sep61 Berger, E. J.
Sep61 Bowen, R. E.
Sep61 Artak, E. J.
Sep61 Hart, H.
Sep61 Armstrong, C. B., Jr.
Sep61 Williams, R. M.
Sep61 Fornonzi, B. A., Jr.
Sep61 Coleman, T. A.
Sep61 Hodde, G. V.
Sep61 Oglesby, E. D.
Sep61 Ritter, D. L.
Sep61 Davis, R. R.
Sep61 Willis, R. L.
Sep61 Maloney, E. S.
Sep61 Slaton, C. H., Jr.
Sep61 Geissinger, R. S.
Sep61 Waskom, W. M.
Sep61 Takala, D. O.
Sep61 Hinshaw, D. M.
Sep61 Sienko, W.
Sep61 Urell, J.
Sep61 Aldworth, J.
Sep61 Johnston, T. J.
Sep61 Herndon, J. L.
Sep61 Stien, L. J.
Sep61 Beach, W. L.
Sep61 Cassidy, E. W.
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Sep61 Winneberger, G. L., Jr.
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Sep61 Eldridge, W. W., Jr.
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Sep61 Huffstutter, H. V., Jr.
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Sep61 Williams, L. F.
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Sep61 Smith, J. B.
Sep61 Seabaugh, P. W.
Sep61 Zorn, E. J.
Sep61 Snapper, J. N.
Sep61 O'Hara, F. J., Jr.
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Sep61 Ritter, L. C.
Sep61 Lovette, L. E.
Sep61 Stender, B. J.
Sep61 Daniel, W. E.
Sep61 Githens, D. P., Jr.
Sep61 Brown, W. P.
Sep61 Zitnik, R. J.
Sep61 Barden, A. W.
Sep61 Lels, S. F.
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Sep61 Hines, C. V.
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Sep61 Domina, W. E.

035732 Bailey, E. A.
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036489 Landrigan, J. M.
034954 Raphael, M. L.
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037415 Moritz, A. B.
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035575 Taylor, W. W.
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037094 House, A. E., Jr.
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036909 Goggin, W. F.
037101 Fisher, J. R.
039457 Barcus, P. W.
038721 Gibson, G. W.
038807 Holben, D. E.
038733 Piel, R. H.
038805 Moody, C. G.
039061 Preston, H., Jr.
039160 Clement, D. A.
039106 Kirsstein, L. A.
039128 Dyroff, W. F.
038549 Freeman, T. R.
038790 Draper, W. H.
039432 Wilcox, E. A.
037856 Vance, R. N.
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039642 Lender, S. F.
037866 Davis, M. C.
039673 Powell, J. B.
039549 McKean, E. A.
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039998 Grimes, D.
039369 Youngs, C. A.
040235 Assad, A. J.
040269 McGuire, J. L.

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045034
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045011
041981
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029849
015670
012321
021954
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Abraham, J. W., Sup Arms Sec.
MCEC, MCS, Quant
Anderson, H. L., CO Ord Maint Co
1stFSR
Blanchard, D. H., CO I&I, 1st Recon
Bn
Bodley, H. C., CO MB NAND, Seal
Beach, Cal
Craig, R., ExO 3dAmTracBn
Field, E. J., Log Sect T&T Board,
MCLFDC, MCS, Quant
Hadene, F. M., Legal Officer, MCSC,
Barstow
Hinson, W. J., ExO, H&HS-27
Kraence, F. R., OIC, MCRS, New
York
Landrum, J., Chief Range Officer,
Wpns Tbn, MCRD, PISC
McClure, M. R., EngO, MCEB, MCS
Quant
March, R. B., WarGames Group,
MCLFDC, MCS, Quant
Phillips, G. A., Ass't G-4 Officer, 1st
MarBrig
Richardson, J. J., Ass't PMO, MCS,
Quant
Sinderholm, J. K., ExO, VMD-6
Wall, T. R., CO, HqCo, H&S Bn,
MCRD PISC
Wann, C. M., Base Maint Off, MCB,
29 Palms, Calif.



Captains



Transfers


Acey, J. B. 7302
Fr 3dMAW WDNov
To 2ndCommSptBn
Allison, J. O. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To 68thRACo USMCR
Banta, W. 7305
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To NABTC NAS Pncla
Bird, N. E. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDNov
To MCB Campen

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Deyo, R. C. Fr 1stMAW To NABTC NAS Pncla	7305 WDNov	Zasio, A. R. Fr 1stMAW To 3dMAW	7333 WDNov	Magerrt, S. C. Fr 3dMarDiv To MCS Quant	0802 WDNov	W-2 Transfers					
Dominques, H. I. Fr 1stMAW To 3dMAW	7305 WDNov	Deaths, Active Duty				Freeman, E. G. Fr MB NS SFran To MCB CamPen	0130 WDNov				
Fanner, R. B. Fr 1stMarDiv To 3dMAW	7305 WDNov	Buckley, J. W. Henderson, N. C.	7335 30Sep	Miller, F. E., Jr. Fr 3dMarDiv To MCB CamLej	0302 WDNov	Kilborn, C. R. Fr 1stMAW To MCAS CherPt	6402 WDNov				
Farrar, R. W. Fr 3dMa:Div To 8th CommCo Indpls	2502 WDNov	Folliard, J. P. Henderson, N. C.	7335 30Sep	Riemer, G. D. Fr 3dMarDiv To ForTrps FMFPac	0802 WDNov	Seymour, E. F. Fr 1stMarBrig To 1stMAW	3401 WDNov				
Farrier, J. A. Fr 3dMarDiv To 1stMarDiv	1802 WDNov	Permanent Promotions, Reserve				Sheridan, L. V. Fr Intel Sch Wash DC To Port-au-Prince Haiti	0302 WDNov				
Hageman, R. A. Fr 1stMAW To 3dMAW	7304 WDNov	Shields, J. M.	Sep61	Saxon, D. W., II Fr 3dMarDiv To MCB CamLej	0302 WDNov	White, W. R. Fr 1stMAW To MCSC Barstow	2715 WDNov				
Hipp, C. A. Fr 1stMarDiv To 1stMAW	2502 WDOct	Temporary Promotions, Reserve				Permanent Promotions, Reserve					
Houser, P. S. Fr MCRDep SDiego To 8th MCRRD	0115 By15Nov	Adair, W. A.	Sep61	Scherzer, R. R. Fr 1stMarDiv To 3dMAW	2715 WDOct	Gardner, K. M.	Sep61				
Icenhower, R. W. Fr 3dMarDiv To 3dMAW	7333 WDNov	Adamaitis, W. G.	Sep61	Uzzelle, G. H., III Fr 2dMarDiv To MA DNABTC Pncla	7399 By18Oct	Deaths, Retired					
Jackson, B. N. Fr MCB CamPen To MCS Quant	4102 WDNov	Boyd, R. C.	Sep61	Wagor, J. L. Fr MCSC Albany Ga To MCSA Phila	4002 WDNov	Baldwin, H. B. USNH Norfolk Va	27Sep				
Johnson, B. W. Fr FMFLant To 1stMarDiv	0802 WDNov	Bremner, M. V.	Sep61	Deaths, Active Duty		Conroy, C. J. Denver Colo	0184 29Aug				
Johnson, G. L. Fr 1stMAW To 2dMAW	7335 WDNov	Callham, M. M.	Sep61	Edison, J. I. Gulf of Mexico	7399 20Oct	Cotham, R. B., Jr. USNH Beaufort S C	31Aug				
Keal, W. M. Fr 3dMarDiv To 2dMAW	9901 WDNov	Clark, J. L., Jr.	Sep61	Talcott, R. T. USNH San Diego Calif	7304 30Oct	Essig, H. P. USNH San Diego Calif	30Aug				
Kelley, P. S., Jr. Fr 1stMAW To NMC Pt Mugu Calif	6602 WDNov	Craig, F. B.	Sep61	Warrant Officers		Fleck, J. W. Brooklyn N Y	20Aug				
Kent, D. E. Fr 3dMarDiv To MCRD PISC	4106 WDNov	Dodd, G. G.	Sep61	W-4 Permanent Promotions		Wright, C. George AFB Calif	24Sept				
Klingensmith, C. H. Fr 1stMAW To CNAVANTRA CorpC	7305 WDNov	Edwards, C. J., Jr.	Sep61	Fields, C. J.	Sep61	Clinch, R. S. Fr 3dMarDiv To 1stMarDiv	3015 WDNov				
Lundberg, D. D. Fr 1stMAW To MCRD SDiego	7305 WDNov	Everill, P. D.	Sep61	Transfers		Fletcher, C. H. Fr 3dMarDiv To 2dMarDiv	0130 WDNov				
Margolis, M. B. Fr ForTrps FMFPac To MAD NABTC Pncla	7399 By18Oct	Gilmartin, M. T.	Sep61	Durocher, W. F., Jr. Fr 6thMCRRD To 3dMarDiv	3510 WDNov	Garibay, A. F. Fr 1stMAW To MCAAS Yuma Ariz	6406 WDNov				
Mauldin, P. D. Fr 1stMAW To 3dMAW	7335 WDNov	Harvill, W. B.	Sep61	Eley, T. J. Fr 3dMarDiv To MCB CamPen	3202 WDNov	Hodgson, D. W. Fr MB NAS Lakehurst To 2dMAW	7102 WDNov				
Melver, W. W. Fr 1stMarDiv To COM-11	0302 By1Dec	Jacobs, R. E.	Sep61	Weist, J. O. Fr 3dMarDiv To 2dMarDiv	2002 WDNov	Johnson, J. A. Fr 3rdMAW To MB NS SFran	6406 WDNov				
Nunn, M. W. Fr NABTC NAS Pncla To MCAS El Toro	335 WDNov	Kinser, G. A.	Sep61	Retired		Johnson, J. E. Fr 3dMarDiv To MCAS El Toro	3302 WDNov				
Poore, H. Fr 1stMAW To NABTC NAS Pncla	7305 WDNov	Larue, L. H.	Sep61	Gibbon, E. E. HQMC	4002 30Sep	La Rue, B. B. Fr 3dMarDiv To NSYd Portsmouth Va	3010 WDNov				
Pope, W. E. Fr 1stMAW To 2dMAW	7333 WDNov	Lewis, T. E.	Sep61	W-3 Transfers		Lichty, R. W. Fr 3dMarDiv To 3dMAW	3030 WDNov				
Rau, R. L. Fr 3dMarDiv To NAD Hawthorne New	9901 WDNov	Mattia, H. L.	Sep61	Jozwicki, H. S. Fr MCS Quant To MCSC Barstow Calif	1502 WDOct	Ross, R. L. Fr 1stMAW To 3dMAW	3060 WDNov				
Rourke, W. B., Jr. Fr 1st MAW To 3dMAW	7304 WDNov	Meredith, M. W.	Sep61	Shul, V. Fr 1stMarDiv To MB NS SFran	5502 WDNov	Sharp, D. D., Jr. Fr MCRDep PISC To HQMC	3402 WDNov				
Saenz, R. Fr MCS Quant To Camp H M Smith Hawaii	2502 WDNov	Norton, D. S.	Sep61	Stephens, H. S. Fr 8thMCRRD To MB NS SFran	3401 By9Oct	Tunison, T. E. Fr 3dMarDiv To 2dMarDiv	3010 WDNov				
Salmon, M. D. Fr 3dMarDiv To MCS Quant	0302 WDNov	Quadrini, F. J., Jr.	Sep61	Retired		Deaths, Retired					
Seymour, W. D. Fr USS Springfield To MCB CamPen	0302 WDNov	Ransom, A. J.	Sep61	Dawson, R. F. MCRDep SDiego	3030 31Oct	Cotham, R. B., Jr. USNH Beaufort S C	31Aug				
Smeltzer, G. W. Fr MCB CamLej To FMFPac	0302 By1Dec	Stimson, T. E.	Sep61	Greenspan, L. MCB CamPen	1310 31Oct						
Thompson, W. G. Fr 1stMAW To 3dMAW	7305 WDNov	Tanzman, A.	Sep61	<div>WO Selection Board Selection Board which went in session 16 Oct '61 (six to eight weeks) is expected to pick 179 WO candidates from 1,507 applicants. Col C. M. DeHority heads board, which is working on Phase I of the Corps' projected two-part WO selection plan first begun a year ago. Phase I applicants have no less than six, no more than eight years service. Those selected will attend WO candidate class at MCS, Quantico, starting 15Jan'62. Phase II WO Selection Board sits in March '62, will pick SNCOs with more than eight years service. This is the last Phase II board slated. Beginning in FY '63, WOs will come from junior ranks only.</div>							
Thompson, J. M., Jr. Fr 2dMarDiv To MB Alameda Calif	3502 By20Nov	Telles, J., Jr.	Sep61								
Tremblay, P. A. Fr 1stMAW To NABTC NAS Pncla	7333 WDNov										
Ward, C. L. Fr 3dMarDiv To 1stMarDiv	1302 WDNov										
Waters, K. D. Fr 1stMAW To 2dMAW	7332 WDNov										
Wehrell, W. K., Jr. Fr 2dMAW To MCRD PISC	7336 WDNov										
Williams, C., Jr. Fr 3dMarDiv To 1stMarDiv	1302 WDNov										

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
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How the Phantom II Affects Advanced Base Logistics

The combat value of an advanced base is directly related to the efficient use of its supplies. Defense planners, seeking to increase the combat potential of advanced bases, quickly come to grips with the economics of logistics. The two-mission Phantom II simplifies the logistic problem because this one airplane provides the capability for not only air defense, but also for long range air-to-ground strikes and troop support. Yet Phantom II support personnel and equipment requirements are no greater than for other fighters with single mission capability.

The Phantom II can effectively deliver

Sparrow III and Sidewinder missiles against air-to-air targets in addition to a full range of ground strike "iron" bombs and nuclear stores. Simply varying the armament of the Phantom II fits the advanced base to shifting combat situations in minutes, in any kind of weather, day or night.

This two-engine, two-man, Mach 2+ fighter holds world speed records for 500, 100, and 3 kilometers, has crossed the continent in 170 minutes, reached an altitude of 98,560 feet and has a dash speed in excess of 1500 mph. Combat equipped, the Phantom II operates easily from existing 5000 foot runways.



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*Phantom II Fighter and Attack Aircraft •
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